The
STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

GERMAN ATTEMPTS AT VERDUN
MERCHANT SUBMARINE · THE
GREAT SOMME DRIVE · SUMMARY
OF TWO YEARS' WAR

VOLUME X

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PART I—OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

CHAPTER I

RENEWAL OF THE STRUGGLE AT VERDUN

IN the preceding volume we have seen that the German artillery returned to the attack against the Douaumont positions on March 1, 1916, after a pause of sixty hours. This marks the opening of the second act. As the German coil tightens around Verdun their heavy guns and Austrian skodas are being placed in position only four miles away to wreck the citadel and sweep the bridges of the Meuse above the city itself. These latter, so long as they can hold them, are valuable to the French to maintain their grip on the south lines of Verdun. From their positions the German guns command the slopes of the Côtes de Lorraine and pave the way for further progress against the fortress from the east. The Meuse is in high water, making cooperation difficult between forces on opposite banks of the river, but the German lines on the west bank begin to move slowly forward under cover of the artillery fire. Here the hills are lower than those on the east side, but they are threatened by the heavy batteries of the fortress, while Douaumont (1,200 feet), on the east side, the highest hill above Verdun, commands the whole surroundings.

The Germans had taken the fort of Douaumont, and a matter of 2,000 Brandenburgers were locked up inside. Every effort of the Germans to come to their assistance had been defeated, and for the time it seemed as though the "irresistible assault" which had won the position would cost them dear.

On March 2, 1916, from 10 a. m. until 3 p. m., the village of Douaumont was covered with such a great number of shells that the Germans believed they had annihilated the defenders. They covered their heads with French helmets and attacked. Again the machine guns and the French rifles stopped and decimated the assaulting waves.

A new bombardment of the village and a new attack of the German infantry came, which, this time, was successful in taking possession of Douaumont. The French, fifty meters behind the last houses, protected all the outlets from the village, and checked the German advance.

On March 3, 1916, it was the turn of the French to bombard Douaumont. The village soon became a heap of stones. All the houses were demolished. As soon as the French were through with their artillery work, they charged the enemy. It was night. Two French battalions of selected troops threw themselves on the German barricades. All gave way before their blow. The village of Douaumont was again in French hands.

On the 4th, the Germans resumed the offensive with considerable reenforcements. A furious battle took place which lasted from daybreak until night. The village was again taken by the Germans, and the French line was reconstructed 200 meters in the rear.

The following report furnished by an officer of the French infantry was published in the Army Bulletin:

"During the night of March 1 and 2, 1916, we took our position in the Douaumont sector. The detachments of the foe which had penetrated the fortress had been able to bring up some machine guns and revolving cannons under cover of night. We had also to watch a sinuous ravine not far from the Douaumont church, whereby the enemy could creep in. Our position was somewhat difficult.

"From 2 a. m. there was a well-supported fire from heavy artillery, which tore up the ground and upset our defense works. The ground shook, the noise of the shells was deafening; dust and smoke rose in blinding clouds. All communications with the front as well as with the rear were impossible.

WESTERN BATTLE FRONT, AUGUST, 1916

"At 3.15 a. m., while the range of their artillery became longer, the Germans attacked the village simultaneously from the north, taking advantage of the ravine, and from the side issuing from the fortress and the masked positions, which we had no time to reconnoiter.

"The first body of the enemy seen by us was the one that came out of the fortress. They wore French helmets. There was a moment's hesitation in our ranks. The commanding officer C—— ordered: 'Do not shoot, they are Frenchmen.' He had barely spoken these words when he fell struck with a ball in his throat. This trick of the Germans aroused our fury. The next in command of the battalion shouted 'Never mind, shoot; they are boches.' In the meantime the latter hurried the encircling movement and tried to seize the village.

"The battalion which was intrusted with the defense of the village was no less determined to make the supreme sacrifice, despite the losses suffered through the bombardment, although it had many of its machine guns out of commission. It could be clearly seen when the Tenth Company rushed ahead on the enemy which tried to force the passage, while the left of Douaumont was threatened all the more. A frightful hand-to-hand fight ensued. The bayonets and clubs incessantly opened new gaps in the German lines. The Tenth Company fought desperately. They were finally overpowered by numbers, and we saw the last ones try to launch a new assault before dying gloriously.

"The Germans tried afterward to slip down the southwest of Douaumont. It was evident that their aim was to go to the top of the crest in the direction of the Thiaumont Farm, situated 800 meters south of the village.

"Captain R——, of the Third Company, made arrangements ments to stop their advance. A machine gun adroitly placed began to work. About 100 Germans who had planned the movement received such a spraying of bullets that only about twenty of them were able to get back, the others remained on the ground. Until that night this machine gun kept on vomiting fire on the western edge and on the southwest opening of the village, wiping out each of the numerous groups of foes appearing under fire.

Under cover of darkness the French built some barriers; and modified their front in such a way as to form a solid defensive network facing the east. Everything was foreseen in order to hold the enemy in check.

"Otherwise the night of the 2d and 3d of that month was rather calm. The Germans worked on Douaumont and fortified themselves there, while the French were busy improving their network of trenches and communication with the rear.

"On the morning of the 3d many reconnoitering parties of Germans explored the grounds toward the southwest passage. Each time they were dispersed by fire.

"At 4 p. m. our artillery took Douaumont for its target. Our heavy guns had the right range and hit true, while our infantrymen enjoyed the deadly work immensely. We were in the front rows and the losses inflicted on the Germans repaid us to some extent for the sufferings we had previously endured.

"The unlucky village was being entirely demolished, slowly but surely. The French counterattack took place at nightfall; it was launched by two battalions of two neighboring regiments, the 410th and 414th. After a fusillade of great intensity, we heard the order, 'Forward, charge with bayonets.'

"The attack was successful; our couriers soon confirmed this success. Our first line was brought again to the front of the village.

"The Germans returned to the attack at eight o'clock. They were stopped short by our rifles and machine guns. But two hours later some new troops were thrown in the attack against us, and they too broke down before our resistance. They had shown themselves in very dense formation, and the next morning we counted about 800 corpses before the trench.

"At daybreak, on March 4, after an overwhelming artillery fire, the Germans with the help of powerful torpedoes, counterattacked Douaumont once more. I will not describe in detail the struggle from house to house, the single combats, the heroic acts of our infantrymen during this engagement which lasted nearly two hours. They received the order to station themselves at about 200 meters from the outlet of Douaumont. The enemy



FIRST ATTACK ON VERDUN

vainly tried to dislodge us from there and to take advantage of a good position which had cost them so much blood.

"While these bloody combats took place in the center of the Verdun sector, the French bent on their right during the night of the 24th and 25th at the foot of the Côtes de Meuse. They bent in this manner in order to make their front more compact. The Germans did not bother them in any way. The German forces on this side (15th Corps, 5th Division of Landwehr and 1st Division of Bavarian Ersatz) did not have to give any kind of battle, contrary to the German reports, and furthermore it took them eighteen hours to find out that the French had accomplished that bending movement. On February 28 the Germans had entered Manheulles. On the 29th the French abandoned the village of Fresnes.

"The French line passing henceforth through Eix, Moulainville, Chatillon, Ronveaux, Haudromont, had not changed sensibly since then.

"During this first stage of the battle of Verdun, the German army corps used in the offensive had been, for the most part, sorely tried. At the left of the French the 7th Reserve Corps of the Germans attacked, with its two divisions one behind the other. The 13th Division which attacked the first suffered very heavy losses during the first days of the battle. On February 28, 1916, it was relieved by the other division, the 14th.

"At the French center the 18th German Corps had placed its two divisions in line. Its right division (the 21st) toward the west and marched from the Caures Woods in the direction of Hill 344. Its left division, the 25th, had attacked on the 24th the village of Beaumont and the Fosses Woods, and on February 25th Louvemont, and had sustained very heavy losses during these combats. On the 27th said division had to be placed in second line. The 21st Division, which had done the least work took charge of its sector.

"On the French right the attack was made by the 3d German Corps having its two divisions in line: the 5th at its right toward the west, the 6th at its left toward the east. Each of these two divisions was in deep formation, which permitted the second-

line regiments to come forward automatically and take the place of the worn-out regiments.

"The elements of the 6th Division (24th, 64th Regiments and the 3d Battalion of Chasseurs) were those which on the evening of the 25th entered the fortress of Douaumont. To establish communications between the 18th and 3d Corps, the German General Staff, the night of February 25-26, 1916, detached a regiment of the 15th Corps stationed in the Woevre which had not taken part in the attack. This same 3d Corps launched the attack of the 28th. On the 29th the Brandenburgers, very much worn out, had to be placed in the rear. To take their place, the 18th Corps was supported on its left by one of its divisions, the 21st, while a division of fresh troops which had not yet taken part in the combat filled the gap. The division, the 113th, had been taken off the German detachment operating between the Meuse and Moselle under the command of General von Stranz. It was the first new unit called up again by the Germans since the beginning of the battle. As the battle progressed the German General Staff was compelled to call other units in order to fill the tremendous gaps made in the ranks of their armies. It can be seen that in proportion to the length of battle they must incessantly call new divisions from all the other fronts, after all their general reserves have been used up."

CHAPTER II

THE BATTLES ON THE LEFT BANK

IT will be seen that the desperate efforts of the Germans on the right bank of the Meuse, in the center of the battle field, had not given definite results. It is true that the Germans had taken the two first lines of the French positions, but they found themselves stopped at the third and unable to pursue their advance. They had suffered enormous losses, as is formally proved by the fact that they were compelled to withdraw their attacking corps to the rear in order to re-form them. Of the three corps which had attacked, two, the 3d and the 18th, were completely worn out.

The German General Staff was compelled to place them in the rear and re-form them with heavy reenforcements which had come from the interior, half of which were recruits of the 1916 class.

The attacking force brought by the Germans to the Verdun sector became consolidated with the army of the crown prince, which formerly held this sector.

The plan of the Germans, as we have seen, consisted of a frontal attack on the right bank of the Meuse, which would have been supported as soon as it succeeded by an enveloping movement of the two wings, but the frontal attack had not been successful. Then the Germans decided to attack the sides. They deemed it necessary to gain the positions of Mort Homme and Cumières on the left bank of the Meuse from which the French artillery took in the rear the German troops operating on the right bank.

The French occupied the village of Forges, west of the Meuse, the slopes in front of Béthincourt and Malancourt; their lines crossed the Malancourt Woods and extended in the front of Avocourt.

On the 6th of March, 1916, the Germans began to bombard the French positions from the Meuse to Béthincourt. They displayed the same abundance of material means as in the previous attacks; their heavy artillery systematically crushed the lines of French positions, fired from barricades on all the approaches that might be used for bringing forward the reserves. The village of Forges, the first objective of the Germans, was literally covered with shells during half a day.

Two German divisions, one belonging to the 6th Corps of Reserve and the other to the 10th Reserve Corps, then threw themselves to the attack. The village of Forges, situated on low ground, was difficult for the French to defend. The Germans entered it. They began to climb the slopes at the north of the Oie coast. The Germans marched slowly along the Regneville railway, then turning toward the west they marched through the ravines in the direction of Mort Homme, which constituted the main French position. One of these ravines is en-

tirely covered with trees—the Corbeaux Woods. During March 7, 1916, the Germans used for this attack an entire division, which with tremendous losses attained its objective. A terrific bombardment began for the possession of the Corbeaux Woods. At first the French had the advantage. One of their counter-attacks made with a wonderful dash enabled them to reoccupy almost all the woods. The Germans tried immediately to retake it. Their first attempt failed. On March 8, 1916, almost all the woods of Corbeaux were in the hands of the French.

But the Germans made use once more of fresh troops. They threw no less than three regiments against the woods.

At the very first roars of the cannon, the French colonel and the battalion chiefs of the regiment defending the woods were killed or wounded. The Germans were successful this time in taking possession of the woods. Then the main position was Mort Homme.

This is a double hill having a summit of 265 meters at the northwest and the main summit of 295 meters at the southeast. The road from Béthincourt to Cumières scales Hill 265 and divides it in two. When it reaches Hill 295 it encircles it and bends toward northeast.

After a lull, lasting four days, the Germans did all they could to retake Béthincourt, Mort Homme, and Cumières. They executed a terrific bombardment with asphyxiating and lachrymatory shells. At about three o'clock in the afternoon their infantry attacked. They succeeded in getting the first French line where many soldiers were half asphyxiated and buried. They occupied Hill 265, but the highest summit, Hill 295, was still in French hands. During the following night the French troops succeeded even in stemming the German advance. They stationed themselves on the counterslope between Béthincourt and Hill 295. Thus, the Germans, despite all their efforts, had not been able to seize the culminating position of Mort Homme. On March 16 and 18, 1916, they made new attempts which were repulsed.

Powerless to take Mort Homme from the front, the Germans attempted to outflank it. They enlarged the attacking front

in the sector of Malancourt and tried to take Hill 304. In order to do this it was necessary for them to take the southeastern point of the Avocourt Woods which was held by the French. On March 20, 1916, the crown prince threw on these woods a fresh division, the 11th Bavarian, belonging to a selected corps which had seen service in the Galician and Polish campaigns with Mackensen's army. This division launched violent attacks, making use of inflammable liquids. They succeeded in taking possession of the Avocourt Woods, but when they tried to approach Hill 304 they were caught between two converging fires which made them suffer enormous losses. In accordance with the figures given to Colonel Feyler, from the 20th to the 22d of March the three regiments of this division lost from 50 to 60 per cent of their number.

After a short rest, which they needed badly, in order to reconstruct their units, they attacked the French again.

On February 28, 1916, at about 3 p. m., the Germans attacked the Haucourt-Malancourt front. Their assault failed. On the morning of the 29th the French made a counterattack. They succeeded in recapturing a part of the Avocourt Woods as well as an important work, "the redoubt of Avocourt."

During the night of the 30th to the 31st, the Germans launched a series of attacks in mass formation from three sides on Malancourt. After a bloody fight which lasted the whole night, they occupied the village, but the French kept the exits therefrom.

While these combats took place on the left bank, the Germans did not give up their objective on the right bank, the essential part of the battle field, the point at which they found themselves nearest to Verdun.

From March 8 to March 10, 1916, a desperate battle was renewed between Douaumont and the fortress of Vaux. The crown prince appealed again to his troops. He asked them for a supreme effort to take possession of Verdun, the heart of France, at all costs.

The attack was launched on the 8th, in a very narrow path leading from Douaumont to the Hardaumont buttress north of the Vaux ravine. This attack was made by the 3d German Corps,



VERDUN NORTHEAST DISTRICT IN DETAIL

the 113th Division and two regiments of the 15th Corps. These attacks against the French center failed with heavy losses. The German 3d Corps was sent to the rear. From the beginning of the battle it has lost more than 22,000 men—more than one-half of its number.

On the 9th the Germans enlarged their attacking front. The 7th Corps of reserves attacked Pepper Hill on the west. On its left the 21st Division sustained enormous losses where the uneven strip of ground separates Pepper Hill from Douaumont. On the east, the 5th Corps of reserves assaulted the fortress and the village of Vaux.

This village forms on the side of the Woevre the beginning of a ravine which goes from west to east for two kilometers and ends behind Douaumont. Through this ravine the Germans hoped to get to the heart of the plateau. The attack on the village of Vaux cost them some heavy losses. One of their battalions, entering the village which they believed abandoned, was received by machine-gun fire, charged with bayonets, and almost exterminated with grenades. Only a few houses east of the church were held by them. The Vaux fortress had remained entirely out of the action. The Germans did not even succeed in scaling the sides. Their communiqué of March 9, 1916, announced that the reserve regiments Nos. 6 and 19, under the command of General von Guretzki-Cornitz, *"had taken the armored fortress of Vaux by assault as well as very many other fortifications near by."*

At the very hour, 2 p. m., that this telegram appeared, an officer of the French General Staff entered the fortress and found that it had not even been seriously attacked!

The following days the Germans launched close attacks to the sides of the fortress. They continued them until March 11, 1916. According to what prisoners said, these attacks were among the most deadly of the campaign. They were again compelled to call some fresh divisions.

On March 16, 1916, five new German attacks were made on the village and fortress of Vaux. They were all stopped by the French fire.

Two days later, on the 18th, the Germans resumed their offensive; six attacks took place on that day. They produced the same results as the previous ones. At this time the Germans stopped in order to reorganize their lines.

From March 30 to April 8, 1916, some partial attacks took place on the banks of the Meuse. On March 31, 1916, the Germans attacked the French positions north of Hill 295. Their artillery raised a barrier of lachrymatory shells. They succeeded in gaining a foothold in the first French line, but were ejected in a spirited counterattack.

On April 2, 1916, they launched several attacks on the Avocourt Redoubt. On the morning of the 30th, they delivered a violent assault east of the Meuse on the French lines near the Douaumont fortress. They were repulsed. Their second attack produced the same results.

On March 31, 1916, there was a terrific bombardment of the woods south of Haudromont and of the Vaux region. Two German attacks were made with large bodies of troops. The first failed entirely, and the second gave the Germans access to the western part of the village occupied by the French.

On April 2, 1916, the fight continued the whole day. The Germans directed four attacks against a division between the village of Douaumont and the fortress of Vaux. They succeeded in entering the Caillette Woods, but a French counterattack ejected them from there.

The same day they also attacked on the left bank of the Meuse south of the brook of Forges. This failed. On the 4th another attack on Haucourt by the Germans also failed.

During the night between the 5th and the 6th, the Germans attacked two of the salients of the Avocourt-Béthincourt front with a large body of troops. At the French right they failed entirely. In the center, after many failures, they gained a foothold in the Haucourt Woods. On the other hand the French launched a spirited counterattack against the Avocourt Redoubt. They gained the "square woods" and took a number of prisoners.

During the night from the 6th to the 7th, new German attacks were launched along the Béthincourt-Chattancourt road. They

occupied a part of the first French line. The French, by a counterattack, took back almost everything that they had lost.

On the 7th German attacks on a front of two kilometers gave no results. During the night from the 7th to the 8th the Germans resumed their efforts against the French positions south of Haucourt. They succeeded in gaining a foothold in two small works.

Thus, from March 30 to April 8, 1916, the Germans succeeded in getting the French front line of the Forges brook on the left bank of the Meuse. The French, having evacuated Forges at the time of the first attack, and Malancourt twenty-two days later, despite all, held on to the village of Béthincourt. They only withdrew from this village, situated in a hollow ground and quite difficult to defend, during the night between April 8 and 9, 1916.

The French General Staff, during this gigantic struggle, was constantly guided by the following rule: make the Germans pay dearly for each of their advances. When it was believed that in order to defend a certain point too many sacrifices would have to be made, they evacuated that point. As soon as the Germans took hold of the point, however, they were the target of a terrific fire from all the French guns, which were put to work at once. This was what General Pétain, commanding the Verdun army, called "the crushing fire."

In this manner the Germans on the left bank reached the foot of the main French position. April 9, 1916, saw one of the most important Verdun battles. The Germans, in very great numbers, launched a violent attack to conquer this position at all costs. They used a considerable number of men. Between Haucourt and the Meuse, by the prisoners they took, the French identified twelve German regiments belonging to five different divisions, of which two appeared in the Verdun sector for the first time. This was the great battle of Mort Homme. The attacking front of the Germans ran from west of Avocourt to beyond the Meuse as high as the woods in the Haudromont farm. This general attack, one of the most violent that the Germans made before Verdun, failed completely. On the left of the French a

little strip of land lost along the southern edge of the Avocourt Woods was immediately retaken. In the center the Germans were repulsed everywhere, except south of Béthincourt, where they succeeded in penetrating an advanced work. On the right bank at the side of Pepper Hill, they only gained a foothold in one trench east of Vacherauville. No important results were obtained by them. The main summit of Mort Homme, Hill 295, as well as Hill 304, the principal positions, remained in the hands of the French. A few days later General Pétain, commanding the Verdun army, addressed to his troops the following order of the day:

"April 9, 1916, has been a glorious day for our armies. The furious assaults of the crown prince's soldiers have been broken everywhere; infantrymen, artillerymen, sappers, and aviators of the Second Army have rivaled with each other in heroism. Honor to all!

"The Germans will attack again without a doubt; let each work and watch, so that we may obtain the same success of yesterday.

"Courage. We will win!"

Following is the report of an eyewitness, a captain of the French General Staff, who followed all the phases of the combat:

"It is a Sunday, and the sun shines brilliantly above: a real spring Sunday. The artillery duel was long and formidable. Mort Homme was smoking like a volcano with numberless craters. The attack took place at about twelve noon. At the same time, from this same place, some lines of sharpshooters could be seen between the Corbeaux Woods and Cumières (to the naked eye they only appear to be one line) and the gradient at the east of Mort Homme. They must have come from the Raffecourt Mill or from the Forges Mills, through the covered roads in the valleylike depressions of the ground. It was the first wave, immediately followed by heavy columns. Our artillery fire from the edge of Corbeaux Woods isolated them. Nothing is more heart-rending that these incomplete episodes of which it is impossible to know the results. At times a rocket appeared in

the air; the call to the cannons, then the marking of the road. The regular ticktack of the machine guns and the cracking of the balls were distinctly perceived even among the terrific noise of the bombardment.

"The German barrage fire in the rear of our first lines is so frightful that one must not dream of going through it. Where will our reenforcements pass? The inquietude increases when at 3.15 p. m. sharp, numerous columns in disorder regain on the run the woods of Cumières. What a wonderful sight is the flight of the enemy. The sun shines fully on these small moving groups. But our shells also explode among them, and the groups separate, stop, disjointed. They disappear: they are lying down. They get up—not all of them—but do not know where to go, like pheasants flying haphazard before the fusillade.

"With a tenacity that must be acknowledged, the enemy comes back to the charge, but the new attacks are less ordinate, less complete and quite weak. Even from a distance one does not feel that they can succeed as much as at first. This lasts until sunset."

A chaplain of the chasseurs, who was in the fortress at that time, writes as follows:

"One of the most dangerous trips made by our men was during a black, foggy night. The region was entirely unknown. The itinerary was only recognized in the early morning, and a chain of runners marks it out, each at a distance of about 200 meters; but since they are waiting some gaps have been made. Poor vanished ones, where are they? . . . They try to renew this chain and replace the broken rings. Calls in a low tone are heard in the darkness, some anxious questions; some short reconnoitering right and left is made, through the shell holes in the woods, along the ditches. . . .

"The shells continue their carnage. Hissing, lightning, explosions, squalls of shrapnels, provoking rapid movements at the end of the holes or behind the trees, groans of the wounded; heavy fall of one who has been mortally wounded; this is the dismal picture that will remain forever vivid in the minds of those who, after this enervating and murderous day, were able to make the

VERDUN NORTHWEST DISTRICT IN DETAIL

two or three kilometers necessary in order to come in contact with the enemy.

"We arrived at the fortress at last. What a tragic sight! What earthquake has shaken all this plateau, digging the soil and mixing together the most heteroclitic wreck? What convulsions above all have demolished this massive construction? Some cement blocks four or five square meters in size have been torn away and now lie in the ditches or on some parts of the tunnel, which is entirely broken up and ruined. The gate is crushed."

And here is the life in the fortress:

"There are sessions of bombardment now and then. One must have lived through these hours in order to get an idea of it. It seems as though we are living under a steam hammer. . . . You receive something like a blow in the hollow of the stomach. But what a blow! Imagine these masses weighing from 800 to 900 kilograms coming from twelve to fifteen kilometers rise to about 4,000 or 5,000 meters above our heads and then exploding their charge of sixty to eighty kilograms of explosives! Each explosion knocks us to the ground. After a few hours one becomes somewhat dumfounded. . . .

"And now let us return to our defenders. Evidently it is they, and their stubborn courage, their heroic will, that constitute the strength of the fortress. These stones are worth something simply because of the defenders whom they protect.

"I am going to visit ten seriously wounded men, ten minutes' walk from the fortress, in a near-by redoubt. Owing to the different formation it has been impossible to evacuate it before then. They have been there for the past eight days, lying down, dying of hunger, suffering thirst to the extent that they were compelled to drink their urine. They ask for water as a favor. Water is more than scarce. Whatever remains is for them. We promised to take them off from there the following night, which was done, but not without losses.

"To all I have administered the last rites. Their consolation was great and their thanks very touching. Among them was a German, a good Catholic, who told me about their losses in-

flicted by our artillery, because these are very heavy; sixty or eighty men each day per battalion.

"The life of the defenders continues under the bombardment, among the alarms, the surprises. On March 17, 1916, the chasseurs went away. Worn out, thin, feverish, soiled, physically unfit; but their moral is splendid. This can be seen by looking at their glittering eyes, by listening to their spirited conversations; by their actions, which show clearly the absolute sway of their gallant souls over the worn-out bodies."

From April 10 to May 4, 1916, many German attacks and French counterattacks were registered. On the 10th, 11th, and 12th the Germans attacked in the region of Douaumont and Vaux. On the evening of the 15th the French, in their turn, took the offensive against the German trench at Douaumont, making 200 prisoners and occupying some parts of the German line.

On the 17th and 18th there was a very violent German bombardment on the whole sector, from the Meuse up to Douaumont. On the 18th, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the Germans launched an extremely violent attack in great force. Over a front of four kilometers regiments belonging to five different divisions were noticed. The attacking mass comprised at least ten regiments; that is, one and a half army corps. About 35,000 men assaulted the French lines. As soon as the invading waves showed themselves, the rifles, machine guns, and the heavy artillery of the French came into play. The Germans were repulsed everywhere except on the French right, at which point they entered a first-line trench, south of the Chafour Woods. A French counterattack took back a part of what they had just conquered. The Germans also launched an attack in the Woevre district on the position of Epargnes, which was repulsed.

The French General Staff now decided to make some limited counterattacks in order to consolidate their lines and prevent any further advance of the Germans.

On April 19, 1916, the French took from the Germans a fortified work at the northwest of the Vaux Pond with 260 prisoners, of whom ten are officers.

On the 20th they captured from the Germans a race course south of the Haudromont farm, which the latter had occupied on the 17th. On the left bank of the Meuse they retook some trenches on the slopes north of Mort Homme and north of the Caurettes Woods. By the end of April French counterattacks were made on a larger scale. Those executed by the French on the 30th east of Mort Homme, on the front of Cumières, gave some very satisfactory results. They took from the Germans a front of 1,000 meters of trenches along a depth varying from 300 to 600 meters.

The Germans reattacked immediately with two of their corps, the Eighteenth and the Third (the famous corps of Brandenburgers of Douaumont), which, after the losses they had incurred, had been placed in the rear. In accordance with the estimate of Colonel Feyler, the first of these corps must have lost 17,000 men and the second 22,000. After having been six weeks in the rear, they were thrown again into battle. They were used in the evening of April 30, 1916, the Third north of Mort Homme and the Eighteenth north of Cumières. This German attack made with a large number of men was repulsed. They suffered considerable losses.

Only at one place did the Germans of the Eighteenth Corps gain a foothold for an instant in the French trenches, but they were soon ejected by a vigorous counterattack.

On March 5, 1916, on the right bank the French front passed by Pepper Hill, the Haudromont Woods, the crest of the ravine at the southwest of the village of Douaumont, across Douaumont Plateau, some hundred meters south of the fortress, the northern edge of the Caillette Woods, the valley and the village of Vaux, the slopes of the fortress of Vaux.

On May 5, 1916, this line was still intact on the whole. Only in one place had the Germans made a small advance: the village of Vaux which has only one road, had passed into their hands; the French were lying a short distance from the slopes of the hill.

On the left bank the multiplied and violent attacks of the Germans caused the loss of the French front line, which ex-

tended from the woods of Avocourt to the Meuse along the slopes of Haucourt, the bed of the Forges Brook, and the crests north of Cumières. The French bent on their main lines of resistance, which were Hill 304 and Mort Homme, and still maintained the line.

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLES OF MORT HOMME AND OF HILL 304—FIGHTING AT VAUX

FROM the 3d to the 8th of May, 1916, the Germans executed some very violent attacks in order to gain Hill 304 at all costs. It was one of the most furious combats of the great Verdun battle.

The French occupied the counterslope north of Hill 304. More than 100 German batteries had concentrated their action on this hill and its immediate approaches since May 3, 1916. On the 4th the bombardment continued; at about 2 p. m. the Germans launched their assaulting waves, and the greater part of the French defenders were buried in the ground. The Germans succeeded in occupying the slopes north of Hill 304. During the night there was a French counterattack; it was directed by a brilliant officer of the general staff, Lieutenant Colonel Odent, who upon his request had just joined the troops and had been placed at the head of a regiment. He rallied all his men and threw them to the assault. The French succeeded in reaching the edges of the plateau facing northeast. Lieutenant Colonel Odent was killed during the charge.

During the fifth day the Germans tried to turn Hill 304; they attacked the Camart Woods and Hill 287. They tried to get through by going to the bottom of the ravine and behind the woods. The French repulsed them with the bayonet. The Germans then began once more their preparation with artillery.

On May 6 and 7, 1916, Hill 304 was subjected to a continuous bombardment. In the afternoon of the 7th the German attack

was resumed. With the exception of a piece of trench east of the hill, which was retaken the following night, they did not make any advance.

The German units participating in this great battle were as follows: Some regiments of the Eleventh Bavarian Division, a regiment of the 192d Brigade, the Twelfth Reserve Division, the Fourth Division, the Forty-third Reserve Division.

From the 13th to the 16th of May, 1916, the Germans continued their attack on the Camart Woods, west of Hill 304. They used a fresh corps, the Twenty-second Reserve Corps, for the first time.

After a lull lasting a few days, the battle assumed an ever-increasing violence on the left bank. In the afternoon of the 20th the Germans threw four divisions to the assault of Mort Homme. The battle continued during the night and the following day. At a heavy cost the Germans at last gained some trenches north and west of Mort Homme. At one time they menaced even the second French lines. A counterattack repulsed them. The French succeeded in retaking some lost ground on Hill 287; on the 21st and 22d they regained other parts of the lost grounds.

The French executed a spirited attack in order to retake the fortress of Douaumont. The division in charge of this attack, the Fifth, was commanded by General Mangin, one of the youngest in the French army. The French brought forward powerful heavy artillery, which opened a terrific fire on the German lines.

The morning of the 22d, a little before eight o'clock, six captive balloons (Drachen) stationed over the right bank of the Meuse exploded, and the German batteries were thus deprived of their observers and were powerless to get their range.

At 11.50 the French infantry charged and three lines of German trenches were taken. The French entered the fortress of Douaumont. The Germans reattacked violently, and the battles raged during the whole night in the fortress. The French succeeded in maintaining their gains and even added slightly to them.

On the morning of the 23d the Germans submitted the French positions at the fortress to a terrific bombardment. The French



THE MORT HOMME SECTOR IN DETAIL

regiment which occupied them (the 129th) clung to the terrain and stopped the German attacks.

During the night between the 23d and the 24th the combats continued. On the morning of the 24th the fortress was still in the hands of the French, with exception of the northern salient and some parts east, but on the next day two new Bavarian divisions were thrown into the fight and succeeded in retaking the lines of the fortress, ejecting the French as far as the immediate approaches; that is, to the places which they occupied before their attack.

On the left bank of the Meuse the intensity of the battle decreased. The attacks were made by the French in order to straighten their lines. The Germans were now reacting very feebly in this part. They concentrated their efforts on the right bank. On this bank, in fact, in the whole region of Thiaumont, Douaumont, and Vaux, they engaged in very violent combats.

On the 1st of June all the French front in this sector was attacked. The Germans returned incessantly to the charge. By a document found on a prisoner, it has been ascertained that General Falkenhayn, chief of the German General Staff, had given the order to advance at all costs, without considering the losses.

The Germans did not succeed in progressing, except through the Caillette Woods, from which they reach the southern edge of the Vaux Pool.

This furious battle lasted five days. The artillery duels became exceptionally violent. The Bavarian division which led in the attack displayed an "unprecedented violence" according to the French communiqué. The Germans, repulsed several times, attacked again, and succeeded in gaining a foothold in the first houses of Damloup.

The battle did not stop during the night from the 2d to the 3d. By repeated and incessant attacks the Germans at last entered the ditches north of the Vaux fortress, but could not get in the works themselves where the French were.

During the 3d, at about eight in the evening, they tried to



VERDUN TO ST. MIHIEL

THE PROLONGED BATTLE

ON THE

VERDUN FRONT

THE HEROIC STRUGGLE OF GERMAN AND FRENCH ARMIES
FOR THE POSSESSION OF THIS GATEWAY TO FRANCE

Copyright, American Press Association

The dead in first-line trenches after terrific artillery fire. In the distance is the sinuous line of long-occupied trenches, abandoned in the deadly battles of 1916

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This French military tramway was constructed and is used exclusively for transporting reinforcements and supplies into the beleaguered fortress of Verdun, whose fall might open the road to Paris

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French staff officers at work in a small, but well-defended and bombproof underground shelter not far from the first lines on the Verdun battle front

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The thoroughly organized French Aviation camp near Verdun, as seen by an aviator flying at a height of 500 meters (about 1640 feet) As the war continues, the daring and skill of aviators win more and more admiration

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Before the beginning of the prolonged Battle of Verdun, here was a forest on the Meuse Heights. Now shattered stumps of trees and almost numberless shell holes testify to the terrific fire that has swept it

Photo by Louis Beaufrere

The body of a German soldier in a captured trench on the battlefield of Verdun, where men have fallen by the hundred thousand in the long battle for the fortress

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German soldiers storing away their shells in a bombproof forest shelter, concealed by branches from the observation of hostile aviators

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The Crown Prince, who commands the German forces on the Verdun front, giving Iron Crosses to men who have distinguished themselves for valor

surprise the fortress at the southeast escalating the ravine which notches the bank of the Meuse, near Damloup. A counterattack of the French foiled them. Then the bombardment against the fortress of Vaux resumed. On the 4th, at 3 p. m., several German battalions coming from the pool, tried to climb to the woods of Fumin. The fire of the French machine guns foiled their attempt. In the evening and during the night the German attacks were resumed more furiously than ever. The woods of Fumin remained in the hands of the French.

On the 5th, the bad weather and the exhaustion stopped the attack. The Sixth German Artillery resumed its firing on the fortress, throwing such an avalanche of shells that all approaches to the fortress became impassable. In the works a handful of French, under the order of Commander Raynal, kept its ground. A German attack was repulsed on the evening of the 6th by the garrison of the fortress of Vaux, but during the night between the 6th and the 7th the German bombardment was such that all communication with the fortress became absolutely impossible. The French garrison was surrounded. They succeeded in communicating with the French troops some distance away from them by means of signals. The struggles continued more terribly than ever. The French still held on during the next day. On June 6, 1916, in the morning, the gunner Vannier dragged with him some comrades, mostly wounded, and succeeded in escaping through an air hole toward the French lines. Commander Raynal, having reached the extreme of human strength, having no more victuals, nor water, addresses this message to his men:

"We have stayed the limit. Officers and men have done their duty. Long live France!"

On June 7, 1916, the Germans announced that they had taken possession of the fortress and its heroic garrison.

The commander, by order of General Joffre, was made Commander of the Legion of Honor. In accordance with a German report, he was immediately taken to the crown prince who authorized him to keep the sword as a token of admiration for his superb defense.

One of the greatest efforts made by the Germans from the beginning of the battle of Verdun was on June 23, 1916, against the French positions of Froideterre, Fleury, and Souville.

By the orders found on German prisoners, the French were certain that it was a case of a very great offensive intended, in the opinion of the Germans, to take them as far as under the very walls of Verdun. The orders given to the German troops directed them to march without stopping, without respite, and to take the last of the French positions.

The Germans got together an assaulting force, estimated at from 70,000 to 80,000 men.

After a terrific bombardment the Germans attacked on the morning of June 23, 1916, at eight o'clock, on a front of five kilometers, from Hill 321 to La Laufée. The fury of the assailants was extraordinary. The French lines bent at a certain point. The Thiaumont works and some near-by trenches were carried by the Germans. A strong column of Germans reached the village of Fleury, but was ejected. On the west, in the woods of Chapitre and Fumin, all the German assaults were smashed. During the night the French counterattacked; they retook a part of the terrain lost between Hills 320 and 321, and pushed back the Germans as far as the Thiaumont works.

The battle continued during the whole day of the 24th. In the center, the village of Fleury was directly under fire of the Germans who succeeded in occupying some houses. The French counterattacked, and succeeded in freeing Fleury in part. On the 25th the bombardment was twice as violent as the previous ones.

The objective of the Germans was the fortress of Souville as well as Fleury. They suffered enormous losses in the ravines of Bazile but secured a foothold in the woods of Chapitre. The French counterattack regained part of the lost ground. The latter hold these gains and the village of Fleury.

The Germans, for this attack which they hoped would be decisive, had brought their reserves to a great distance from the lines, although their losses caused by the violent fire of the French artillery were considerable.



VERDUN GAIN UP TO AUGUST, 1916

The Thiaumont works were retaken by the French on June 28, 1916, lost again on the 29th, retaken once more and lost once more on July 4, 1916.

On July 2, 1916, the Germans took possession of the Damloup battery which was taken away from them again that very same night.

Their tactics for these attacks are always the same. They made their efforts successively on the right and on the left of the point under aim, so that they could encircle this point which formed in this manner a salient and was suitable for concentration of artillery fire.

The Germans made a very light advance in the center of the French lines. The French counterattacked in a vigorous manner and succeeded in halting their advance.

On July 12, 1916, a German attack made by six regiments succeeded in reaching the roads to Fleury and Vaux at 800 meters of the fortress of Souville. A few days later the French counterattacked and halted the German advance.

By the middle of July Verdun had withstood all efforts to shake its impregnability for nearly five months. The Germans still strained every nerve to succeed. Their heaviest bombardments raged against the French defenses on both sides of the river, but round the Dead Man their efforts were totally repulsed. The Germans threw into the fight three fresh divisions, two of them brought from Metz. At several points on successive days they advanced their footing, in Fumin Wood, at Damloup Battery, and above all at Chapelle Ste. Fine, southward of Fleury, and within a thousand yards of the French key position, Fort Souville. In this last attack, on July 12, 1916, the Germans captured, according to their claims, over 2,000 French prisoners and 39 officers. They did not, apparently, attempt to pursue their advantage, but once more set up a heavy bombardment of the French works at Souville, Chênois and La Lauffée. As the allied offensive on the Somme developed, the German attacks on Verdun perceptibly weakened, for beyond a few patrol engagements in Chênois Wood no further infantry fighting was reported from Verdun on July 16, 1916. But the French had

continued to "nibble" into the German positions around Fleury, three miles from Verdun, and considerably improved their strength at Hill 304. Fleury was now the nearest to Verdun that the Germans had reached, but here their progress was halted. By the 23d the British had penetrated the German third line on the Somme and the Russians had delivered a smashing blow in Volhynia. The pressure on east and west constrained the Germans to withdraw many troops from the Verdun sector and send them to other exposed parts. The Franco-British "push" is the main German preoccupation at the end of July, and the great struggle for Verdun, regarded as the longest continuous ever fought, falls into a position of second-rate importance for the time being. In the six months' combat some 3,000 heavy cannon had been brought into action; some two millions of men had attacked and defended the stronghold; perhaps 200,000 had lost their lives, and the end was not yet in sight. The second anniversary of the war found Germany on the defensive. Twenty million fighters had been called to the colors of twelve belligerent nations; about four millions had been killed and over ten millions wounded and taken prisoners. And yet, with all this vast expenditure in blood and treasure there was little to show in the way of a really decisive battle beyond that of the Marne, in September, 1914. Each side is still confident of ultimate success; it is too early to deliver judgment; the near or distant future must decide.

CHAPTER IV

SPRING OPERATIONS IN OTHER SECTORS

WHILE greater issues were being fought out in the Verdun sector, from the beginning of the second phase of the German attack during March, there was considerable sporadic "liveliness" on other parts of the western front. Though the main interest centered for the time around the apparently impreg-

nable fortresses of which Verdun is the nucleus, a continuous, fluctuating activity was kept in progress along the whole line up to the opening of the big allied offensive on the last day of June. March 1, 1916, found the battle line practically unchanged. From Ostend on the North Sea it ran straightway south through the extreme western corner of Belgium, crossing the French frontier at a point northwest of Lille. From there it zigzagged its way to a point about sixty miles north of Paris, whence it then followed an eastern tangent paralleling the northern bank of the River Aisne; thence easterly to Verdun, forming there a queer half-moon salient arc with the points bent sharply toward the center. From the south of Verdun the line extended unbroken and rather straight south and a little easterly to the Swiss frontier.

In the Ypres sector during the first four days of March the fighting was confined to the usual round of violent artillery duels, mine springing, hand grenade skirmishing, intermittent hand-to-hand attacks and effective aircraft raids. On March 1, 1916, twenty British aircraft set out seeking as their objective the important German lines of communication and advanced bases east and north of Lille. Considerable damage was inflicted with high explosive bombs. One British aeroplane failed to return. From all parts thrilling, tragic and heroic aerial exploits are recorded. While cruising over the Beanon-Jussy road a German Fokker observed a rapidly moving enemy transport. Reversing his course, the pilot floated over the procession and dropped bombs. The motor lorries stopped immediately, when the aeroplane dropped toward the earth, attacked the transport at close range and got away again in safety. On the same day also a French biplane equipped with double motors encountered an enemy plane near Cernay, in the valley of the Thur, and brought it down a shattered mass of flame. North of Soissons, near the village of Vezaponin, a French machine was shot down into the German lines; another French aero was struck by German antiaircraft guns; with a marvelous dive and series of loops it crashed to earth. Both pilot and observer were buried with their machine. During the evening of March 1, 1916, the

German infantry, after a furious cannonading north of the Somme, delivered a sharp assault on a line of British trenches, but were held back by machine-gun fire. Along the Ypres sector the same night violent gunfire took place on both sides with apparently small effect or damage. In a previous volume it was mentioned that the Germans had once more recaptured the "international trench" on February 14, 1916. For a fortnight the British artillery constantly held the position under fire and prevented the consolidation of the ground. At 4.30 a. m. the British infantry suddenly emerged from their trenches. The grenadiers dashed ahead, smothering the surprised Germans with bombs. The general disorder was increased by the fact that the trench parties were just being relieved. In a few minutes the lost ground was recovered, the German line dangerously pushed in and 254 prisoners, including five officers, fell to the British. At midday the Germans bombarded the line with fifty batteries for four hours. Then waves of assaulting columns were let loose against the British. The latter noticed that the front line of infantry hurled their bombs several yards *behind* the British trenches and rushed forward with hands up. Immediately a hurricane of shells from their own guns burst among the German infantry. The survivors flung themselves on the ground and crawled into the British trenches for protection. This action was the more significant in that the men who thus surrendered were all very young and belonged to a regiment which, until then, had fought with conspicuous bravery. At the end of the day the British counted more than 300 corpses, while their own losses were slight and their entire gains maintained.

Most of the combats in the Artois and Ypres sectors consisted of mine springing and crater fighting. What was once the Hohenzollern Redoubt was particularly the scene of some vigorous subterranean warfare. What happened there on March 2 is thus described by an eyewitness: "Many huge craters have been made, won, and what is more, retained by a rare combination of skill, courage, and endurance. Men who fought all through the war have seen nothing comparable with the largest of these craters. They are amphitheaters, and cover perhaps

half an acre of ground. When the mine exploded at 5.45 p. m. on March 2, 1916, a thing like a great black mushroom rose from the earth. Beneath it appeared, with the ponderous momentum of these big upheavals, a white growth like the mushroom's gills. It was the chalk subsoil following in the wake of the black loam. With this black and white upheaval went up, Heaven knows, how many bodies and limbs of Germans, scattered everywhere with the rest of the débris. And the explosion sent up many graves as well as the bodies of the living. One of the British bombers who occupied the crater and spent a crowded hour hurling bombs from the farther lip found that he was steadying himself and getting a lever for the bowling arm by clinging on to a black projection with his left hand. It was a Hessian boot. The soil of the amphitheater was so worked, mixed, and sieved by the explosive action and the effects of the melting snow that it was almost impassable. A staff officer, among others, who went up to help, had to be pulled out of the morass as he was carrying away one of the wounded. There is no fighting so terrible and so condensed as crater fighting. The struggle is a veritable graveyard, a perfect target for bomb and grenade and the slower attack of the enemy's mine. The British held a circle of German trenches on a little ridge of ground north of Loos. The capture meant that they could overlook the plain beyond and win a certain projection. At 6.00 p. m. on March 2, 1916, the engineers exploded four mines under the nearer arc, and within a few minutes, while artillery thundered overhead, the British infantry advanced in spite of terrible mud and occupied each crater. Not a single machine gun was fired at them as they charged—probably the mines had destroyed them all — and their casualties were very small indeed."

Germans counterattacking hurried up their communication trenches, and as they came on some examples of prompt handiwork stopped their advance. A sergeant and one man stopped one rush; a color sergeant and private, well equipped with sandbags, each holding a score of bombs, performed miracles of resistance. Every night the Germans came on, capping a day of continuous bombardment with showers of bombs, rifle grenades,

and artillery, mostly 5.9 howitzers, and with infantry onsets at close quarters. They stormed with dash and determination, backed by good artillery and an apparently inexhaustible stock of grenades. The tale of the German losses was high. One communication trench packed with men was raked from end to end with a British Lewis gun till it was a graveyard. On this occasion the British artillery was overwhelming in amount and volume; shells were not spared, and they fired ten to the Germans' one. Within less than a mile and a half there were eight groups of mines.

On March 3, 1916, an intense artillery duel progressed for possession of the Bluff, an elevated point above the Ypres-Comines Canal. The Germans evidently regarded the point as important, for they flung great masses of troops over the Bluff, when the British attacked and captured more than their lost lines of trenches running along an eastern hillock by the canal. The next night and morning the British heavy artillery poured a continuous stream of shell on the Bluff in well-marked time. The men in the front trenches began cheering, as always before an attack, but instead of advancing they shot over a heavy shower of bombs. One soldier alone was credited with having flung more than 300 bombs into the German trenches. In the obscurity of the gray dawn British troops quietly and suddenly dashed into the Germans and cleared the trenches with bayonets. This was accomplished in two minutes, when the large guns spread a curtain of fire over the Germans, inflicting severe losses. The German soldiers then attempted resolute counter-attacks, but were repulsed with machine-gun fire.

Between the 1st and 4th of March, 1916, there was sharp grenade fighting southeast of Vermelles, in some mine craters. After severe bombardment the Germans attempted to recapture the craters by infantry attacks, but apparently without success. In Artois they endeavored to drive the French from a crater they occupied near the road from Neuville to La Folie, and failed in the enterprise. In the Argonne the French bombarded the German organizations in the region southeast of Vauquois and demolished several shelters, while in Lorraine, in the neighborhood

of the Thiauville Ponds, the French carried sections of German trenches after artillery preparation, capturing sixty prisoners, including two officers, and some machine guns. On March 4, 1916, a serious explosion occurred in the powder magazine known as "Double Couronne," St. Denis, a fort used by the French as a munitions store. The concussion was so terrific that a car a considerable distance away and containing thirty-two passengers was overturned and nearly all were injured. Altogether the casualties amounted to about thirty-five killed and 200 wounded.

In the Ypres sector during March 4 and 5, 1916, the fighting came to a standstill and the positions remained unchanged. In the Champagne vigorous artillery action continued on both sides with occasional infantry attacks and counterattacks of little consequence. In the district about Loos and northeast of Ypres heavy cannonading endured all day on the 6th, the Germans hurling quantities of large caliber shells over the enemy's trenches without any apparent object. On the Ypres-Comines Canal the British still held the positions gained by storm on March 2, 1916. Near Soissons the French heavily bombarded the German works, and their terrific fire at Badenviller in Lorraine compelled a German retirement from the positions established there February 21, 1916. In the Flanders sector, on the Belgian front, concentrated artillery fire silenced German bomb throwers in a futile attempt to capture a trench. In the Woevre district the German troops, after a fierce assault, stormed the village of Fresnes and captured it, the French retaining a few positions on the outskirts. The German infantry advanced in close formation and literally swarmed into the village, while the French 75's and machine guns tore great gaps in their ranks. Northeast of Vermelles small detachments of British troops penetrated the German trenches on March 6, 1916, but were compelled to retire. Active engagements and furious hand-to-hand fighting centered around Maisons de Champagne. The positions the French had taken on February 11, 1916, were recaptured by surprise bayonet attacks, the Germans taking two officers and 150 men prisoners. In the Argonne region attempts on the part of the Germans to occupy some mine craters were repulsed.

CHAPTER V

MINOR ENGAGEMENTS

THERE was no defined offensive, excepting that of Verdun, on the west during the first half of March. The Belgians were fighting with all their old vigor and fury to save what little remained of their war-ravaged country; the Germans, French and British maintained a steady and constant duel, feinting here and there, gaining and losing respectively small vantage points of no particular importance, and making local inroads in the enemy's lines, only to lose the same again by counterattacks. The second week in March saw a considerable growth of activity in the north. In Belgium, south of Lombaertzyde, British artillery completely wrecked the German trenches, causing the enemy to retire. In the Argonne the French commenced a violent bombardment of the German lines of communication and trenches near Haute Chevauchée and Boureuilles, where fire soon afterward broke out.

A raiding squadron of sixteen French aircraft dropped 124 bombs on the Metz-Sablons station, where many transports and trains were located. German aviators rose to attack, when the French retired, with the exception of one machine, which was shot down. On March 8, 1916, a Zeppelin fleet appeared in the radius of Revigny station, where a munitions train of seventy cars was standing. The station agent, named Plançon, collected the cars with the aid of his assistant, and drove them to a place of safety amidst a shower of bombs. He was decorated with the Military Cross for his promptness and courage. The following thrilling air encounter was related by a British observer: "While on a flight of reconnoissance over the German lines, we had ascended to an altitude of about 10,000 feet. Coming from the German front, and 300 feet below us, I saw a Fokker pursuing and rapidly overhauling a British biplane fleeing back to the British lines. Down we went almost vertically. The Fokker had caught up with the Britisher and was emptying

its gun at a distance of fifty yards. We wound up our drive twenty yards behind the German, who didn't see us until we opened fire. Twenty rounds failed to hit him in a vital spot, but he quit the chase and turned his attention to us. The beggar began describing circuits around us, firing all the time, while we did sort of an inner circle. Suddenly he decided he had had enough and started for home, with us after him, diving lustily. We were getting so low we expected the German 'archies' to begin any moment. Then we got him. A lucky shot found its billet, and the Fokker pilot was no more. First he turned over, wheels up; then he looped, then several cart wheels, a head dive, more loops and several turns to and off his back, sideways until he struck. The nose went head first through the top of a British dugout constructed of heavy logs and with three feet of earth on top, and severely wounded four soldiers. Both observer and pilot were torn to pieces."

Between March 7 and 10, 1916, a short, fierce struggle took place north of the river Aisne. Destructive operations progressed on the Craonne Plateau and the vicinity of Pasly, west of Soissons. On the right bank of the Aisne, northwest of Rheims, after a severe bombardment the Saxon regiments made a furious attack on the French positions between Croyons and Berry-au-Bac, a distance of ten miles, carried by storm 1,400 yards of trenches and penetrated to a depth of nearly a mile in part of the Bois des Buttes. They captured twelve officers, 725 men, one revolver cannon and thirteen mine throwers. The French immediately counterattacked with still greater violence and drove the Germans from the entire territory in a hand-to-hand fight. In the Champagne the French recovered on March 8, 1916, some lines they had lost on the 6th. They took three officers, eighty-five men, and several machine guns. The next day they effectually bombarded the German positions and defensive works to the west of Navarin, and also gained some ground near the farm of Maisons de Champagne in grenade fighting. Between the Somme and the Oise the French bombarded (March 10, 1916) the German organizations in the region of Herbecourt, Laucourt, and Beuvraignes.

To describe most of the engagements that occurred about this time would be merely to give a dreary list of place names and compass points interspersed with descriptive adjectives. All the disconnected fighting was "furious," "heavy," and "violent." In the middle of March the line was practically unchanged, with very slight exceptions. From the rather hilly country north of the Swiss frontier to the flat, loamy land at Ostend on the North Sea the soldiers of the opposing forces were looking forward to the coming of spring. Two hard, cold, and wet winters had been sufficient to wear off the novelty of war; and the terrible, gruesome monotony of trench life, broken only by occasional bombardments and infantry attacks, was beginning to wear down even the most sturdy. Many quondam strong and healthy men were invalided home with rheumatism and tuberculosis caused by perpetual vigil in water and mud up to the knees and waist. The sickening odors of putrefying flesh added to their innumerable discomforts. The hordes of man-eating rats and other vermin inculcated a fear more deadly than shrapnel; it was not uncommon to find living men horribly mutilated by these pests of the trenches. Whenever the order rang out for a sortie it was met with loud cheering; stern activity, even death itself, was a welcome relief from that barbaric subterranean life.

It would be difficult at this stage to relate in continuous narrative form the operations in any one sector on the western front, excepting Verdun; and even there the fine frenzy of the first dash was almost spent. What began as a mighty encircling wave had already broken up into three or four smaller waves, each laboriously rolling forward or receding to its own tempo. The reader should cast his gaze along the various sectors, fixing it here and there as scenes of activity arrest his attention. Innumerable aircraft dot the heavens. On March 13, 1916, a French squadron dropped thirty shells on the railway station of Conflans, setting some houses on fire. Over the Champagne three French aeroplanes were brought down by German guns, while six others dropped 130 bombs on the village of Brieulles, causing much damage to an advanced munitions base. A con-

fused medley of artillery and infantry fighting raged in the Argonne, along the Aisne, in upper Alsace, in Lorraine, and the Champagne. Lieutenant Immelmann, the famous German aviator whom the kaiser named the "Superhawk," shot down two British biplanes near Arras on March 14, 1916. He himself was killed in June, 1916. In Flanders, particularly in the region near the coast, artillery combats grew in violence about March 15, 1916, while at Ypres, the scene of so many desperate encounters at the beginning of the war, a more pleasant incident was enacted. Here the First Canadian Division were fighting in the first line at Laventie. One of them told this story: "A German shell exploded in a field over a pile of brush near where I was shooting toward the German line. And we, weary of the monotony of the fighting, were overjoyed to see the ground covered far and wide with potatoes, which some farmer had hidden under hay. Potatoes! We blessed our periscope for the toothsome vision. And, marvelous to relate, we noticed that the German fire slackened. Our officers could not restrain the French Canadians. On our bellies, over the death line we crawled unscathed and, flat on the ground, we wriggled to the potatoes, braving death for what we deem so common in America. I got my share. Nor did the flaming sky pour upon us the leaden hail we feared, for the Germans held their fire while we gathered the crop we did not plant. Toward night, in the dusk, we discovered that the German boys, who were cold in their trenches, were demolishing a house for firewood, an old cottage, the property, perhaps, of that very peasant who had hidden our potatoes under the hay. We remembered our Irish feast—and word went down the line to hold our fire. Nor did one German die. That was the golden rule of the battle front."

The aerial activity along the front during March 17 and 18, 1916, was quite without precedent. The French concentrated their efforts in attempts to destroy the important supply stations where large quantities of munitions were stored. The Metz-Sablons station was again attacked by a bombing group of fourteen flyers. Large shells were dropped with unerring aim; fires broke out in the station itself, and numerous explosions occurred

along the railway. Though subjected to an intense fire, the squadron returned safely to their lines. Another fleet of eighteen machines flew over the Conflans station and dropped forty large bombs, causing considerable damage. During the two days the French made twenty-nine flights and fought thirty-two duels in the air. On March 19, 1916, four German sea planes crossed the Channel and dropped bombs on Dover, Ramsgate, and other places. The main damage was confined to a girls' orphanage and a hospital. The bombs appeared to have been filled with shrapnel, which carried destruction in every direction. In retaliation, a large fleet of allied aircraft, protected by a convoy of armored machines, attacked the German submarine and sea-plane base at Zeebrugge and the Belgian town of Houltade in the early morning of March 20, 1916. Fifty machines carried 200 pounds of high explosives each. All was dropped with telling effect; great havoc was wrought among the hangars and naval depots. At the aerodrome near Ostend six German aeroplanes were destroyed, and at Zeebrugge a torpedo boat was towed in with six dead and thirty injured aboard.

It is necessary here to touch upon the fringes of Verdun. During the early part of March that sector appeared on the map as a parabola extending from the vicinity of Forges on the north to the outskirts of the village of Fresnes on the south. It was the German plan to force the ends of this sector together at a point southwest of Verdun and thus absorb the strongest fortified area in France. At the same time this move would secure from capture the valuable and indispensable iron mines of Lorraine and, incidentally, prepare the way for a triumphant entry into Paris. But the French strategists anticipated the pincer movement by throwing ample reenforcements into the Argonne and St. Mihiél sectors, respectively the northern and southern terminations of the Verdun sector proper. Contrary to prior military postulates, however, the Germans proved that the modern offensive was superior to the modern defensive, for the fighting front gradually wound itself around Verdun until it circumscribed nearly three-fourths of the distance. Thus the French were compelled to fall back slowly on the strongly forti-

fied heights west of the Meuse, not without inflicting much injury on the crown prince's army. To the north, west of the river and in the Argonne, similar results developed. The French were not mistaken in their calculations that the pressure from without could be so neutralized by a stubborn defense that the slow German advance would be hardly worth the price of sacrifice in men. At the junction of the Argonne-Verdun sectors rather obstinate fighting was precipitated by the Germans between March 22 and 27, 1916. The Argonne Forest, where the troops had fought for two winters in water, is thickly wooded and contains almost impenetrable underbrush. Cleft by deep ravines and abrupt, slippery precipices with water continually dripping from rather high promontories, it presented difficulties which the German offensive could not overcome. The French lines had not been forced as far back on the west as on the east of the Meuse, and the French front, which had long presented a salient at Béthincourt and Forges, now protruded sharply at the former point and to the west of it at Malancourt. Strong as was the defensive nature of the ground, such a salient was continually an invitation to attack. However, there was but little cause for alarm on the French side, for the positions immediately behind were still better for defensive operations, and both would have yielded only at an exorbitant price. The long German siege in the Argonne began in September, 1914, and ended in February, 1916. Between those two dates the Germans had learned that the forest would not be cleared without heavy losses. And yet it constantly threatened the new German lines on the heights of the Meuse to the east. The long-range guns of the French maintained an incessant and devastating fire against all the enemy highways, cantonments, and revictualing convoy routes, which entirely cut off all communication with the first-line trenches for days at a stretch. Prisoners taken by the French often stated that they received neither food nor relief for several days owing to the terrible bombardment.

On March 27, 1916, the British launched an attack against the German salient in front of St. Eloi, south of Ypres. It was

begun by a series of mine explosions covering a front of nearly a mile. The Northumberland and the Royal Fusiliers then rushed into the gap and held the ground, eventually taking the first and second line trenches. A curtain of artillery fire prevented the Germans from sending reenforcements. The British consolidated the position on the following day despite artillery and grenade attacks. About this period the British army had been largely augmented; it held over seventy miles of the front at the end of March, or twice as much as a month earlier, extending now from the Yser to the Somme. The British continued their activity around St. Eloi, and what appeared to be a situation leading to an offensive turned out to be an effort of the British to straighten out the battle front south of Ypres. This they succeeded in accomplishing. The struggle spread in area and grew in intensity. The Germans were as persistent in their efforts to regain the lost terrain as the British were determined to hold it. A mine crater to the south of St. Eloi was carried by the Germans on March 30, 1916, after a sharp grenade attack, but they were forced to evacuate the crater two days later with a loss or four officers and eighty-four men. The British now established themselves more firmly in the position and consolidated their lines farther ahead, as the captured area at once became a valuable base of operations. A steady artillery duel was kept up by both sides about Souchez, Aix-Noulette, Ypres, and St. Eloi. The Germans again prepared the way for another assault on the new British positions, shelling the crater strongholds with a carefully concentrated fire. After an obstinate hand-to-hand fight the crater was once more relinquished to the Germans, and again the British sprayed the coveted lines with high explosive shells. While the fight continued during the first week in April, the weather became more propitious for aerial operations. German, French, British, and Belgian aircraft ascended daily and gave battle, several German and British machines being shot to earth. One of the latter fell near Hollebeke and its occupants were captured, while a German flyer was shot near Lens. Heroes of the air may be found on every battle front. An adventure of Sergeant Chaput, of the French

aviation service, is worth recording: He chased and engaged a German aero above Monzeville. The two were flying at the great height of two and one-quarter miles. The idea of a machine-gun duel among the clouds is thrilling enough. This, however, gave no tangible result, and Chaput fell upon the desperate expedient of ramming his adversary. Climbing above him, he deliberately volplaned down on the German machine and struck it amidships. It fell to earth in two pieces; the pilot, a Bavarian officer wearing the Iron Cross, was given a military funeral. Chaput's engine was driven into the fusillage and his machine was otherwise damaged; but he did not lose his nerve and succeeded in landing without serious injury.

CHAPTER VI

OPERATIONS IN THE ARGONNE, FLANDERS, AND ELSEWHERE

IN the Argonne region the French continued their general defense. Their artillery bombarded the enemy positions north of Haute Chevauchée and on the southern boundary of the Cheppy Wood. In Lorraine a surprise attack was made on the German works in the forest of Parroy; they were captured, destroyed, and immediately evacuated. Near Lihons, two miles west of Chaulnes, a small German detachment raided a French position and brought back fifty-eight prisoners.

The Germans renewed their activities with increased vigor in the Vosges, Alsace, and Lorraine, during the first half of April. Winter had passed with its attendant hardships, and the kaiser, reasoning, perhaps, that snow and ice had hitherto been a sufficient barrier, closed the Swiss frontier.

Southeast of Seppois, after a bombardment of the French positions, German infantry left their lines and attempted to penetrate the French trenches, but were stopped by a barrier of fire that completely demoralized the movement; they retired,

leaving many dead on the ground. A French dirigible hovered over the railway station at Audun-le-Roman and dropped thirty-four bombs. South of Sondernach a German reconnaissance party endeavored to occupy a small post at Langenfeldkopf, but were dispersed by French artillery. Long-range guns of the French shelled the railway station at Noveant-sur-Moselle and on the Corny Bridge, north of Pont-à-Mousson, where a fire was started in the station buildings. By the same shell fire a German convoy on the road from Essey to Nonsard was scattered. Several sharp encounters between patrols were recorded; ever on the offensive, the German infantry found the mountainous, wooded region of the Vosges for patrol attacks and surprise assaults, while the French lines were continually bombarded and frequently penetrated. In the Lorraine region the fighting was similar in character to that of the Vosges and the Alsatian fronts.

Mounted on hilly projections long-range guns could easily command a wide area; while small infantry bodies placed on advantageous heights and armed with machine guns made attacks both hazardous and costly. Hand-to-hand encounters were here not indulged in by the opposing forces as in the sectors to the north. From the first part of April to the latter days of the month the German staff adhered to its plan of continued offensive so that by the 27th a well-defined thrust was made along the entire line with the exception of Verdun, where a marked lull occurred, from the beginning of the Alsace sector to Nieuport on the North Sea growing in intensity until the last ten days in April, when it reached its climax. It was quite a coincidence that with the general offensive of the Germans came the tragic and unsuccessful attempt of the Irish revolutionists to break away from England—alleged to have been aided and abetted by Germany—and the dangerous sortie of the German North Sea fleet. Whether the kaiser and his staff placed any hopes in the leadership of Sir Roger Casement may never be known. However, the land fighting on the west soon drifted back to what may be called its "normal" course, and the crown prince resumed his hammering against the rock of Verdun.

During the month of April the Verdun sector remained the chief center of interest and activity, though even there the "great battle" had ceased to deserve that title; it had developed into a series of attacks, now on this side, now on that, of what was at first a wide front. Of the forty-four miles of the original front there was now fighting on less than one-third of the line. The developments on the rest of the western front were neither important nor startling. Everywhere the French and the British seemed capable of preventing their opponents from striking anything like a decisive blow. On April 20 and 25, 1916, Russian troops were landed in France and received a mighty ovation by way of welcome.

Artillery dueling had become quite a habit with the opposing forces in Flanders. For the first sixteen days of April the terrible "monotony" of the big guns was broken only by an occasional infantry movement. A destructive fire on the German trenches in front of Steenstraete and on the German organizations at Middelkerke and Langemarck was carried out with marked effect. At Dixmude the German howitzers were particularly busy raining a stream of shells on the town; for each one sent over two were returned, together with a malediction in Flemish for the hated invader. The descendants of the the warlike Nervii, whose ferocious bravery Cæsar commented on, were still fighting with characteristic fearlessness for the slim strip of territory that was left to them.

A German observation post and some concrete shelters were shattered east of Ramscapelle. War has also its amusing moments. Two British soldiers had been taken prisoners at Ypres in the spring of 1915. They eventually came together again in the same concentration camp in Germany. They hatched plans of escape, and on a very dark night stealthily crept past the German sentry. They reached the woods and the open country, when boy scouts were sent out after them. At one spot they had to hide for nine hours in wet grass bordering on a wood, with a hostile sentry only a few yards away. In one village children stoned them for tramps. After traveling for two nights hunger forced them to seek food at a farmhouse.

Their entire knowledge of German consisted of the solitary word "Ja." Fortunately, their German uniforms and jaded appearance elicited an immediate query about food; both answered with an abrupt, growling "Ja," when they were quickly supplied. They devoured what was placed before them and hastily departed without a word of thanks, but not without gratitude. Arrived safely in old "Blighty" (home), they presented themselves before the military authorities and were sent back again to the front.

In the Artois sector, which in April extended almost directly south from La Bassée through the city of Arras to the north bank of the river Somme, the German forces, on the offensive, were at times extravagant with munitions and men. While mine springing and consequent crater fighting predominated, artillery duels and infantry assaults assumed rather violent proportions. The French were sparing of their native soil and did not give up a yard of it without exacting heavy penalties. The British troops who defended the major part of the front north of the Somme during April, were equally determined in their efforts to eject the common foe. In the neighborhood of the quarries and opposite Hulluch the Germans exploded five mines, causing some damage to the British trenches. Around Thiepval, Mouchy-au-Bois, and Souchez violent artillery combats continued unabated, and in the Vermelles region vigorous mining operations were maintained by both sides. German bombing attacks became quite a feature in the vicinity of Neuville-St. Vaast, Arras, and Grenay. After a wild cannonading concentrated on either of the objective points of attack, followed by a veritable shower of bombs, small detachments armed with a plentiful supply of hand grenades and gas machines, advanced toward the enemy trenches to prepare the way for the infantry. At times their entry into the British lines was a foregone conclusion. The suffocating fumes of gas made it impossible to show resistance; their occupation of the lines was nevertheless short, for they were many times driven out again at the point of the bayonet. Toward the end of the month of April the fighting in the Artois grew heavier until attacks and counter-

attacks were in progress most of the time. Accounts from the different fronts gave little clue to the ferocity of the determined struggle, yet the weekly reports of killed, wounded, and missing, clearly demonstrated increased energy. British bombing groups, on April 23, 1916, raided the German trenches southwest of Thiepval and brought back thirteen prisoners. Many dugouts were torn to pieces and their occupants either killed or buried under the débris. South of La Bassée Canal strong British detachments attacked mine craters held by Germans, but were forced to retire after some severe hand fighting. West of Givenchy-en-Gobelle mining activity was carried on with attendant infantry rushes to occupy the resulting craters formed by the explosions. At the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Cabaret Rouge, and particularly at Loos the conflict became ever fiercer.

The night of April 26, 1916, the Bedfordshire regiment carried out a successful raid on the German trenches between Carnoy and Hebuterne. Artillery became very active about La Boiselle, Mouchy-au-Bois, and Neuville-St. Vaast, while in the regions of Souchez, Vermelles, and Hulluch mine springing and crater fighting raged continuously. In the early morning of the 27th the Germans started an attack with gas south of Hulluch and at the same time spread a fire barrage on the British lines north of Loos. In two hours a second gas cloud was released from the same places, and after an artillery bombardment the German infantry rushed the British trenches, where they succeeded in gaining a footing. In half an hour Irish troops counterattacked and drove them out again. The Germans again advanced from their trenches south of Hulluch, but the assault was enfiladed by enemy machine guns which caused much havoc. A few Germans reached the trenches, but were driven back. A British officer with four men found a German patrol in occupation of a bit of trench and, jumping in on top of them, killed the lot. There was little activity on April 28, 1916. Early in the morning German troops tried to enter enemy trenches at two points north of Roclincourt. They exploded five mines and prepared the way with artillery and trench mortar bombardment, but the attempt failed. At Loos it remained comparatively quiet, as at

other points on the front. On the 29th the Germans made two attacks, under cover of bombardment and gas, opposite Hulluch. The wind suddenly veered round and drove the gas back over the German trenches, and the soldiers were seen to leave their positions and run to the rear through the barrage of British fire on a front of about 700 yards. The front was colored by gas on a front of 1,000 yards to a depth of about 3,000 yards. The casualties must have been very heavy among the German troops from their own gas, as many ambulances were seen to come up from the rear lines.

As the spring weather brought warm, clear days there came a general livening up in aerial reconnaissance. Flocks of airmen soared at great heights and reported to those below the actual positions of important bases, ammunition trains, movements of troops, and battery emplacements. During the last few days in April and the early part of May over seventy aerial combats took place. In one instance four British machines attacked eight German aeroplanes flying in formation, and drove a wedge into the middle of them; a ten-minutes' fight resulted in four of the German flyers having to descend.

The "international trench," in the Ypres sector, was destined to return once more into German possession. The first half of April found the position almost precisely the same, notwithstanding that fighting was increasing. April 5-6, 1916, after a concentrated artillery preparation, German troops advanced upon the British craters south of St. Eloi. With tenacious hand-to-hand fighting they succeeded in capturing them. These positions, it will be remembered, had been taken by the Canadians on March 27, 1916. The British reported that German troops were in possession of only one crater out of four in the disputed region. The struggle, nevertheless, continued with unabated severity. The Canadians pressed forward in furious dashes to regain any territory left in German hands. The fortune of war varied day by day, neither side being able to oust the other. The artillery still hammered away at all points to batter a path through wire entanglements for the attacking troops. To the south of St. Eloi, at Richebourg, the British made a small raid

on enemy trenches, while to the north, on the Ypres-Pilkem road, the Germans made three successive attacks and gained a footing in the first line trenches. They were forced out again, leaving twenty-three dead and three prisoners. The artillery bombarded the entire region west of the road occupied by British, and in the vicinity of Wytschaete and St. Eloi heavy guns maintained an uninterrupted duel. The region on both sides of Ypres, Hulluch and Loos, and that to the north and south of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, bore the brunt of the fighting. At these points periodical battles were fought between Teutons and Britons with marked fury and reckless bravery on both sides. During the night of April 18-19, 1916, the Germans launched four attacks against the British line about the city of Ypres—one each at the Langemarck-Ypres road, Wieltje, the Bluff, and at St. Eloi. The French gunners to the north of the scene of action assisted the British by shelling east of the Langemarck-Ypres road, where the fighting could be seen. The Germans penetrated the lines at several places. A counterattack was immediately organized and the Germans were driven out everywhere except at the above-mentioned road and at St. Eloi. On April 21, 1916, British headquarters reported that their forces had recaptured the trenches and reestablished the entire position. Berlin announced that the Germans were compelled to evacuate their newly won positions on the Langemarck-Ypres road on account of high floods, which made their consolidation impossible. The once beautiful city of Ypres again suffered a severe artillery visitation. An eyewitness thus describes the day's bombardment: "The Germans go on battering Ypres day after day as if in a mere senseless temper, or as if, ashamed of the ruin they have made, they hoped now so to pulverize every building as to destroy all traces of their handiwork. There is much less of the fine Cloth Hall and Cathedral now than there was a week ago. There is less to-day than there was yesterday morning; for both in the morning and afternoon of yesterday the Germans were 'strafing' that shell-torn square for the fiftieth time. The morning 'strafe' was over when we were there, and before the afternoon period of wrath set in we were sitting on a bit of rising

ground not far away, whence we could watch each shell when it burst in or over the town; shrapnel, high explosives, and, apparently, lyddite, for at times the thick fumes rose so densely as almost, in spite of the sunshine, to veil the ruins. The 'strafe' lasted for perhaps half an hour. Then it ceased, and after an hour's interval began again for another half-hour more furiously than ever." At the end of April, notwithstanding the intense fighting, the gains made by either side were scarcely perceptible. In the night of the 26th and 27th the Germans attacked the British at Armentières and about Frelinghein, forced their way into the trenches and were immediately expelled. At the same time they attacked at Hill 60 with no better result. Other assaults were delivered west of Zillebeke and northeast of Hill 60. Then the infantry movements slackened, and the artillery resumed its perpetual pounding.

Early in May the British war office announced that Australian and New Zealand troops had arrived in France and taken over a portion of the front. On their first day in the trenches the Germans showed a notice welcoming the Australians, but soon after, it was stated, they displayed another notice calling them sons of convicts and blackguards, which naturally aroused the bitterest feelings. The British at this time were holding nearly ninety miles of front to 300 miles held by the French. On May 1, 1916, a German attack was repulsed north of Loos. Clouds of poison were liberated from the German lines north of the Messines-Wulverghem road. The infantry assault which followed was broken up by the British artillery fire. Equally fruitless was an attack by bombers near Hollandsche Schuur. On the 3d further attacks fell on the British east of Ypres and north of Albert. Little of importance happened until May 11, 1916, on the evening of which day the Germans succeeded in capturing about 500 yards of the British lines northeast of Vermelles; by a night counterattack a portion of the ground was recovered. On the 15th Germans made a raid east of Loos; the French rushed some German trenches in the Somme Valley and gained a small local success in the Champagne. Verdun was still—or rather again—the center of interest; elsewhere events were merely

marking time. The situation was admirably described by the New York "Evening World" as follows: "On the western battle front it often seems as if opposing generals might just as well shake dice from day to day to see which side shall shoot a few score thousand of its own men. The dead pile higher, but the gains, one way or another, remain pitifully small. Lines bend but never break. . . . From a distance it can seem only hideously, inexplicably futile."

During the first week in June the Germans broke into the British line at Hooge, east of Ypres; on the 13th the Canadians recaptured the British positions lost southeast of Zillebeke; the Germans retaliated by taking some trenches west of Thiaumont; they also captured part of the village of Fleury, for the possession of which there was a terrific struggle. The French asserted that the Germans were driven out of Fleury. For ten days there was miserable weather, with unceasing rain. The ground was sodden, unless where countless shell holes full of standing water made it more desolate. For ten days there was no chance for attacks, but preparations for future eventualities were industriously carried on. French and British were getting ready for their Somme drive. Meanwhile the Germans had found it necessary to withdraw five divisions from their reserves on the Somme and send them to Verdun. They made some attacks at Vimy with the object of masking the departure of these troops, consisting of the First Bavarian Corps.

On the Franco-British side the scenery was carefully being set in position preparatory to ringing up the curtain for a fresh act in the great spectacular pandemonium. They had taken a leaf from the German book and were piling up a tremendous mass of artillery and munitions. They could not, and did not hope to, sweep the enemy out of the field. That was forbidden by the depth, strength, and rail power of the enemy's organization in the west. With masterly skill a week's operations was carried out to harass, hurt, and fluster the enemy along the whole line—to damage his positions and expose them to assault on many sectors without giving any hint of the main direction of their intended attack. The coming struggle was to extend the Allies'

hold over the rolling plateau, from 300 to 500 feet high, which stretches round Albert. Here the British and French lines had hitherto run backward, forming a kind of deep bay, and it would have been an enormous advantage to carry them forward by a few miles. Much had already been done to rectify the alignment of the most awkward curve. On the bend of the Somme the French had carried Curlu, on the road to Péronne. Above them the British troops had carried places like Mametz, Montauban, La Boiselle, and Serre. All around we see the preliminaries of a great experiment. Real experiment in the gigantic laboratory of modern war must be elaborate and continued. The process must be subject to revision before there can be any certainty that the surest means have been found. During the months of relative acquiescence of Sir Douglas Haig's command the main British army had become a magnificent force in equipment and ability. With its reserves it had now become one of the four most powerful armies in existence. It had been supplied with an artillery as formidable in proportion to its size as had yet been known even in this conflict of stupendous mechanism. This time British fighting power, like the famous palette, was unmistakably mixed with brains. With brazen-lunged instruments the overture began on Saturday, June 24, 1916. At 7.30 in the morning the British batteries, giving voice along a line of eighty miles, from the Yser to the Somme, began to operate in colossal unison against the German front. That front was overwhelmed with a deluge of explosives. On many stretches the German entanglements were pulverized, their foremost trenches beaten to rubbish, and their support positions reached. Woods and bushes that were green before were shattered and stripped of leaves. The remains of villages, châteaux, and farms sank into shapeless heaps. Flame and smoke and fume marked out this ravaged zone of death. The artillery of the British was aided by balloons which floated in evident security over their lines; the German balloons had been driven down. Taking its range and weight together, this bombardment was unparalleled. It went on, more or less, by night and day for a week. Calais heard it; Amiens heard it; even Paris heard it, with particular joy. In

the calm of the nights the southern hills and cliffs of Britain listened to the distant rumbling roar. This cannonade did not mean only demonstration or even preparation. It did much killing in the German trenches. The attack was supported in other ways. Clouds of poison gas were repeatedly let loose upon the originators of this new messenger of death. Superadded to gas and shell was a new form of infantry attack. Except when rain interrupted, scores of British patrols and raiding parties went out every night, penetrating the German lines at many points, while curtain fire was carried over the enemy's support and communication trenches. In these deadly scuffles grenades, knife, and bayonet decided the issue. Prisoners were brought back from nearly every position attacked, so that the British knew the name and station of every battalion lying before them. Above all, these raiding parties brought back reports upon the state of the enemy's trenches and progress of the damage to the whole German front. Comparatively slight losses were suffered by the raiders. These harassing preliminaries continued till Saturday, July 1, 1916, from which stage the narrative will be continued in another chapter.

CHAPTER VII

BATTLES OF THE SOMME—POSITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES

ON one of the first days in July, 1916, at the beginning of the great Anglo-French offensive on the Somme, General Joffre issued to the troops at Verdun the following order of the day:

"The plan matured in the councils of the Allies is now being put into full execution. Soldiers of Verdun! it is to your heroic resistance that we owe it; this it is that has been the indispensable condition of success; this it is upon which our approaching victories will depend; for it has been your resistance that has brought about on the entire European battle field a situation out of which will come the definite triumph of our cause."

The British, receiving reenforcements without interruption, were from the beginning of 1916 in a position to lengthen their front sensibly. In the neighborhood of Arras they were able to relieve an entire French army, the tenth. New battalions and new divisions arrived uninterruptedly from England during the spring and the beginning of the summer of 1916. The French on their side had not by any means made full use of their reserves at Verdun. The longer the battle of Verdun continued the more insistently does the German press repeat that the objective of the German Staff was not so much the taking of Verdun as the obliging of the French to use up their reserves and so become deprived of the hope of ever again taking the offensive.

Thanks to the great number of units still available to the French, they were not obliged to keep the divisions too long on duty in the Verdun sector. They were able to relieve them rapidly before they suffered very considerable losses. Thus having at their command the numerous British reserves that had not so far been made use of, as well as important French forces which the French Staff had been wise enough to hold in readiness, it was with these forces that the allied commanders decided to undertake the offensive on the Somme.

The date, the place, the importance—in a word, all the conditions of this general offensive—were decided on by the commanders of the allied armies at the war councils held in Paris during the spring of 1916. The prime object of the Allies, the problem which they had to solve before every other, was to prevent the Central Empires, and Germany above all, from making use of their interior lines and their means of transportation to and from their armies on one front or another, in such a way as to be able to concentrate considerable forces wherever they were attacked or wherever they wanted to attack themselves. During 1915 Germany was able to play at this game of shuttle because her enemies had allowed her to remain at relative rest over considerable segments of her front. But on the day on which the Allies determined to launch a simultaneous offensive this sort of play became impossible.

It was decided that Russia should be the first to strike in order that she might profit without delay from the depleted condition of the Russian front imprudently permitted by the Austrians when they launched their offensive in the Trentino. The date of the Franco-British offensive was fixed for the beginning of July.

The sector this time chosen for attack by the Allies was slightly more to the south than the point chosen in May, 1915. The attack was to be made on a front of about forty kilometers going from Gommecourt, which is situated exactly on the Doullens elevation, to a little north of Chaulnes. Conjecture as to the reasons for this change is easy. Right at the beginning the British lengthened their line considerably. They relieved the French army that held the Arras sector and descended to the Somme. For the rest, the region in which the attack was to be delivered is a purely agricultural region, very different from that in which the attack of May, 1915, was made, for that is a mining country. There are no large villages, none of those big groups of houses offering to the Germans, who are so skillful in organizing places of that kind for defense—formidable rallying points. The country is nothing but a vast stretch of corn and beet fields. The villages are wide apart, situated near the water and surrounded by orchards. They look like green bouquets against the cultivated soil. The small streams, placid and gently murmuring, flow through dales that have been carved in the plateaus. The rain water absorbed by the mud and chalk of the plateau makes its way to the valleys. The valleys are as moist as the plateau is dry, and are filled with peat holes and canals from the hortillons (little gardens, half land, half water, with waters all around, where the people of the marshes go in boats). Two rivers, the Ancre and the Somme, flow through this country. The slopes are very gentle. From a height of a hundred and twenty yards at the Ancre they rise only to 174 yards over a distance of six miles.

South of the Somme the country is still more level; this is the plateau of Santerre. The front had been fixed there almost immediately after the battle of the Marne, when each of the foes was trying to envelop the other on his western flank.

SECTOR WHERE GRAND OFFENSIVE WAS STARTED

The German front from the sea on the north as far as Roy was held by three armies, which, counting from the north to the south, were: the fourth army, commanded by Duke Albert of Württemberg, and comprising in front of Nieuport the Naval Corps which faces the French; opposite the Belgian divisions, a brigade of Landwehr and brigade of Ersatz, forming the division of Von Basedow from St. George to Dixmude; then in the sector of Dixmude the Fourth Division of Ersatz, the Eleventh Brigade of Landwehr; and at the salient of Ypres two corps, the Twenty-sixth and the Thirteenth, where, in September, 1915, the Germans had four army corps. At St. Eloi began the front held by the sixth German army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria.

The army comprised, in the spring of 1916, the Twenty-third Army Corps, the Nineteenth Army Corps, and the Sixth Bavarian Division of Reserve. A Germany army corps, the Seventh Corps, which was there in April, 1916, was transferred to the eastern front.

More to the south, from La Bassée to Lens, the Second Reserve Division of the Guard, the Second Bavarian Corps, and the Fourteenth Corps were placed. To the south of Lens, as far as Arras, there were at the end of March, two corps, namely, the Ninth Reserve Corps and the First Bavarian Corps. This force had been sent to the Meuse, and in their place, without a doubt, were brought other units to take a rest. Thus it was between La Bassée and Arras that during the spring the principal accumulation of German forces was found.

There, opposite the British, the Germans had massed very important forces for the purposes of meeting a British offensive, in case, as they thought likely, the British might want to reply to the German attack on Verdun. South of Arras, the left wing of the sixth German army was composed, in April, of the First Bavarian Reserve Division, the Thirty-eighth Landwehr, and the 111th Division. Near Mouchy-au-Bois began in April the line held by the second German army. The army was composed of the Fifty-second Division, the Fourteenth Reserve Corps, the Sixth Corps, and the Tenth Bavarian Division.

Finally there were in April, recuperating behind the fourth army and the sixth army, a certain number of German divisions: the Hundred and Twenty-third south of Bruges, the Fifty-third and the Hundred and Twenty-seventh on the Lys, the Fifty-fourth at the confluence of the Lys and the Escaut at Gand. More to the south another group was formed by the Twenty-second Corps and the two divisions of the guard east of Cambrai.

The front chosen for attack stretched from Gommecourt to the north of Chaulnes, approximately a distance of twenty-four miles.

About fifteen miles were to be held by the British, the six remaining miles on the south by the French. For some time the British lines had extended to the Somme.

In view of the contemplated attack, the British pressing northward, abandoned to a French army corps the sector on the right bank of the Somme, which runs from Carnoy to the river, a distance of about five kilometers.

From the time that the war of movement had transformed itself into a war of trenches an event which occurred immediately after the battle of the Marne, the problem of how to break through a front, became one of capital importance for the general staffs.

Never before in other wars had there arisen a difficulty so serious. This difficulty arises from the fact that in war, as it is now waged, armies have ceased to have any flank.

In the present war the trench lines stretch continuously from the sea to the frontiers of neutral countries, absolutely barring all hope of one adversary turning the flank of another. Thus the obstacle could not be turned; it had to be attacked from the front and broken.

How could this breaking of lines be effected? Two solutions of the problem appeared possible. The first consisted in carrying at a single stroke, following on waves of assault incessantly renewed, the whole series of hostile positions, the first, second, and third lines, if such there were, so as to arrive in the open where there was room for maneuvering, and where even the cavalry might be able to take part.

This solution, while attractive in theory, encounters in practice formidable and even insurmountable difficulties. Waves of assault, no matter how carefully prepared, would never succeed in giving sufficient intensity to the attack. The effort at carrying both the first and the second lines of the enemy would exhaust the energy of the attacking side. By the time the assailants arrived at the third line, assuming such a possibility, the units would become entangled one with another, and the connection between the attacking columns and their rear would nearly always be broken. In such a disordered condition of affairs the troops could no longer be kept in hand. The slightest obstacle, the fire of a few mitrailleuses, would suffice to bring them to a stop. Above all, and here is the greatest difficulty, the artillery would not be able to give sufficient support to the infantry columns that were thrown forward. If the advance was very rapid, say over two, three, or four miles, it would be necessary to bring the artillery forward. The new order of artillery could not be moved with the requisite speed; in short, at the moment when the infantry, having made the greatest possible effort, was exhausted and out of breath, and was in the direst need of the support of the artillery, it would be just at that moment that the support would not be forthcoming.

The other solution of the problem consists in an advance that is slow and methodical. A limited and well-defined objective is put before the attacking columns. This objective attained, the columns stay where they are and fortify the conquered positions. The artillery comes forward if it can find a place, and proceeds with all desirable care to deliver a new bombardment. When the bombardment has shown itself sufficiently effective the infantry is launched forward again to the attack, conquering the second line, and so with the others. This time it would not be a matter of a violent crumpling up of the opposing front or of a sudden breach, but of a continuous pressure directed against the hostile positions, and little by little forcing them to yield.

It was this second method brought to perfection and employed over a sufficiently large segment that was adopted by the Franco-British troops for their offensive on the Somme.

In preparation for the offensive on the Somme the rear of the armies that had to engage in it was transformed into a huge industrial plant where work was carried out on the broadest scale. Old roads were repaired and new ones laid, while railways with both the ordinary and narrow gauge were constructed. The quarries were opened and worked to supply foundations for the roads and railways.

It was essential to prevent the Germans from seeing the preparations that were going forward. It was necessary in some sort of way to blind the enemy—to put out his eyes, as it were. The eyes of a hostile army are his aeroplanes and his captive balloons. Thanks to the valor of the French and British aviators the German flyers were literally prohibited from crossing the enemy lines during all that time. In five days fifteen of the German aeroplanes were brought to the ground. Few German balloons attempted to take to the air.

The preliminary bombardment began on June 25, 1916. The intention was that it should last five days, but bad weather having postponed the attack, it lasted seven days, up to July 1, 1916. On their entire front the British bombarded the German lines with unprecedented violence.

The Germans were thus able to appreciate what the British had done in the way of big shells and guns; and yet this was only the beginning.

On the French side the huge pieces of artillery brought up by rail played an important part in the artillery preparation.

During the period of the entire bombardment the French and British aviators, by means of direct observation and by photographs, rendered full and detailed reports of the results obtained by the fire. The French and British General Staffs thus followed from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the progress made in the destruction of the German trenches and shelters.

While this terrible bombardment was proceeding the British were making a series of attacks and intrepid raids into the German trenches. The British communiqué during the last days of June all make reference to them. Thus the communiqué of June 28, 1916, says:

"A particularly successful raid was carried out by the Highland Light Infantry near the Vermelles-La Bassée road, when forty-six prisoners and two machine guns were captured."

The communiqué of June 29, 1916, says:

"During the past twenty-four hours a large number of our reconnoitering and raiding parties entered the enemy's trenches at various points along the entire front of the British army. All these enterprises were successful in achieving their objects, inflicting heavy casualties on the Germans and capturing prisoners and warlike stores.

"In several instances our troops remained for a considerable period in the German lines, repelling hostile counterattacks across the open. One of these enterprises took place after a discharge of gas, and our troops on entering the German trenches found a considerable number of dead. Our casualties were insignificant." Properly to follow this great battle as it unrolls it is necessary to take separate account of the operations on each of the two sectors.

CHAPTER VIII

FIGHTING NORTH OF THE SOMME

FROM the hamlet of Vaux, ruined by the German artillery, on the right bank of the Somme, part of the battle field, with the configuration of a long crest, looks like a foaming sea stretching away to the horizon.

Against the whitish yellow background the woods resolve into dark spots and the quarries into vast geometric figures.

In the valley the Somme zigzags among the poplars; its marshy bed is covered with rushes and aquatic plants; on the left you perceive crumbled walls surrounding an orchard the trees of which have been cut to pieces by German shells; it is the mill of Fargny through which the French first line passes. Farther on there was the first German trench, at a place that goes by the name of the Chapeau-de-Gendarme. Farther still, in the valley,

there is the village of Curlu, entirely surrounded by gardens and occupied by the Bavarians. More to the east there were some walls, almost invisible among the trees; this was the village of Hem. On the horizon one could see the church of Péronne and the church steeple of Clery.

At half past seven on the morning of July 1, 1916, the foot soldiers dashed forward to the assault on the German trenches. They had to carry strongly fortified positions, which the Germans had been left leisure to fortify during a period of nearly two years—two, three, and four lines of trenches, bounded by deep ditches, with the woods and village of Curlu organized for defense. But the driving power of the assault was magnificent. By a single dash forward, by one whole-hearted stroke, the foremost German works were carried. Mounting the steep ascent that goes by the name of the Chapeau-de-Gendarme, the young soldiers of the class of 1916, who were under fire for the first time, waved their handkerchiefs and cried: "Vive la France!"

Here they were among the foremost houses in Curlu. The village was occupied by companies of Bavarians who made an energetic resistance. Mitrailleuses, which the bombardment was unable to destroy, appeared on the roofs, in the openings of the houses, in the environs of the church, even in the ventholes of the cellars.

The attacking columns, in conformity with the orders they had received, stopped immediately. The soldiers crouched on their stomachs, and the French artillery recommenced a terrible bombardment of the village, which had not yet received its full quota of shells. Every battery concentrated a hellish fire on this point. The houses were razed to the ground and the mitrailleuses put out of action within half an hour. Then the attack was continued. This time the French infantry took the village of Curlu almost without suffering any further loss. During the night the Germans launched their counterattack, as the French had expected. This counterattack failed, and the village remained in the hands of the French.

There were found in the ruins of the houses a great number of packages which had been put together by the Bavarians—

pieces of furniture, articles of dress, and various other objects pilfered from the various houses and intended to be carried off by the pilferers. The French attack did not allow them time enough to do it.

During the three days that followed the French organized the positions which they had conquered.

On July 5, 1916, at seven in the morning, there was a new bound forward. The infantry of the same army corps went forward to attack the village of Hem, situated more to the east. The village and all the neighboring trenches were taken in a few hours. The French gained ground right up to the edge of the road to Péronne. Toward midday the last houses in Hem still in the hands of the Germans were in their power. At the same hour a French company installed themselves in the quarry called "Spahn," at the southeast of the village; there they quietly had their luncheon.

Thanks to the soundness of the plans, the prudence of the commanders, and the rapidity of the attack, the casualties anticipated in the course of this operation were reduced greatly.

CHAPTER IX

FIGHTING SOUTH OF THE SOMME

SOUTH of the river Somme, from the village of Frise to opposite the village of Estrees, on a front of almost ten kilometers, the attack was launched on July 1, 1916, at 9:30 a. m., or about two and a half hours later than the attack on the right bank.

Here it was that a colonial corps delivered the assault—a corps that had also particularly distinguished itself in the course of the war. More to the south were the Bretons. Both of them performed miracles. As in the northern sector, they attained all their objectives in the course of a few hours.

By the evening of July 1, 1916, all the foremost positions of the Germans, from the environs of Frise to the ridges of Estrees,

were taken. The villages of Dompierre, Becquincourt, and Fay were occupied by the French.

The progress continued at the rate decided on. On July 2, 1916, the French infantry attacked the village of Frise; by noon the village was taken. Here a battery of seventy-seven was found still in good condition. The French continued their progress and reached the horn of land northeast of the wood of Mereaucourt. The village of Herbecourt, a little more to the south, was completely surrounded, and an hour later the village was entirely in the hands of the French. By night the French had taken the whole assemblage of German defenses, linking Herbecourt to the village of Assevillers. During the day of July 3, 1916, there was the same regular movement forward, the same continuous advance. The French took Assevillers and Flaucourt.

During the night the cavalry patrols advanced to the village of Barleux, which was occupied by the Germans in strength. A regiment of the Foreign Legion took Balloy-en-Santerre on the fourth, and more to the south the French took the village of Estrees.

The almost mathematical regularity of this advance was very remarkable.

On the fifth the Germans counterattacked, failing completely. On the ninth the advance forward continued, and the village of Biaches was taken. On the 10th the French succeeded in reachin La Maisonette, which marks the highest point in that part of the country, quite dominating the village of Péronne and the valley of the Somme.

The German casualties had been very great. At Biaches alone a whole regiment had been destroyed. To the south the French halted for a time in the environs of Estrees. The troops that occupied this point and linked it to the rest of the French lines had to execute a very difficult maneuver, requiring absolute sangfroid and great skill. Their duty involved leaving their trenches and moving to the east, then to wheel round and advance in a direct southerly direction, so as to guard against any flanking attack that might later be attempted by the Germans.

This maneuver was executed under bombardment and under the fire of the mitrailleuses with a precision and method that were very remarkable.

Thus in ten days the French succeeded over a front of fifteen kilometers in effecting at certain points an advance ten kilometers in depth. They succeeded in carrying something like eighty square kilometers of works of every kind, trenches, fortified villages, quarries as strong as fortresses, and so on. They took eighty-five cannon, several of them of great caliber, a hundred mitrailleuses, twenty-six "Minenwerfer," and considerable other material. They took prisoner 235 officers and 12,000 men.

It might well be said that that was a very splendid result. But it was only the first result.

The measured and sustained regularity of this advance, the precision and order of the entire maneuver, are deserving of a more detailed description. Looking into what may be called its strategic mechanism, it is noted that south of the Somme the French line turned with its left on a pivot placed at its right in front of Estrees.

The longer the battle continued the more this turning movement became accentuated. On the third the extreme left advanced from Mericourt to Buscourt, the left from Herbecourt to Flaucourt, which was taken; the center occupied Assevillers.

On the 4th the right, abandoning in its turn the rôle of fixed point, moved forward and took the two villages of Estrees and Belloy. Thus from the first to the fourth the French corps, operating south of the Somme, constantly marched with the left in advance.

After an interval of repose the attack was again taken up by the left wing on the 9th and carried before Péronne, Biaches, and La Maisonette.

Thus the maneuver which began early in an easterly direction developed into a movement toward the south. It had as its object, as stated in the official communiqué, to clear the interior of the angle of the Somme and to cover the right of the French troops operating north of the river. This delicate maneuver in-

volved great difficulty and great risk, inasmuch as the French right flank became the target of an enfilading fire from the south. It will be seen, if the map is consulted, that the artillery positions south of Villers direct an enfilading fire on the plateau of Faucourt and near-by points. The French General Staff showed sagacity in parrying this danger by advancing the right at the proper moment.

Thus the French attained the actual environs of Péronne. Péronne, an old fortified city, standing in an important strategic position, is situated at the apex of the angle made by the Somme between Bray and Ham. It is a natural and necessary road of passage for the armies, whether coming from the north or the south, that want to cross the Somme.

Blücher, while pursuing the French armies after the battle of Waterloo, passed the river exactly at this point.

As a matter of fact both adversaries are astride of the river; the Allies face the east, the Germans look toward the west. Singularly enough it is the exact situation that prevailed in the war of 1870, but with the rôle reversed. At that time the Germans were attacking Péronne as the French are attacking it now; they came, however, from the direction of Amiens, precisely as the French came on this occasion.

The French, on the other hand, were in the position of the Germans—they came from the north. The army of Faidherbe had its bases at Lille and Cambrai, as has now the Prince of Bavaria.

CHAPTER X

THE BRITISH ATTACK

THE front selected for attack by the British, and running from Gommecourt to the height of Hardecourt, is divided in two by the valley of the Ancre.

The attack was launched on July 1, 1916, at 7.30. North of the Ancre the ground taken by the British was partially taken from

them again. South of the Ancre, on the other hand, as far as the region where they were cooperating with the French, their progress was considerable.

The progress was, above all, continuous. The continuity of their efforts and of their advance is the significant and most remarkable feature of this Franco-British offensive.

The Allies never flattered themselves that theirs would be a headlong rush; it was their intention to go forward slowly but surely. They determined that having started this gigantic conflagration not to let it go out, but to see that it spread farther and farther.

That is the point of view from which to study this great offensive. It is not possible to consider it as isolated. It is not a whole in itself; it is only a part of a whole. It is linked with the battle of Verdun, with the Russian offensive, and with the Italian counteroffensive.

A preliminary remark is necessary regarding the attack so brilliantly executed by the British.

The Germans, it is evident, expected this attack; they took every precaution against it.

On the other hand, it would appear that the attack launched with so much enthusiasm by the French rather surprised and upset them. Having proclaimed to the world that the battle of Verdun had used up all the French reserves, that the French had as a result no fresh division available, they ended by taking their own affirmations seriously. Having taken so much pains to convince others, they came to the point of convincing themselves that the French were henceforth in no position to attack them.

The British line from Gommecourt to Maricourt runs at first to the south. At the Fricourt height it made a brusque turn and took an easterly direction. The village of Fricourt then marked the apex of the pronounced salient that was formed at this point by the German positions. More to the north, on the other hand, in two other quarters the British lines formed two slight salients in the German front. The first was at the height of Thiepval, the second at the height of Villers-La Boisselle. We shall see that

these three salients hold an important place in the conduct of these conflicts.

The British, as might be expected, did not make a frontal attack on the great salient of Fricourt. They threw forward their attacking columns on two sides. Fricourt being in its contour something like a great German nose, they pinched the nose strongly on each nostril and ended by twisting it.

The first attack was made in a direction due north and south through the villages of Mametz and Montauban. Within a few hours the whole labyrinth of German trenches was taken. The strongly fortified villages of Montauban and Mametz were taken by the British troops.

Another attack was delivered more to the north in a west and east direction upon La Boisselle. The Germans here resisted desperately; they were there in considerable force. The British nevertheless made some progress.

The village of Fricourt was thus almost inclosed, with the British troops crowding it on three sides. On July 2, 1916, at two in the afternoon, it fell into the hands of the British. La Boisselle, which was taken by the British, was retaken by the Germans and again passed into British hands. More north the British made a partial seizure of the village of Ovillers, part of which was held by the Germans. South of Thiepval violent German counterattacks regained from the British troops part of the ground which these had won. The first three days of the battle thus brought the British some important gains taken altogether. They succeeded in taking part of the German first line; they took by assault villages strongly fortified and defended by valiant troops; and they took prisoners 4,300 men, and this number was yet to be enlarged. These first engagements had for the British still another important result; it gave to the troops an absolute confidence in themselves. They showed that they could measure themselves with the best soldiers of the kaiser and beat them.

The names of the British battalions that early in the conflict carried in such brilliant fashion the villages of Montauban and of Mametz have been made public.

The first of these villages was taken by the Manchester regiments. They advanced so rapidly that their comrades on the left were not able to keep up the pace, with the result that the Manchester men were made the targets of a flanking fire from rifles and mitrailleuses.

Once in the village, which was then no more than a heap of ruins, they held their ground against every counterattack.

The Liverpool regiments were engaged not far from those of Manchester. They fought admirably and raided several lines of German trenches. They made 800 prisoners.

The Royal Scotch Fusiliers were engaged not far away from those mentioned.

The German garrison occupying the village of Fricourt that surrendered to the British was composed of a battalion of the 186th regiment of infantry, which had arrived two days before from the Champagne front in the sector of Tahure.

The British troops operating on the left, between Fricourt and La Boisselle, were the contingents from York and Durham, who bore themselves very well.

In taking the small wood which crowns the plateau in front of Hill 100 these contingents greatly aided the enveloping movement.

During the night of the 3d and 4th the Germans delivered violent counterattacks and reconquered a part of the village of La Boisselle.

The total number of prisoners taken by the British had by that time reached more than 5,000.

During the day of the 5th the British repulsed several German counterattacks. They fortified the ground already won.

The day of the 6th marked a slackening in the fighting—it was a sort of entr'acte in the great battle. These intervals, these entr'actes, had been foreseen and desired by the general staffs of the Allies. They made use of them to improve the new positions, and to make new plans. They formed a sort of prelude to the new springs forward.

During the night between the 6th and the 7th the British renewed their attacks with extreme violence.

South of Thiepval there was a salient in the German line where the Germans had organized a very strong redoubt, known under the name of the redoubt of Leipzig. During the preceding twenty months they had had all the leisure necessary to fortify it into great strength. The British after a violent bombardment took the redoubt. More to the south they took the German trenches on the outskirts of Ovillers.

A furious battle was fought for the possession of the village. It was on the left, between La Boisselle and Contalmaison, that the principal action took place that night.

There are west of Contalmaison three groves: the wood of Bailly, the wood of La Pointe, and the wood of Bouleaux. The wood of Bailly, which is situated more to the south than the others, was in the hands of the British. They had therefore to attack the wood of La Pointe. A little more to the west of this there was a labyrinth of German trenches called the Fer-à-Cheval, or Horseshoe.

The British attacked on the night between the 6th and 7th on the south and north, where there was reared a strong redoubt.

The two operations succeeded, but they had a singular result. Both of the lateral attacks progressed. In the center the Germans held their ground and fired from two sides both to the right and the left. Thus the night passed; it was only in the morning that, the wood of La Pointe having been taken in a separate action, the last German defenders of the Fer-à-Cheval found themselves surrounded and obliged to surrender. At seven in the morning the British began to bombard Contalmaison and also the wood of Mametz a little more to their right. The fire of the artillery began at seven o'clock. It was a gloomy day; clouds covered the skies. Whirlwinds of smoke rose from the points which were being bombarded. According to witnesses, it was the most terrible bombardment of the battle. The Germans replied with a violent fire on their old trenches: the Fritz trench and the Danzig alley.

At eight o'clock the British artillery lengthened its fire: the moment for the attack had come.



THE ENGLISH GAINS

The infantry advanced on Contalmaison and on the right from two sides of the wood. Behind them the barrage fire of the Germans beating time methodically entirely hid from view the attacking columns.

That has been indeed a frequent phenomenon in the present manner of waging war. The columns once thrown forward are in a way cut off from the other troops by the barrage fire of the enemy. They move and fight almost without communication with their rear. Nothing is known of what is going on in the quarter where they are fighting; one needs must wait till the end of the action to know what is the result.

The British reached the roll of ground in front of the wood. At ten o'clock they were in the wood; at noon part of Contalmaison was taken. Between the wood of Mametz and Contalmaison there occurred a dramatic incident. Just before the bombardment began the German commander threw forward five battalions of the Third Reserve Division of the guard. They advanced toward the British lines in the exact direction in which an hour later the British infantry was inversely to advance. They were about halfway down the road showing in the twilight of a gray morning when suddenly the British bombardment broke forth.

The spectacle was affrighting. The German columns were literally cut to pieces by shells. One battalion seemed to be absolutely annihilated. To escape the dreadful fire the Germans threw themselves desperately forward. It was in its way a flight in the direction of the enemy. The remnants of the troops thus clashed with the British infantry and surrendered.

The German prisoners of Contalmaison were very much astonished to learn that they had had to do with the new armies of Kitchener. They never believed that troops so newly recruited would be able to fight so well. Their officers had told them that they had in front of them the British guards themselves.

That day was for the rest filled with incidents. At noon the gathering clouds broke and a torrential rain, a real tropical storm, burst over the battle field. It kept on raining during the whole afternoon.

The village of Contalmaison presented considerable difficulties to those attacking it from the east side; the attack was impossible in the face of a formidable redoubt of the Germans called the Quadrilateral. On the east side the ground was in the form of a sloping bank swept by cannon and mitrailleuses. The ground was divided by only two ditches along which it was impossible to debouch. The German artillery stationed at Pozières prohibited approach from the south side. The problem, as may be seen, was a difficult one.

The British attacked for the first time along the southwest, using two trenches, one of which was called "Shelter Alley." The leader of this attack was a brave officer who had gained the Victoria Cross at Gallipoli.

The three British companies, or at least what remained of them, arrived in the village and occupied a third of it. But unfortunately it was at that moment that the rain began to fall in bucketfuls. The trench to which the British had arrived, already half filled with dead and wounded, became instantly filled with water. It was like a veritable torrent. Reenforcements attempted still to go forward through the trench, but the thing was impossible. Night came and the rain continued. In the darkness the Germans tried to envelop the British, who had been reduced to a very small number of men. This handful of British soldiers then retired in good order toward the southern extremity of the village, where they stood their ground.

They had presence of mind enough to take with them about seventy German prisoners who had fallen into their hands. They also took a small body of British soldiers who had been made prisoners by the Germans two or three days before and penned by them in a shelter in the village. These British soldiers delivered by their comrades belong to the Northumberland Fusiliers. It is hard to explain why the Germans had not taken them away previously. Probably they had not the time. The German prisoners made that day all declared that the kaiser had visited their front two days before. The rain fell during the night. The British organized their positions on the outskirts of Contalmaison and on the ridges of the Mametz Wood.

BEGINNING

OF THE

GREAT BATTLE ON THE SOMME

BASTILLE DAY · RUSSIANS IN FRANCE · MOTOR-MOUNTED 75
DEAD ON THE BATTLE FIELD · GERMAN PRISONERS · BRITISH
SUPPLY STATION · HOWITZER

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A trench mortar, used wherever the first line of the enemy is not far away. The soldier has discharged the mortar and its bomb is flying over the top of the trench

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Russian soldiers — picked regiments sent to aid the French and British on the western front — marching between lines of French cavalry, and enthusiastically greeted by the populace

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Large bodies of soldiers from the armies of the Allies in France made the celebration of Bastille Day anniversary, July 14, 1916, remarkable. Here French infantry are viewed marching through the Rue Royale, Paris



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The mobility of the French motor-mounted batteries makes them most effective, not only in bringing down aircraft but in strengthening the line at any point. The gun is the famous 75. The motor in the rear carries a supply of shells

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A bit of a Somme battle field. In the foreground are the bodies of French soldiers who fell in a charge on an enemy trench. Their comrades captured the trench and occupied it

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British soldiers and their German prisoners, taken in one of the early battles of the campaign on the Somme. In some cases the positions captured had been held so long that the fields close to the trenches were cultivated

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Premier Briand, General Haig, and members of the British Headquarters Staff inspecting a great British supply station on the French coast. Since the beginning of the war, this station has become almost a city by itself

Copyright, Central News Photo Service

One of the giant British howitzers that have helped blast the way for the advance of the Allies along the Somme. This gun, like many of its kind, is mounted on a flat railway car. A vast supply of new arms and ammunition is at the command of the British troops

The King of England addressed to the commander in chief of the British forces in France, Sir Douglas Haig, the following message:

"Please convey to the army under your command my sincere congratulations on the result achieved in the recent fighting. I am proud of my troops; none could have fought more bravely."

In the left British sector the struggle continued in the village of Ovillers, where the British progressed. It was particularly violent in the right sector, where the French and the British were cooperating. The allied troops fought as comrades, the soldiers of the infantry and artillery cordially shook hands.

The British General Staff intimated to the French General Staff on the 7th that in the morning they would make an attack on the Trônes Wood. The general commanding the French division working with them thought it would be an act of soldierly comradeship to march to battle at the same time. On July 8 at 9:30 the men left their trenches and in less than forty minutes they reached and passed the village of Hardecourt, by the woods. Here they repulsed two German counterattacks which came from the direction of Maurepas. During this time the British were not inactive. They issued from the Berhafay Wood and seized a line of German trenches in the Trônes Wood. Here they took 130 prisoners and several mitrailleuses.

The Germans launched a massed counterattack with the purpose of winning back the positions they had lost. This counterattack came under the fire of the heavy British cannon and French 75's; it was checked with considerable losses to the attacking party. The British continued to hold two-thirds of the Trônes Wood.

This action, which was lively while it lasted, gave to the allied troops on their northeast salient two excellent points of support, the last being the very important point of Combles, which commands the lateral communications of the Germans between Péronne and Bapaume.

From all this we can see the fortunate character of this advance by successive bounds forward, of marching over so much ground at a time. The progress made by the Anglo-French in

the course of the battle brought them to lines flanked and supported by the new French positions of Sormont and Barleux. The Germans who resisted in front of Combles were thus made the targets of a flanking fire from the batteries of Flaucourt. It was thus seen that each of the sectors newly conquered rendered valuable support to the others. It is difficult to imagine a maneuver better coordinated. Every one of the actions in their detail contributed to the result in its sum total.

If a map of the wood of Trônes, which was seized by the British, is consulted it will be seen that the wood is situated in the salient of the new British positions. In a way it marks the apex of the angle made by the new lines.

The wood of Trônes was a thorn in the German flesh, and violent counterattacks were to be expected from them. These counterattacks came in due time. They were delivered with extraordinary persistence and fury. The Germans did not stop at any sacrifice. They performed the impossible in endeavoring to reconquer at any cost this important position.

During the days of the 9th and the 10th a violent conflict was waged around the Trônes Wood.

This wood is triangular in form and about 1,400 meters in length, running from north to south. Its south side is about 400 meters. The Germans directed against it a violent bombardment with shells of every caliber.

On July 9th at eight o'clock they launched desperate counterattacks directed from the east to the southeast. The first failed; the second succeeded in landing them in a south part of the wood, but they were ultimately repulsed with great loss. During the night there was a new German attack, which was broken down by the British fire. During the afternoon of the 10th a sixth attack enabled the Germans to penetrate the wood of Trônes at the cost of serious losses.

The conquest of the wood by the Germans was of short duration. In the morning, following on some bitter fighting, the British retook nearly the whole of it.

The British army achieved another success almost as brilliant. During the night between the 10th and the 11th, following

on a violent bombardment, the British took Contalmaison by assault, capturing 189 prisoners, including a commander of a battalion. A German counterattack was repulsed and the whole village remained in the hands of the British.

This last exploit put an end to what may be called the first phase of the battle. In his communiqué of the evening of the 11th the commander in chief of the British forces, Sir Douglas Haig, was in a position to balance the account of this glorious operation. He said:

"After ten days and nights of continuous fighting our troops have completed the methodical capture of the whole of the enemy's first system of defense on a front of 14,000 yards.

"This system of defense consisted of numerous and continuous lines of fire trenches, support trenches, and reserve trenches extending to various depths of from 2,000 to 4,000 yards, and included five strongly fortified villages, numerous heavily wired and entrenched woods, and a large number of immensely strong redoubts.

"The capture of each of these trenches represented an operation of some importance, and the whole of them are now in our hands."

The number of prisoners taken by the British rose to 7,500.

The French troops, on the other hand, had no intention of remaining at rest. They also closed this first phase by new and brilliant successes that increased and rounded out their already considerable gains.

South of the Somme, in the angle made by the river, the French advanced in front of Péronne, taking during the day of the 10th a small fort, where the Germans obstinately held their ground and where they were in a position to cause our troops rather heavy losses. The village of Biaches had been carried by the French during the day of the 9th. In front of the village there was a small fort surrounded by a network of iron wire concealed among the oats and plants and still left intact despite the fire of the artillery. For a space of twenty-four hours two French companies encircled it; every attack was repulsed and cost the French serious losses.

The fort was finally carried as a result of an act of bravery by a captain commanding a battalion. This captain is the son of a French general. In a letter to his father he himself gives the details of this brilliant operation:

"I resolved to take the fort," he wrote, "having done nothing up to that time. I took with me a scout and two cyclists belonging to the battalion. On the way we met a herald, a corporal, then a sergeant and two men as well as a sublieutenant of the 10th company. We were nine in all. We crawled for a long time on our stomachs through the oats until we came to an opening in the network. At a given moment the sergeant, the sublieutenant and myself dashed into the fort. The sergeant and the sublieutenant threw grenades. I fired several revolver shots, shouting: 'Forward, with the bayonet!' The six others remained in the rear to protect our retreat in case of failure. We succeeded so well that the boches, imagining they were surrounded by a considerable force, surrendered and prepared to leave without arms.

"I expected to find about fifty men. There were 114, with two officers and five subofficers. I feared for a moment in seeing so many that they might change their minds and might fall on us.

"So I fired my last three shots, whereupon the boches, greatly frightened, fell to their knees, their arms in the air and cried: 'Kamerade!' It was extraordinary.

"I called the officers, who, believing that I wanted to kill them, came forward, still on their knees, up to my feet. The six men came in and joined us and we nine escorted the band to the post of Commander T., accompanied by an avalanche of shells which the boches sent among our group. Not one of us was hit.

"The fort was ours: we could breathe.

"It was certainly the best thing I did in the war.

"General F. came up. He embraced me, saying: 'You are a son worthy of your father. I am going to propose you as an officer of the Legion of Honor.'"

Above Biaches the Somme winds round a breast of land at Hill 75 that dominates its confluence with the Cologne. This ground

has two points of support: La Maisonette and the small wood situated to the north. They were both taken by the French during the day of the 10th. The small wood is just at the military crest of the plateau on the side that looks toward the Somme. From there you can see Péronne in the valley at your feet, less than a kilometer away.

The total number of prisoners captured by the French during this first period exceeded 11,000.

In that quarter the first and second German lines were carried completely. In the north and south the progress was not so rapid. The irregularity of the advance in this course of an offensive is one of the characteristic traits of this war of trenches. It depends on what is encountered in the positions attacked; at the points of least resistance progress is made most easily.

The weather during this first phase had been highly unfavorable from the point of view of the Allies. Fine weather, with a clear sky, permitting aerial reconnaissance and facilitating new alignments of artillery, are great helps in carrying out an offensive. In that respect the Allies had not a great deal of luck.

Last September the attack of the French in Champagne was greatly impeded by storm and rain.

This time again, although right in midsummer, the weather was far from good. The sky was covered with clouds. It rained almost every day. When the British made their first attack on Contalmaison there was a sudden storm, which, as we could see, filled the ditches and hindered the efforts of the British to get in front, thus allowing the Germans to retake the village, though only for a time.

But in spite of the unfavorable weather the progress made by the Allies was none the less considerable and was very encouraging.

CHAPTER XI

THE SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE— GERMAN COUNTERATTACK— THE FRENCH ATTACK

IF the new line is studied on the map, it will be seen that the ground wrested from the Germans by the French troops constitutes a pronounced salient in the direction of Péronne, from which the French forces are only a kilometer distant.

It was difficult for the French to continue their advance, thus accentuating still more this salient, as long as in the north and in the south the lines held by them and by their allies had not been straightened.

It was with a view of bringing about such a straightening of line that the efforts of the Anglo-French forces were directed during the second phase of the battle.

The British, as far as they are concerned, do not lose time in preparation. Hardly two days after they had taken Contalmaison and the Mametz Wood they went forward over the front of 5,000 yards in an assault on the second German lines. It was half past three on the morning of July 14, 1916, that this attack took place. The 14th of July is the national feast day of France. On that day a moving ceremony was being performed in Paris. The President of the Republic, the members of the French Government, the military authorities, were taking part in an imposing review, at which there marched past troops brought directly from the front, among them British, Russians, and Belgians. The British army determined to celebrate the day in its own way.

The first attack on the German lines, made on July 1, 1916, was directed from two sides at a time, from the west to the east as far as Fricourt and from the north to the south, in the direction of Contalmaison. This time the attack was made solely from the north to the south, exactly from La Boisselle to the wood of Trônes, which the British had conquered, but where a number

of Germans still held their ground. The task before the British General Staff was to take all the second German lines and particularly to plant their men on the crest of the heights that lay on the horizon. And here is a point that is important and worthy of especial note. From the first day of their attack the British had constantly to make their way uphill. If this territory is studied by means of a military map, it will be seen that the land rises continuously from the valley of the Ancre in the direction of the northeast. The small village of Albert, which is in the valley, is at Ridge 100. At the east of the village of Mametz there is a ridge of 125 meters; the village of Contalmaison is at 124 meters. Toward the northeast the heights continue to rise; near Bazentin-le-Grand there is Ridge 144, the village of Longueval is at Ridge 154. The ridge thus ascends until a little north of Pozières, at the height of the village of Martinpuich.

It passes by the wood of Foureaux, called by the British the High Wood; the point there is the highest in that part of the country. A little beyond begins the descent in the direction of Bapaume. It was therefore extremely important for the British to reach that line of heights from which they could obtain an excellent view and which had many valuable points from which the artillery could cover the country on the other side.

The hour fixed for the attack was half past three in the morning—an hour that would, at this season of the year, be about half an hour before the dawn. It was an hour which the Germans, during the first part of the war, frequently chose for their attacks. In making their assault when it was still night the British counted on escaping the barrage fire and still more the fire of the mitrailleuses, which might have been destroyed.

The simple fact that they chose this hour was indicative of the faith the British generals had in their soldiers. For these attacks during the night (as all military men well know) allow of an exact test of the warlike qualities of a body of men; their cohesion, their discipline, and their coolness.

If the soldiers are not absolutely reliable and full of spirit,

if they are not perfectly under the hands of their commanders, they could easily fall into disorder and even into a panic.

That day of the 14th was marked by a brilliant success on the part of the British. They accomplished what they wanted, and in the way they wanted it accomplished. The second German lines were all carried by one great stroke. The British took three villages: Longueval, Bazentin-le-Grand, and Bazentin-le-Petit. They took in addition the two woods of Bazentin. They drove the Germans, who still resisted, into the Trônes Wood. Beyond the village of Longueval there is a wood moderate in extent called the Delville Wood. The British took it with the exception of a narrow strip on the north. Moreover, their foremost detachments pushed as far as the Foureaux Wood. The British troops remained there for some time, but the British General Staff, thinking they were a little too far ahead, too much in the air as it were, decided to bring them back again.

The artillery preparation was made during the preceding day and during the night. It seemed to be very effective. None of the British soldiers had to stop. The two woods of Bazentin, which they took, had been well organized for defense by the Germans, who, during a period of more than a year and a half, had all the leisure requisite for perfecting their defenses. The British took 2,000 prisoners, and of these two were colonels, one a commander of a regiment of a third division of the guard, and the other commander of the Ninety-first Bavarian Regiment. This latter one was discovered by the British at the bottom of his dugout. It was an elaborate dugout, having two different stories.

On this colonel was found an order enjoining his second in command personally to see to the solidity of the lines and to the regular arrival of reenforcements while he took his place in the wood with the intention of defending it to the last.

The number of prisoners taken by the British was thus increased to about 10,000.

One of the most picturesque episodes of the day was the brilliant cavalry charge made by a squadron of dragoons. These British dragoons, during the afternoon, approached the Four-

neaux wood on the left of the British troops that attacked Longueval. They courageously charged a German company in a wheat field, cutting down the enemy, and taking thirty-four prisoners. This was the first time since the battle of the Marne that the British had any opportunity of engaging the enemy on horseback. During the French offensive in the Champagne, in September, 1915, two French squadrons also had a chance of charging the Germans.

North of the sector, the British troops penetrated into the outskirts of Pozières, a village situated on the highway from Albert to Bapaume. On the 17th the British took 1,500 yards more of the German positions to the northeast of Bazentin-le-Petit. They also widened the breach to the east of Longueval and captured an important position strongly defended by the Germans—the Waterlot Farm.

In the village of Ovillers, the British and the Germans fought without any let-up from July 7, 1916. It required no less than ten days for the British to conquer the entire village where the Prussian guard put up a desperate resistance. It was on the 17th that the last houses were taken. The British took prisoner what remained of the German force—two officers and 124 soldiers of the guard.

The gains made by the British troops were very considerable; above all, the positions taken had a great deal too much importance for the German General Staff not to make a violent counterattack.

Indeed, it meant for the Germans not only a material, but, what was more important, a moral loss. For the first time since the beginning of the war the British troops, the new armies of Kitchener, measured themselves with the Germans in protracted fights, and though the German armies knew the attack was coming and had been considerably reenforced, they were obliged to yield them ground.

The Germans had mustered with all speed into this sector all the troops available on the French front. It was on the 18th that they attempted to wrest from the British positions that had been taken from them.



THE FRENCH GAINS

That date of the 18th is worth noting. It is very significant. It was on the 14th that the British attacked and carried the German second lines. The German counterattack did not take place until four days later, and this meant a considerable delay. This delay was greatly to the disadvantage of the Germans, and on the other hand very favorable to the British, who had all this time to improve their new lines, and consolidate the positions that had been taken.

Every time the Germans were able to do so they have rallied and counterattacked immediately without losing a day or an hour; if they did not follow their practice this time, it must have been simply because they were unable to do so.

Against the large forces which the British had gathered together for the purpose of their offensive, considerable reenforcements were necessary—and this probably explains the delay.

The point chosen by the Germans for their counterattack was perfectly indicated by the configuration of the land. During the first phase of the battle the Germans, as we have seen, made every effort to retake from the British the Trônes Wood, which is situated at the apex of the angle made by the new British lines. Now these lines are removed farther to the north. The salient, the point of the angle, is constituted by the Waterlot Farm, the Delville Wood, and the village of Longueval. These are the points against which the Germans directed their embittered attack.

The Germans used at least thirteen battalions in this counterattack. They led up to it with a violent bombardment, throwing forward asphyxiating shells and tear-producing gas. A desperate struggle was waged the night long. The Germans were checked at the Waterlot Farm, but they retook a part of the Delville Wood and established a footing in the houses north of Longueval.

On the following day the British came back with energy. They reconquered the greater part of the ground which they had lost in the Delville Wood and at Longueval. On the evening of Thursday, the 20th, they obtained a marked success; they

chased the Germans from the Fourneaux Wood, which is, as has been noted, the highest point in that part of the country. During the attack of the British on the 14th, the British advance guards had pushed as far as the wood, but they were not able at that time to hold their ground there. This time the British returned and took the Fourneaux Wood.

On the 23d the battle recommenced and it was the British who led in the attack. They attacked over a line from the village of Pozières as far as Guillemont. Very notable is this vigorous method which the British gave to the battle, this persistent continuity of effort, this tenacity in the offensive.

In this battle of the Somme the initiative belonged entirely to the troops of the Allies. The Germans only made a partial response, and that by piecemeal. Their counterattacks were slow in coming and nowhere did they obtain a marked success. The Allies held on to the sum total of their gains. On July 23, 1916, the British territorial troops and the Australians assaulted the village of Pozières, the first houses of which they had already conquered.

They retook from the Germans the entire village of Longueval and fought on the outskirts of the village of Guillemont, which changed hands twice.

It was in the struggle for the possession of the village of Pozières that the most furious conflicts took place.

The village occupies a point, the strategic importance of which is easily understood. Originally it constituted a point of support in the second German line. This line having been taken, the Germans replaced it with another that leaned on the west upon the village of Pozières. It was thus in a way the keystone of the new German organization. The village is built on a slope facing the southwest. The Germans had to climb the height in order to attack it. Right at the top there is a mill. Three columns had been brought together for this attack: on the left the London territorials had to carry the western trenches; in the center the Australians had the rough job of crossing the village itself along its whole length; and finally another British body of troops had to advance to the east.

In the night between the 22d and the 23d, a little after midnight, the Australians made the first attack. They carried the two lines of trenches which blocked the outskirts of the village. A house-to-house struggle ensued, while the Australians continued to go forward.

On the 25th, in the afternoon, the Australians had completely passed through Pozières, shaking hands at the north end with the London territorials who had attacked on the west, and with the troops on the right who had attacked on the east. The entire village was taken. The Bavarians who defended it tried to reply with an attack in the direction of the mill situated 400 meters to the north, but they were caught under a British mitrailleuse fire and were almost annihilated.

The villages of Picardy constituted veritable little fortresses. The farms of which they are composed, every one of them, have attached a big courtyard or an enclosed meadow with hedges and rows of barbed iron wire. Moreover the farm buildings have their foundations over splendid cellars cut in the chalk and giving excellent shelter. It was necessary, therefore, to carry one by one the farms, the inclosures, and the cellars. Each village was a sort of conglomeration of fortresses standing side by side. This explains the slow character of the advance. It took the British ten days, as we have seen, to carry Ovillers. On the other hand only two days sufficed for the taking of Pozières.

On July 15 and 17, 1916, two German counterattacks were made on the lines newly conquered by the French at Biaches and at La Maisonette. The Germans, profiting from the storm, slid down into the valley and succeeded in surprising and taking the village of Biaches. The French rallied immediately and drove the Germans from the positions they had just succeeded in occupying.

On July 20, 1916, a general attack was made by the French. It was a sort of corollary to the attack made by the British on the 14th. As may be gathered, the two allies, each in their turn, delivered powerful hammer strokes against the German lines, the advance of the one aiding the advance of the other.

North of the Somme, over a front of five kilometers, from Ridge 139 (800 meters north of Hardecourt) the French carried the first German trenches. They reached as far as the slope east of the height of Hardecourt. Their line passed the boundary of Maurepas and followed the highway from Maurepas to Feuillères. That would total an advance of about a kilometer in depth. This advance consolidated the action of the British troops, who were cooperating with the French troops north of Hardecourt.

South of the Somme the situation remained stationary from July 9, 1916. The French held the outskirts of the village of Barleux, without, however, actually penetrating into the village itself.

From that point their line descended as far as Belloy-en-Santerre, which was entirely in their hands, and in the direction of Estrees, which they also held in its entirety. It joined the original front at the ridge north of the village of Soyecourt, which was held by the Germans.

It was along this front that the French attack was made. Over a front of about six kilometers the whole German first position was taken. Ultimately to the south of Soyecourt the French likewise occupied the first German position as far as the height of Vermandovillers.

In the course of these various actions north and south of the Somme they captured 2,900 German prisoners, of whom thirty were officers.

The ground newly won by the French on both banks of the Somme was in the form of a triangle, the base of which would be the old French line from Hardecourt to Soyecourt, the top being at the village of Biaches, at the very gates of Péronne. The new French positions were therefore now driven into the German lines in the form of a square rule. The second attack, which the French had made on July 20, 1916, was carried out at each of the two ends of the base of this triangle. In striving to lengthen this base the French were seeking for room and air. They succeeded in their object on both sides, at Hardecourt toward the north, and at Soyecourt toward the south.

Following on this French attack of the 20th, the German counterattack was only a feeble one. They came back with small energy. On July 21, 1916, a German battalion tried to debouch in front of the new French positions south of Soyecourt, but it was checked by the barrage and mitrailleuse fire before it was able to reach the French trenches. On the 24th the French in a minor operation took a hostile battery stationed south of the village of Estrees. On the following day to the south of the same village they took a group of houses very powerfully fortified by the Germans.

PART II—THE WAR IN THE AIR

CHAPTER XII

THE VALUE OF ZEPPELINS IN LONG-DISTANCE RECONNOITERING—NAVAL AUXILIARIES

THE growing intensity and fierceness of the gigantic struggle between the great nations of the world in the second half of the second year naturally was reflected in the extraordinary activities of the aerial fleets of the combatants. To give in detail the thousands of individual and mass attacks is manifestly impossible in a restricted work of this kind, and we shall have to be satisfied with a description of the more important events in this latest of all warfares.

Undoubtedly the most pronounced feature of aerial combat in 1916 was the complete rehabilitation of the Zeppelin type of rigid airship construction as an invaluable aid to the land and naval forces in the difficult and dangerous task of reconnoitering the enemy forces. There can be no doubt that the frequent raids of the eastern counties of Great Britain were undertaken far more with the idea of gaining as clear an idea as possible of the distribution of British naval units in the North Sea than with the desire of hurling destruction from the sky upon sleeping villages, towns, and, of course, harbors and factories which might be of value to the British military forces. And there also can be no doubt that for this purpose of reconnoitering over immense areas the Zeppelin airship stands to-day unchallenged by any other single means at the disposal of the army leaders.

The German Zeppelin airship carries at present a powerful wireless-sending apparatus, the electric current for which is fur-

nished by one of the motors. These motors, five in number, are of the six-cylinder Mercedes type, furnishing a total of 1,200 horsepower. Four of the motors are usually in service, the fifth being held in reserve, and used in the meantime for furnishing the required electric current. The wireless equipment is stated to have an effective range of about 300 miles, due mainly to the great height of the "sending station." It was this wireless equipment which is now known to have precipitated the great naval battle off the Jutland coast, and to have sent the German fleet to its home base before the full force of the much superior British fleet had a chance to exercise its crushing power.

According to the report of the captain of one of the German battle cruisers, the Zeppelins, of which there were two in the early hours of the battle, sighted a strong British naval force in the North Sea, about two-thirds of the way from the British coast to Helgoland. The information was flashed to Helgoland by the leading Zeppelin, which was hovering more than two miles in the air, commanding an immense area of the North Sea. The approach of the German fleet was unknown to the British, although the Zeppelins could distinguish both fleets from their great height.

As the battle developed and the British battle cruiser squadron became sorely pressed by the superior forces opposed to them, calls for assistance were flashed from them to the main fleet. The Zeppelins, of course, caught the calls and set off at high speed northward with the intention of giving timely warning to the German squadron battling several thousand feet below them against the gradually increasing British force.

The mist which hung over the North Sea made it difficult for the Zeppelin commanders to distinguish objects clearly, but the same mist prevented the British ship crews from sighting the airships in the clouds. When the heavy black smoke from the battleships rushing south at their highest speed was sighted by the northernmost Zeppelin, word of the apparent strength of the reenforcements was flashed to the German commander in chief and the order for retreat was given. While the fleets executed their maneuvers, the British main forces arrived and the greatest battle

in naval history took place. Had it not been for the timely warning from the Zeppelins hanging high in the air above the sea, the German fleet might have been overwhelmed by the huge forces rushing south to destroy it. Outnumbered by more than two to one, its only safety lay in retreat—and so heavy had been the fire, that the British commander did not press the pursuit too close. For while the Germans knew to a ship the strength of their adversary, the latter had to reckon with the unknown, hidden possibilities of forces not yet seen. It cannot be denied that the Jutland naval battle was a complete vindication of the use of Zeppelins as naval scouts, a value now recognized by every naval officer in the world.

The second field of action in which the Zeppelin airship has shown a certain measure of success is that of destroying small naval units of the enemy. And not only the German airships have had occasion to show their value, but the French have been especially successful in this work. For several months previous to February, 1916, little had been heard of the activities of the new French dirigibles, which were reported to have been built, although a number of them were continually cruising high in the air above Paris and in the district north of the capital. Occasionally hints were dropped here and there concerning their activity above the Channel and portions of the North Sea, and in the early summer a fairly substantial report reached this country to the effect that the new French lighter-than-air machines were utilized chiefly in "submarine hunting."

In the early stages of the war, when military and naval aviation was trying to adopt peace-time theories to war-time facts, Great Britain attempted to hunt the German submarines with aeroplanes, or hydroaeroplanes; but the method had its serious drawbacks. The aeroplane is of necessity a fast traveling machine; it must make at least forty miles an hour to be able to stay aloft. Whizzing through the air at such speed is not conducive to a careful scrutiny of the surface of the water below, necessary in order to detect the vague, dim outlines of a submerged submarine. At first the pilots of naval aeroplanes had considerable success in locating the submarines, and Germany lost quite a few of them,

before the reason was discovered. Some one in Great Britain announced that it was easy to locate a submarine from an aeroplane by the peculiar reflection in the sunlight caused by the fine film of lubricating oil on the surface of the water. As soon as this "tip" was communicated to Germany, submarines discontinued the use of oil for lubrication, employing instead deflocculated graphite. The fuel oil used in the Diesel engines for propulsion on the surface is so thoroughly consumed and the exhaust now is so free of oil that an oil film as an indication of submarine proximity is no longer trustworthy. Besides, the submerged boat *might* be a friendly one, a fact which was borne upon the British authorities on two separate occasions when scouting aeroplanes reported submarines near, and speedy motor boats rushed to the attack. In one case the British submarine is reported to have been rammed, and in the other—so the story goes—the commander of the submarine liberated a little buoy attached to the outside of the boat, which rose to the surface and informed the watchers above that "a friend is down below—not an enemy!"

The system followed now in the locating and possible destruction of German submarines in the Channel and North Sea by French dirigibles is as follows: The airships, chiefly of the *Astra* type, travel at a height of not more than 500 feet above the surface of the ocean, while the observers constantly sweep the water within a radius of half a mile with their glasses. Usually the airships are sent ahead at low speed in spirals, or in a series of curves which enable them to cover every square mile of watery area below. As soon as one of these airships sights a submarine traveling submerged, it flashes the news by wireless to destroyers which at the time may be fifty or more miles away, and in the meantime endeavors to remain directly above the submerged boat. Soon the destroyers arrive and, following the direction of the airship, can ram or sink the submarine with almost certain success. The French admiralty claims to have accounted for a number of submarines by this method, but has found that the scheme no longer will work. The German naval department, learning of the airship patrol, has given its sub-

marine commanders orders to travel at great depth during daylight hours in the Channel and the southwestern section of the North Sea, or to go to sleep on the bottom where the sea is too shallow. In the evening the boat makes its escape from the dangerous neighborhood.

The third field of action of airships—devastating hostile countries—is the least valuable, although perhaps the most spectacular of the activities of airships of the Zeppelin type. The damage caused by the numerous Zeppelin raids over England, for instance, is a subject of so much dispute that a true appreciation of their value cannot be formed at present. While the German official bulletins repeatedly declare that great material damage was done by the bombs to military establishments, factories, harbor works, etc., the British statements dwell more upon the number of noncombatants who were killed, and deny the infliction of any material damage.

Information of this kind is considered legitimate secrecy and it is only when files of the British local and trade papers are examined that an inkling of the real damage is obtained. Fires, boiler explosions, railway traffic suspensions, and similar highly suggestive items fill the columns of the papers, after every one of the Zeppelin raids. On only one occasion, February 2, 1916, has the British War Office admitted serious military damage in its official communication. This communication was issued after exaggerated reports of the damage caused had appeared in the German and neutral press, covering the Zeppelin raids of January 30-31, 1916, and February 1, 1916, and admitted officially the following: Bombs dropped totaled 393; buildings destroyed: three railway sheds, three breweries, one tube factory, one lamp factory, one blacksmith shop; damaged by explosions: one munition factory, two iron works, a crane factory, a harness factory, railway grain shed, colliery and a pumping station. "One of the spectacular incidents of this raid was the chase of an express train by the Zeppelin, the train rushing at its utmost speed of seventy miles an hour into a tunnel, disappearing just as the first bombs began to drop. The train remained in the tunnel for more than an hour, waiting for the Zeppelin to fly away!" The official

figures of killed and wounded in this raid are given as sixty-seven killed, and 117 injured.

During the month of July, reports of the new German super-Zeppelins began to appear in British reports, and a number of neutral correspondents endeavored to obtain authentic data concerning them. Conflicting descriptions arrived from many sources, and it was not until a Swiss reporter, equipped with extremely powerful glasses, watched the trial flights of two of these super-Zeppelins above Lake Constance, that fairly reliable information could be compiled.

One of these airships leaves Friedrichshafen every week for duty in the North Sea, and the factory on the shore of Lake Constance expects to be able to complete five machines every month after July, 1916. The super-Zeppelin has two armored gondolas, without a visible connection, although it is highly probable that such communication is provided for within the outer envelope. Each gondola carries six machine guns and, in addition, two quick-firing guns, as well as an aerial torpedo-launching device, which was first used in the extensive air raids on England in the last week of July.

The super-Zeppelin contains approximately 1,000,000 cubic feet of gas and has a capacity of ten tons useful load. Of this load, about four tons can be composed of bombs or other munitions, the remainder being needed for fuel, machinery, and the crew, as well as ballast and provisions. The gross weight of a fully equipped and loaded super-Zeppelin is thirty tons, or roughly, 60,000 pounds. The envelope, which heretofore has been painted gray with liquid aluminum paint, now is impregnated thoroughly with finely divided metal, by means of the Schoop metal-coating process, which is heralded as one of the most far-reaching improvements in aerial navigation. By its means the airship envelope is made absolutely impervious to atmospheric influences.

For its protection against antiaircraft fire the new super-Zeppelins carry apparatus in each gondola, producing artificial clouds of such size and intensity as to envelop and shroud completely the entire airship, rendering it absolutely invisible from below.

While this cloud expands and gradually grows thinner, the airship rises rapidly in a vertical direction, speeding away while under protection of the self-made clouds.

The motors of the latest Zeppelins weigh only 595 pounds each, although developing 240 horsepower, which means that one horsepower is developed for every three and three-quarter pounds of metal used. They are fitted with twin pumps, double jet carburetors, and are usually operated on mixtures consisting of one part benzol with one part alcohol.

CHAPTER XIII

AEROPLANE IMPROVEMENTS—GIANT MACHINES—TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

THE experience gathered in the first eighteen months of the war by the aviators of the hostile armies has done more for the development of aeroplanes than many years of peaceful improvements could possibly have accomplished. The ever increasing size, power and stability of the heavier-than-air machine is plainly shown in the latest types of battle planes, in which a spread of wings exceeding seventy-five feet is no longer a novelty. True, the heralded approach of the gigantic German battle triplanes did not take place in the second year of the Great War, although it is an incontrovertible fact that such machines have been built and are being used for some purpose. But none of them took part in the fighting on the western front, nor has one of them been seen on the Russian battle lines. There is reason to believe, however, that these planes are used in naval reconnoitering, and their great size permits of the carrying of large supplies of fuel, giving them a great cruising radius. Reports from steamers plying the Baltic state that gigantic aeroplanes have been sighted high up in the air by captains and officers on Swedish and Danish ships, seemingly maintaining a careful

patrol of that sea against possible Russian and British naval exploits.

There have been numerous unconfirmed reports concerning the use of *cellon,* a tough and yet completely transparent material, in the construction of aeroplanes on the German side, and occasional hints of new "invisible" machines were dropped now and then. The reports probably are based on some foundation of fact, but there is little to show that *cellon* is used to any large extent by the Teuton forces. Samples of the material reached New York late in 1915, but the actual uses to which it was put were not known at the time.

The tendency in recent months, especially on the western battle front, has been the "attack in squadrons," instead of the individual combats which made international heroes out of Boillot, Immelmann, Boelke, Warneford and Navarre. The squadron attack was first employed by the Germans in the Verdun operations. Previous to that time, only bombing expeditions had been undertaken en masse, as many as sixty aeroplanes taking part in a single attack. But actual aerial combat usually engaged only two or four aviators.

Early in February of the second year of the war, several famous French aviators fell victims to the new mode of warfare. It seems that as soon as a machine would appear above the trenches in that section, six or more German machines would rise quickly and surround the Frenchman. Outnumbered and surrounded on all sides the French machines rarely got back safely to their lines, among the first to be lost being George Boillot, world-famous as an automobile racer.

The German tactics at once were imitated and improved on by the allied forces, and by July, 1916, the French had perfected a system of defense which, paradoxically speaking, may be termed "air-tight." French aviation squadrons would be held in readiness at all times to repel attacks, and twenty machines usually were considered a "unit." At first sign of a hostile aeroplane approaching, ten French machines would rise at top speed to a height of 10,000 feet, while five minutes later the second ten would follow, rising to 5,000 feet. The attacking machine

usually would be found at a height intermediate between the upper and lower French squadrons, both of which would attack the invader vigorously, and with highly satisfactory results.

One of the lessons of these true aerial battles between opposing squadrons has been the efficiency of the biplane, as compared with that of the monoplane. When the war started the monoplane was considered the machine par excellence for war use; its high speed and quick maneuvering being cited as most important for fighting in the air. Eighteen months of aerial battles have shown that for all-round fighting, bombing and reconnoitering the biplane is far more effective, and the construction of new monoplanes has been practically abandoned by the allied governments. The Germans, it is true, have found the Fokker type of monoplane a very efficient one, but the number of Fokkers in use is comparatively small, when the great fleets of Aviatiks and other well-known types of German biplanes are remembered.

Exact statistics regarding the number of aeroplanes at present in use along the various battle fronts are not available, but estimates made by aviation officers, by correspondents and from notes in the respective publications devoted to aviation abroad, fix it as in excess of 12,000 machines. More than half of these are used by the Allies on the western front; Germany is credited with 3,000 aeroplanes, Russia with about 1,000, Austria with 1,500, and Bulgaria and Turkey with 500. In a statement made in the British House of Commons, Mr. Tennant, speaking of the Royal British Flying Corps, declared that 835 officers and 521 civilians were on the waiting list of the Flying Corps in the last week of February, 1916.

France has definitely discontinued the use of monoplanes and is manufacturing them solely for the British forces, as some of the British aviators greatly prefer the monoplane. One of the reasons given by the French for their action is the construction of Fokker monoplanes by the Germans, which are so accurate a copy of the earlier Morane monoplanes of the French that they could not be distinguished from them in the air. Furthermore, the German copy of the Morane was far speedier and could easily outdistance or overtake the French machines of the same

type. In place of the original Morane France now has three types of speed planes, the Maurice Farman, a 110 mph. biplane, the Morane-Saulnier, 111mph., and Spad, 107 mph. The older Nieuports, too, are fast machines, being capable of more than 100 miles per hour.

The new Maurice Farman speed plane is a biplane of small wing area, the upper plane overhanging the lower. It is equipped with a new type of Renault-Mercedes eight-cylinder motor, giving 240 horsepower at the highest crank shaft speed. The Morane-Saulnier and the Spad are both monoplanes, but of different shape and construction from the original Morane; it is of the so-called monocoque type, made familiar to Americans by the Duperdessin monocoques which took part in the Gordon Bennett Cup race in Chicago in 1912. It is equipped with a device which was first used in Germany and which permits the firing of the gun through the propeller. It is an electric synchronizing device which fires the gun at the exact moment when the bullet will pass between the propeller blades.

Following the destructive raids of the German naval Zeppelins over the eastern counties of England during the last days of January, 1916, there came a period of retaliation flights by Allied aviators over German cities, attacks on railway stations and munition depots, culminating in the great attack of the coast of Schleswig-Holstein by a fleet of British aeroplanes. On a certain section of this coast the Germans have erected a series of Zeppelin hangars behind one of the most elaborate systems of defenses known at present. According to information which had reached the British admiralty, the German coast north of the Kiel Canal is protected at intervals by the most powerful anti-aircraft artillery, including 4.1-inch guns, capable of firing thirty-five pound shells to a height of 26,000 feet at the rate of ten every minute. The risk which the British sea planes underwent was great, but there seems to have been no hesitation on the part of the aviators to fly to the attack.

Early in the morning of March 25, 1916, two sea-plane "mother ships," accompanied by a squadron of eight protected cruisers and fast destroyers under the command of Commodore Tyrwhitt,

started from the east coast of England. When about fifty miles from Schleswig-Holstein five sea planes and one "battle aeroplane" (according to the German version of the attack) rose from the mother ships and flew toward shore. What happened during the next two hours is still a matter of doubt. Only two of the machines returned from the invasion, torn and riddled with bullets and shrapnel, reporting the most terrific shell fire from batteries of antiaircraft guns. The aviators declared, however, that they "successfully bombarded the airship sheds." The subsequent German report denied the claim, stating that none of the machines succeeded in even reaching the Zeppelin stations, which were several miles inland. Three of the sea planes were shot down by the German guns, and the aviators were made prisoners. It was a gallant attempt against heavy odds on the part of the British Flying Corps, and its failure probably was due to the small number of machines employed. If fifty or sixty machines had taken part in the attack, ten or twelve might have been lost, but the others would probably have been able to reach the sheds and do great damage to the Zeppelins stationed there.

It was from the same sheds that three days later the Zeppelins arose for their tremendous raids of England, during the week of March 30 to April 4, 1916, as many as seven of the airships appearing over the British Isles at the same time. During this series of raids London was visited by one of the airship squadrons, the visit resulting in twenty-eight deaths and forty-four injuries. Another squadron turned northward and dropped bombs on Stowmarket, Lowestoft, and Cambridge, while a third section of the air fleet attacked the northeast coast. One of the attacking air cruisers was hit by gunfire, as well as by bombs thrown from an aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant Brandon to a height of several hundred feet above the Zeppelin. This ship, believed to be the *L-15*, was so severely damaged that it was forced to descend in the mouth of the Thames, after dropping overboard portions of its machinery, gun, ammunition, and gasoline tank. The loss of the airship was admitted by the German admiralty in a statement issued on April 2, 1916, which

said: "In spite of violent bombardment all the airships returned, with the exception of *L-15*, which, according to report, was compelled to descend in the waters of the Thames River. Searches instituted by our naval forces have, up to the present, not been productive of any result."

Zeppelin raids followed each other in quick succession, no less than forty having been chronicled by July 31, 1916. They became so common, in fact, that the people of England lost much of their first terror and began to view the spectacle of a bombardment from the air as something that was quite "interesting" to watch! How great the damage caused to manufacturing and to railroads and shipping has been in the course of these two-score air raids is something that the British censor has jealously guarded. That such damage has been done is but natural, for tons of explosives cannot be hurled from heights of two miles upon a thickly populated district without doing considerable harm. In one case, it is known, the first bomb dropped upon the power house of the manufacturing town which was attacked, and put the entire electric power and light supply out of business for a week.

Another Zeppelin raid, in which the attacking squadron suffered the loss of an airship, took place on February 22, 1916, in the neighborhood of Verdun. The Zeppelin *L-77*, one of the largest and latest of the German air fleet, crossed the French battle lines at a height of about 2,500 yards, when it was picked up by searchlights stationed in the rear. A violent bombardment immediately began and one of the exploding shells damaged the motor of the rear gondola. The speed of the Zeppelin was reduced by the failure of the motor, and one of the new French incendiary shells struck the gas bag near its center, causing a violent explosion. The two ends of the big gas bag dropped and as the gondolas hit the ground the entire load of bombs exploded, tearing the ship and its crew to shreds. Two other Zeppelins, flying at greater height, about ten miles to the north of the scene of the accident, watched the destruction and then continued inland over the French positions, dropping bombs for more than an hour. They returned undamaged to the German lines.

Still another Zeppelin, *L-19,* was lost in the North Sea, on February 2, 1916, while returning from an "invasion" of England. Hit by gunfire from the British antiaircraft batteries—or by the Dutch, as some reports have it, for crossing over Dutch territory—the *L-19* gradually dropped lower and lower until it floated on the surface of the sea. The British trawler, *King Stephen,* appeared and the crew of the Zeppelin asked to be taken off, and offered to surrender. The captain of the trawler frankly declared that he would not take the chance of rescuing twenty-eight well-armed German sailors, as his own crew only amounted to nine men, unarmed. He steamed away, leaving the Zeppelin crew to drown. When destroyers of the British fleet appeared later on, guided to the spot by the trawler captain's report, the Zeppelin and its crew had vanished.

CHAPTER XIV

LOSSES AND CASUALTIES IN AERIAL WARFARE —DISCREPANCIES IN OFFICIAL REPORTS— "DRIVEN DOWN" AND "DESTROYED"

TO tabulate or chronicle accurately the losses and casualties suffered by the various armies in their aerial warfare is absolutely impossible. Not so much because of censorship or secrecy, but because of the fact that when an aeroplane is "driven down" by the French behind the German lines, it cannot be said that this aeroplane is actually destroyed or even damaged, or that its pilot has received a wound. Similarly when German machines attack and force a French or British machine to descend swiftly behind its own lines. The reporting of machines "driven down" among those "destroyed" is the cause of all the discrepancies between the official reports of the contending forces.

The following figures have been gathered with the greatest care from the British "Roll of Honor," covering the killed, miss-

ing and wounded members of the Royal British Flying Corps. They are for the month of February, 1916, a month of comparative quiet, and there can be no doubt that proportionately larger casualty lists could be compiled from the more active months of the summer of 1916. The first week of February resulted in nine officers killed, one wounded, and five "missing"; two noncommissioned officers were also reported "missing." The second week six officers were killed, two wounded, while one noncommissioned officer was killed and another wounded. During the third week three flight lieutenants were killed, five wounded, and two captured by the enemy, while eight noncommissioned officers were wounded. In the last week of the month there were three officers killed, five wounded, and six "missing," while three noncommissioned men were listed as killed. The total losses for the month on the short battle line held by the British forces were therefore: twenty-one officers killed, thirteen wounded, and thirteen missing; fifteen noncommissioned officers killed or wounded. The losses among German aviators, taken from the regularly published casualty lists issued by the German Government, were twenty-four killed, and eleven wounded, during the month of January.

The casualty lists become a deep mystery when compared with the losses of machines admitted by the respective war departments. During the month of February, for instance, the British announced the loss of *six* aeroplanes—yet the casualty lists showed a loss of sixty-two officers and men! During the same month the French lost six machines, the Germans eight, the Russians three, Austria one, and Italy one.

Statistics for the four months from April to July, 1916, gathered from the periodical press of Great Britain and Germany, and probably far more accurate than the occasional "estimates" made by the war departments themselves, show the following losses in officers killed in aerial combats:

April—British 18, French 15, Russian 7, Italian 3; German 16, Austrian 3, Turkish 1, Bulgarian 0.

May—British 16, French 11, Russian 5, Italian 4; German 10, Austrian 5, Turkish 0, Bulgarian 0.

June—British 19, French 10, Russian 11, Italian 3; German 8, Austrian 6, Turkish 1, Bulgarian 0.

July—British 15, French 15, Russian 13, Italian 5; German 16, Austrian 8, Turkish 0, Bulgarian 1.

Total losses in aviation officers: Allies, 170; Central Powers, 75.

A cursory examination of the records of aerial combats on the western battle front shows an average of eighteen combats daily; on some days there were as many as forty distinct aerial battles, while on others, in blinding snow and rainstorms no machines were aloft. In the 3,000-odd duels in the air, the Franco-American Flying Corps began to take a prominent part early in the spring of 1916, shortly after the various American volunteer aviators had been gathered into a single unit and been placed at the point of the greatest danger—the Verdun sector of the front.

The formation of the Franco-American Flying Corps was formed by Frazier Curtis and Norman Prince, after many unsuccessful attempts since December, 1914. At the time of gathering the scattered Americans into a single corps there were about thirty experienced aviators in the group, but the number has been greatly augmented since then, and in the latter part of July nearly a hundred are reported to have been gathered in the aviation corps near Verdun.

The first American aviator to fly over the Verdun battle field since the beginning of the great battle still raging in that sector, was Carroll Winslow, of New York, who piloted one of the Maurice Farman speed planes. Previous to the beginning of that battle, Lieutenant William Thaw of Pittsburgh and Elliott Cowdin of New York had crossed the battle field repeatedly.

CHAPTER XV

AERIAL COMBATS AND RAIDS

FEBRUARY, 1916, because of foggy, stormy weather, did not furnish many thrilling aerial combats. With the exception of a Zeppelin raid over England and an attack on Kent by two German Fokker aeroplanes, in the course of which bombs were dropped on Ramsgate and Broadstairs, few events worthy of chronicling occurred on either of the big battle fronts. In Egypt, early in that month, an officer of the R. F. C. flew from Daba, railhead of the Mariut railway, to El Gara and return, without a stop. The entire trip was made in eight hours, covering 400 miles. It was one of the most splendid pieces of reconnoitering work accomplished by a British aviation officer.

On February 25, 1916, announcement was made in the British House of Commons to the effect that the total loss of life in the twenty-nine great and small Zeppelin raids up to that date had been 266.

On March 1, 1916, an Aviatik aeroplane, piloted by Lieutenant Faber, and containing Lieutenant Kuehl as observer, succeeded in wrecking the leading truck of a motor transport train on the Besançon-Jussey road. The bomb struck squarely and blockaded the road for a considerable time, causing confusion and delay in the transport. While the drivers of the trucks endeavored to straighten out the tangle, the aviators poured a withering fire from their machine gun into the crowd of men, while circling over the truck at low altitude.

Four days later an extensive Zeppelin raid was directed at the east coast of England, the result being twelve killed and thirty-three injured, while considerable material damage was admitted by British papers.

Aerial duels and combats over the battle lines began to increase in number to such an extent as to cause their omission from the official bulletins. Only the most spectacular feats thereafter were considered worthy of record. Among these was an

attack by four German sea planes, which set out from some part of the Belgian coast and raided the English coast from Dover to Margate, killing nine and injuring thirty-one persons. One of the planes was damaged by the defending guns.

A few days later the British returned the visit with five sea planes, accompanied by a cruiser and destroyers, with disastrous results. As related in a former chapter at some length, only two of the machines succeeded in escaping from the withering fire of the strong antiaircraft defense guns.

Then followed the series of Zeppelin raids between March 31 and April 5, 1916, when practically the entire eastern and northeastern coast of England was bombarded by the German air fleet. Even Scotland was visited by some of the Zeppelins, and there is every reason to believe that the main object of the raid was to discover the whereabouts of the main British battleship fleet. However, the airships seem to have returned southward before locating the fleet. The German admiralty never gave up hope of locating the main base with certainty, for many Zeppelin and submarine raids were made with no other object in view. Had the ships succeeded, there is no doubt that all available submarines would have been dispatched to the spot, ordered to lie in wait, and then entice the fleet out by offering a couple of older ships as a sacrifice. The plan did not work out to the satisfaction of the German navy heads, but it still remains one of their pet hopes.

On April 3, 1916, a French dirigible appeared above Audun-le-Roman, bombarding the railway station, while on the same day a German Aviatik was winged at Souchez, crashing to the earth and killing the occupants.

On April 4, 1916, a sensational aerial battle took place between more than a score of Austrian and Italian machines above Ancona. Three Austrian planes were reported shot down, while two of the Italians seemed severely damaged.

The next day a German official résumé of the aerial battles was issued by the Germans, in which it was claimed that fourteen German machines and forty-four British and French were lost in March. In this compilation the German statement differentiated

AEROPLANES · BALLOONS AND ZEPPELINS

AIR SERVICE ON VARIOUS FRONTS - FRANCE MESOPOTAMIA AND SALONIKI



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An aeroplane flare, dropped by an aviator to make the enemy's trenches visible. The weighted, pointed end holds the flare upright and shot pours from the circle of tubes

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The French aviator Marchal, who flew across Germany and almost reached the Russian lines. He dropped messages instead of bombs on Berlin

Copyright, American Press Association

The aviator, who is the American Chapman, has just descended wounded In a flight a few hours later he was killed

Copyright, Central News Photo Service

A British aviator in Mesopotamia starting for a flight over Kut-el-Amara. Bags of food for the relief of General Townshend's beleaguered soldiers are seen attached

Copyright, Paul Thompson

A store of cylinders of gas from which French soldiers are inflating one of the huge war balloons which are in constant use for observation purposes

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The Allies at Saloniki reconstructed the framework of the Zeppelin that fell in the Vardar marshes and placed it on exhibition. In the foreground are unexploded bombs

Photo by Louis Beaufrere

A French aviator, having brought down his opponent in an air duel, finds the German aeroplane strangely wrecked and held standing on end in a wire entanglement



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A British hydroplane returning to the mother ship after patrol duty over Saloniki. In the background are the city of Saloniki and warships of the Allies

Copyright, Central News Photo Service

A night view on a British battleship in the harbor of Saloniki. The ship's powerful searchlights sweep the sky constantly in search of Zeppelins, and the antiaircraft guns are ready for immediate attack

between "destroyed" and "brought down," claiming to have listed only those which were actually shot down under conditions which precluded the safety of pilot and observer, or which were captured in the German lines.

April 7, 1916, saw a heavy bombardment of Saloniki by Bulgarian and Austrian aeroplanes; the camp of the Australian section and that of the French contingent were severely damaged, and fire broke out in them.

A week later, three naval British aeroplanes dropped bombs on Constantinople and also farther north on Adrianople, in an attempt to destroy the large powder factories and hangars there. The damage reported was very slight, and of no military value. The machines made a trip of 300 miles length, in order to carry out this attack, an achievement worthy of special notice.

A strong French squadron shelled the stations at Nantillons and Brieulles on April 10 and 11, 1916, doing considerable material damage to buildings.

On April 12, 1916, the Czar of Russia had a narrow escape from death when an Austrian aeroplane, of the Rumpler-Taube type, appeared over the parade grounds at Czernowitz, throwing several bombs on the officers present. The aviator did not know of the presence of the czar, and the incident did not become public for several days after.

On April 15, 1916, a large French battle plane, fitted with a 37-millimeter gun, attacked a German steamer in the North Sea, but the ship escaped without damage, as all the shells went wide of the mark.

The French résumé of the operations on the west front during March challenges the statement of the German authorities concerning the number of machines lost. "During the month of March," says the official communiqué, "our military aircraft displayed great activity along the entire front, notably in the region of Verdun. In the course of the many aerial engagements thirty-one German machines were 'brought down' by our pilots, nine of which descended or crashed to the ground within our lines, while twenty-two were brought down in the German lines.

There is no doubt concerning the fate of those twenty-two machines which our pilots attacked over the enemy's lines. Twelve of these aeroplanes were seen coming down in flames, and ten descended in headlong spirals under the fire of our airmen. Moreover, four German machines were brought down by our special guns, one in our lines in the environs of Avocourt and three in the enemy lines—one near Suippes, one near Nouvion and one near Sainte-Marie-à-Py. This total of thirty-five machines should be contrasted with the figures of our own aerial losses, which amount to thirteen aeroplanes, as follows: One French machine brought down in our lines and twelve brought down in the German lines."

A pitched battle between Zeppelins, battle cruisers, and submarines on the German side, and destroyers, land batteries, aeroplanes and sea planes on the British side, took place in the morning of April 25, 1916, near Lowestoft. A number of aeroplones and sea planes rose to attack the Zeppelins which were flying high and bound westward. In the course of the battle the airships turned toward the sea, bringing the pursuing aeroplanes within range of the naval guns. Four submarines also appeared on the surface and began firing their high-angle guns against the British aeros. One of the latter was destroyed by fire from a Zeppelin quick-firing gun, while two sea planes were severely damaged by the fire from the battle cruisers and submarines.

May, 1916, began with three disasters for the German aerial forces. On the 3d of the month, the naval airship *L-20* (Schuette-Lanz type) which had raided the coast of England and Scotland on the preceding day, ran out of fuel on the return trip and was carried by a strong wind eastward onto the Norwegian coast, where it stranded near Stavanger. The Norwegian authorities interned the crew and blew up the ship.

Two more Zeppelins were lost two days later; the *L-7* (one of the oldest airships in the service) was shot down by French warships off Saloniki, while the other fell a victim to the guns of a British squadron off the coast of Schleswig-Holstein.

An Italian airship, the *M-3*, attempted a reconnoitering trip over the Austrian positions on the Gorizia front, but was heavily bombarded with incendiary shells. Fire broke out on the airship and the resulting explosion tore it apart, killing the crew of six men.

Sixteen Allies' aeroplanes undertook a bombing expedition upon the German aerdromes at Mariakerke, dropping thirty-eight large and seventeen small bombs. A sea plane dropped one 100-pound bomb and two 65-pound bombs on the Solvay Works at Zeebrugge. All the machines are reported to have returned in safety, with one exception.

Aerial combats increased in number and violence during the summer months, as many as thirty separate fights taking place in a single day on a short stretch of the battle fronts. In one of the combats, early in June, Lieutenant Immelmann, of the German forces, was shot down and killed. At first the report included his famous comrade, Lieutenant Boelke, among the killed, but news received later mentioned his name among the fighting corps.

Dover and other ports on the English coast were raided by two German sea planes on June 9 and 10, 1916, according to the German official report. The British denied that any such raid took place. The next day, two German sea planes attacked Calais, on the French side of the Channel, dropping bombs on the port and the encampments. They returned to their base undamaged.

German aeroplanes also raided Kantara, thirty miles south of Port Said, and fired on Romani with machine guns. A number of casualties occurred at Kantara.

A raid of considerable magnitude was carried out by the German forces against the port of Reval, during which they bombarded cruisers, destroyers, military buildings, and several submarines lying in the harbor. One of the latter is reported to have been hit four times. The sea planes had been convoyed to the port by a fleet of cruisers and destroyers which waited in the open sea for the return of the aeroplanes. The attacking party had no losses.

An aerial battle between more than forty machines took place on July 3, 1916, near Lille. A British squadron set out to bombard the city of Lille, but was attacked during the bombardment by a fleet of twenty German monoplanes and biplanes. The British claim to have brought down two of the German machines, while all the British returned safely to their lines.

Similar raids continue every day along the battle front in Flanders, Belgium, and France, and even to enumerate them would be merely a repetition entirely without value to the reader.

PART III—POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES

CHAPTER XVI

PEACE SOUNDINGS

WITH the spring of 1916 a dove of peace fluttered its wings over the battle fields of Europe. It had been sent forth from Berlin a half-hearted messenger with an abortive mission. The olive branch it carried to the capitals of the Entente Powers met the expected chilling reception; then it sped across the Atlantic to the White House with the petition that the President be the bearer of its plea to the obdurate foes of the Teutonic alliance. The Berlin overtures, however, were suspiciously viewed, alike by the foes thus hesitatingly approached and by would-be mediators. Yet the dove of peace continued to hover, vainly beckoning, but sustained by the forlorn hope that its plea would not finally be without avail. Then it suddenly disappeared. The great naval battle off Jutland interposed. Germany had a change of heart and proclaimed that she would fight till the end.

Foretokens of a desire for peace had meantime been so pronounced as to delude the onlooking world with the belief that the close of hostilities was nigh. In March, 1916, came a deliverance from Maximilian Harden, a German publicist whose influence was more with the masses than with the government, since he edited a bold newspaper which came under the official ban. "Germany," he said, "has heaped victory upon victory. Upon her, therefore, devolves the duty of making an offer of peace. Such an offer could only add to and not diminish her prestige. It would be a proof of her strength, not weakness.

"Besides, Germany must propose peace because she is in need of peace. Internally she is beset with difficulties.

"If Germany waits longer she will find herself reduced to obeying the will of her enemies. It thus becomes necessary that she invite the world to conclude peace. This invitation may be interpreted as a sign of weakness, but that matters little."

The hour had come, he said later, for the German Government to state its war aims. This the kaiser's chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, did in the Reichstag, on April 5, 1916. Of late, in this public rôle, the chancellor had been viewed as an exponent of moderation. He was supposed to have set himself against the forces striving to intensify the war by "frightfulness." His stand for a restricted U-boat warfare—revealed in Germany's friction with the United States—had raised a storm. Resolutions critizing his attitude were smothered in the Reichstag only with difficulty. Manifestoes denouncing him were published by papers supporting the Von Tirpitz party. Consequently it was thought that in him at last the civil intelligence of Germany had found its point of crystallization, and that the impotence of the military power to end the war was beginning to be perceived.

The imperial chancellor did not fulfill these expectations. His was the difficult task of addressing differing parties in the Reichstag so as not to antagonize any one of them. He had to speak for the empire in a way to stimulate German pride, yet without assuming too haughty or unyielding an air. He had to give a message to the whole world; to an enemy in arms; to neutrals having controversies with Germany. He succeeded in winning favor for his government at home—the chief consideration—while failing to satisfy opinion abroad.

No attempt was made to conceal Germany's longing for peace. He alluded to a previous speech he made—in December, 1915—in which he had affirmed Germany's readiness to enter into a discussion of peace terms.

Then, as now, the Fatherland's foes had declined the offer. Any suggestions of peace, however, were futile on the basis of the destruction of Prussian military power:

"Let us suppose I suggested to Mr. Asquith to sit down with me at a table and examine the possibilities of peace, and Mr. Asquith begins with a claim of definitive and complete destruction of Prussia's military power. The conversation would be ended before it began. To these peace conditions only one answer would be left, and this answer our sword must give. If our adversaries want to continue the slaughter of human beings, and the devastation of Europe, theirs will be the guilt, and we shall have to stand as men."

Consequently there was little or nothing in what the German chancellor said regarding possible terms of peace to reenforce the belief that peace was in sight. The minds of the belligerents were still too far apart. But, nevertheless, this broaching of the delicate theme of peace in a deliverance that was not otherwise pacificatory pointed to a tendency among German leaders to harp upon the subject so to create at least a pyschological atmosphere and condition of mind among her foes favorable to a receptive attitude toward peace overtures. His speech was frankly bellicose in describing Germany's aims in the war:

"The sense and aim of this war is for us the creation of a Germany so firmly united, so strongly protected, that no one ever will feel the temptation to annihilate us, that every one in the world will concede to us the right of free exercise of our peaceful endeavors. This Germany, and not the destruction of other races, is what we wish. Our aim is the lasting rescue of the European Continent, which is now shaken to its very foundations."

As to Belgium:

"After the war, there must be a new Belgium.

"We must create real guarantees that Belgium never shall be a Franco-British vassal; never shall be used as a military or economic fortification against Germany. Also in this respect things cannot be what they were before. Also here Germany cannot sacrifice the oppressed Flemish race, but must assure them sound evolution which corresponds to their rich natural gifts, which is based on their mother tongue and follows their national character.

"We want neighbors that do not form coalitions against us, but with whom we collaborate and who collaborate with us to our mutual advantage. Remembrance of the war will still echo in the sadly tried Belgian country, but we shall never allow that this will be a new source of wars—shall not allow it in our mutual interests."

As to Poland:

"Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary intended to touch the Polish question, but the fate of battles brought them in contact with it. Now this problem stands before the world and needs to be solved. Germany and Austria-Hungary must and will solve it. History will not admit that after such earthquakes things will ever become what they were before.

"Mr. Asquith mentions the principle of nationality. If he puts himself in the position of this unconquered and unconquerable adversary, can he really suppose that Germany will ever of her own free will deliver into the hands of reactionary Russia the nations between the Baltic and the Volhynian swamps who have been freed by her and by her allies—no matter whether they are Poles or Lithuanians or Livonians of the Baltic?"

As to Germany's foes:

"Our enemies wish to destroy united, free Germany. They desire that Germany shall be again as weak as during past centuries, a prey of all lusts of domination of her neighbors, and the scapegoat of Europe, beaten back forever in the dominion of economic evolution, even after the war. That is what our enemies mean when they speak of definitive destruction of Prussia's military power."

In his references to a "new Belgium" the German chancellor referred for the first time to the possibility of Germany's withdrawal from that country. His misty words were construed as an affirmation that Germany would not evacuate a country in which the blood of her sons had been shed unless its political status was differently constituted. The "new Belgium" must include a special disposition of the Flemish portion of the kingdom, a hint of this nature being discerned in the apparent solici-

tude of the German chancellor for preserving the tongue and racial gifts of the Flemings.

A strong movement among the Belgians themselves, and encouraged by their conquerors, later began by the revival of the Flemish People's party with its platform demanding the reconstruction of Belgium as a Federal union of two states—one Flemish, the other Walloon—after the model of Austria-Hungary and Switzerland. Petitions to this end were sent to King Albert, who replied that he could not consider the idea of a dual government during the war.

The Walloon, or historically, the French province, Hainaut, Liege, Namur, Belgian Luxembourg and a portion of Brabant, including the city of Brussels, would form one government, ancient Flanders, including Antwerp, Bruges, Ostend and Ghent, akin in language and history to the Teutons, would be a government independent in itself, united to that of the Walloons under Albert of the Belgians and his descendants.

"We want to be neither German nor French," said the chairman of the meeting at which the constitution was formulated. "We demand a free Flanders. In free Belgium a centralized system is only possible under the maintenance of both languages. Belgium must not emerge from the war as she was before the war. Hence we must begin the struggle now and conduct it until we secure our rights."

The Allies did not look with favor on the proposal; but the Germans encouraged it, seeing therein a way to a solution of their difficulties in Belgium after the war. A dual government in which the Teutonic or Flemish elements would be grouped together and kept distinct from the Walloons, or French, could be drawn close into political unity with the German Empire.

The neutrality of Belgium would be preserved by giving the Germans their own friends at the court of the king at Brussels, to see that the balance of influence in international affairs swung evenly between the Teutons and the Anglo-French.

A German interpretation of the chancellor's cryptic utterances on peace terms was as follows:

No annexation of Belgium; but an independent Belgium that was a Flemish Belgium, freed from French influence and British "vassalage."

No annexation of French territory.

A hint of the annexation of Courland and Lithuania because chiefly inhabited by peoples of Germanic origin.

A guiding principle that under no circumstances must Poland revert to Muscovite rules.

The restitution of conquered Belgian and French territory was to be conditional upon Germany receiving binding guarantees that French territory would not in the future be a gateway through which Germany could be attacked and that the independent Belgium should not be a British bulkhead against Germany.

These conditions were viewed only as meaning a Belgium compelled to be a German vassal, who as an American critic put it, "shall never point guns at Germany, who shall collaborate with Germany because Germany wants it, and who shall not cherish revenge against her conqueror, because vassals should not harbor revengeful feelings."

Belgium, in brief, as seen in the Teutonic indorsement of the chancellor's speech, would come to lie in Germany's hands, politically and economically.

Great Britain spurned the peace terms hinted at in the chancellor's deliverance. Though indirectly aimed at Germany's enemies it was really meant for domestic reading; but it contained too many contentious statements to escape being assailed by the Allies' spokesmen. It furnished a theme for a speech the British premier addressed to some visiting French legislators to London a few days later. As a result of the war, he said, "we intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free negotiation on equal terms between free peoples, and that this settlement shall no longer be hampered or swayed by the overmastering dictation of a Government controlled by a military caste. That is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of Prussia—nothing more, but nothing less.

"We are in this struggle the champions not only of treaty rights but of the independent status and free development of weaker countries. In the circumstances cynicism could hardly go further than in the chancellor's claim that it is for Germany —of all powers—to insist, when peace comes, upon 'giving various races a chance of free evolution along the lines of their mother tongue and national individuality.' Apparently this principle is to be applied, I suppose, on approved Prussian lines, both to Poland and Belgium.

"The attempt to Germanize Poland has been for the last twenty years at once the strenuous purpose and colossal failure of Prussian domestic policy. Nobody knows this better than the chancellor, for he has been one of its principal instruments.

"It is with this record that the chancellor sheds tears over the fate of what he calls the long-suppressed Flemish race. I wonder what the Flemish race itself thinks of the prospect the chancellor opens out to it.

"The chancellor says that after the war there must be a new Belgium, which must not be a Franco-English vassal, but between whose people and the Germans, who burned their churches, pillaged their towns, trampled their liberties, there is to be in the future the collaboration of neighbors.

"My answer is a very simple one. The Allies desire and are determined to see once again the old Belgium. She must not be allowed to suffer permanently from the wanton, wicked invasion of her freedom, and that which has been broken down must be repaired and restored."

Comments even more pungent came from Lord Robert Cecil, the British Minister of War Trade, in addressing a group of American journalists:

"These periodical speeches in the Reichstag are cunning blends of bombast and peaceful protestations. Through them all runs the deliberate design to nourish German hatred of England above all her allies, to bolster the fiction that the German Government are fighting a defensive war, and to forestall and prevent that which the German Government most fears—a popular demand in Germany for peace.

"Never can the Allies dignify this attitude by taking it as an overture. The chancellor made his so-called proposals last year solely that he might be able to refer to them virtuously to-day."

One allusion of the German chancellor to peace, made in December, 1915, was, as quoted by this minister, in these cautious terms: "None of our enemies has approached with peace proposals, and they believe it to be in their interest falsely to attribute peace proposals to us." But if the chancellor were to speak of peace conditions he would "first see the conditions of Germany's enemies." Lord Robert Cecil's view of this peace "feeler" was:

"It is clear that the Germans themselves did not make any proposals, in spite of what the chancellor now pretends. Even if he were sincere, and in the precise proportion as we believe him sincere, we reject, with indignation and contempt, the basis of peace he offers."

Officially there were no overt advances towards peace; but reports were persistent that Germany sought a loophole for making them. The references to peace in Germany's note yielding to the United States over the submarine issue, and a further statement by the German chancellor in the Reichstag, were substantial straws showing which way official Germany was looking. The Allied Powers, not being approached through any other channel, took cognizance only of Germany's deeds and ignored her inviting words. Their attitude was expressed by President Poincaré, who, speaking for France, said: "France does not want Germany to tender peace, but wants her adversary to ask for peace."

When the dangerous issue with the United States was settled, more and more symptoms were revealed that the craving for peace was spreading in Germany. The allusions to peace in the German note to the United States, in fact, gave a fresh impetus to the popular yearning for the war's close, of which a harbinger was seen in the preservation of relations with America. President Wilson's qualifications for the rôle of mediator were debated. Germans considered such discussions no disgrace nor sign of weakness, particularly in view of the then continued

strength of their military position. As seen by one German observer:

"The desire for peace is so strong among the masses of all the warring countries that, were President Wilson to break the present baneful spell by offering his services as mediator, no Government, not even that of England, would dare risk defying public opinion at home and the moral condemnation of the whole world by answering 'no'."

But, in the opinion of the "Morgen Post," "such attempts at mediation, though made in good faith and backed by power and influence, are in general doomed to failure so long as the idea has not dawned upon all the nations concerned that nothing more is to be achieved by a continuation of this bloody struggle. When once this thought has taken root among our enemies, then only may one calculate on the success of an attempt at mediation."

No doubt was entertained in Washington that the peace propaganda had the secret sanction and encouragement of the German Government. Yet all peace talk was idle, Sir Edward Grey told the House of Commons, since the hostilities had not yet reached a stage where it was possible to talk of ending the war, especially as the German public was being constantly "fed with lies." The position of the Allied Powers had in no way been changed.

The British Foreign Secretary had granted an interview to an American correspondent, to whom he said that the Allies were fighting to end "all war," and that peace could not come until Germany had righted the wrongs she had inflicted upon the small nations she had overcome. Objection was taken in the House of Commons as to the propriety of "employing the American press as a platform" to air British views. Sir Edward Grey contended that since German statesmen were constantly utilizing the American press to ventilate Germany's position it would be mere pedantry to hinder British statesmen from countering by the same means the German assertions thus made. "If I thought," he said, "that the German Government or the German people had reached the point where the Allied Govern-

ments could bring nearer a peace comparable with their desires by making speeches about them, I would make dozens of them." But that time had not yet arrived, and the Allies were bound by common obligations not to submit any terms of peace except by mutual agreement.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ALLIES' CONFERENCE

"THE war after the war" engaged the earnest attention of statesmen of the Allied Powers in a momentous series of conferences in Paris. The phrase referred to the bitter commercial conflict which all signs foreshadowed would be waged between the countries affiliated with the Teutonic and allied consolidations respectively after hostilities had ceased. As usual, the challenge had first been thrown by Germany, in her proposal to establish a customs union by the Central Powers on aggressive lines—which meant an economic war after a military war. The Allies thereupon proceeded to formulate plans to resist Germany's avowed aim to establish political predominance in foreign countries by means of the projected customs union. The economic war Germany threatened would, the Allies feared, be a permanent barrier to the peaceful development of Europe unless foiled. An essential step to thwarting Germany's post bellum projects lay in crippling her trade resources while the real war progressed.

"Crushing the enemy's trade is vital to victory," said a British spokesman, Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade. "Every belligerent at all times during the progress of the war has attempted to destroy the enemy's trade as a measure of war.

"Germany's power of resistance, as well as ours, depends upon the extent of her material resources. These we must, as an act of war, diminish in value. We must do everything in our power to prevent her from accumulating stocks or adding to her wealth abroad. We are doing everything in our power to prevent this.

"We can't allow our citizens to trade with German firms in China, from whom we are withholding supplies. That is only one of the many instances of our efforts to prevent her from creating credits abroad or retaining the commercial strength which would enable her to carry out the threat of an economic war on the conclusion of military peace.

"We want to make it clear to Germany that the longer the war continues the less will be her chance of recoupment out of the profits of foreign markets. We aim at shortening the war. Everything which tends 'to preserve her wealth is likely to lengthen the war.' "

But the Allies' chief economic aim was to construct elaborate commercial machinery, internationally linked, that would defeat the purposes Germany had in view after the war.

The German proposal was for an economic union between the Central Empires and the Balkan and Ottoman Allies. As ventilated by Germany's financial specialist, Dr. Helfferich, the scheme contemplated the abolition of tariff duties, and economical boundaries between Germany, Austria, and Hungary, so that they formed one great commercial and industrial territory. This customs union, in short, was designed as a means of creating greater unity and establishing a uniform industry in the two empires. It aimed, moreover, at the economic conquering of the whole world, not the conquest of one ally by another. In other words, the German Government had far-reaching political aims in view. Dr. Helfferich and a group of German commercial dignities in explaining the project to Hungary—which, incidentally, received the proposal with distrust—made no secret of the underlying tendencies of the proposed customs union. They frankly disclosed that the principal interest of the Central Empires lay in the establishment of a "Central Europe," which would consist of a formidable military and economic power under the central control of a German hegemony, the main object of which, it was affirmed, was to prevent any danger in the future to the peace of Europe. This "Central Europe," together with such territory as might fall to the Teutonic Powers and their allies at the close of the war, would be in a position—so Hungary was told—

to organize a military power so formidable that other nations would fear to provoke it. Thus the proposed economic union would serve only as a forerunner to the organizing of a military union calling itself "Central Europe,"—which would be a German military and economic consolidation. It would, in fact, be the Prussian military system established on an enlarged scale, and the proposal disclosed Germany in the light of endeavoring to realize the old Prussian dream of dominating Central Europe behind the modern mask of an economic union. Germany's historic aspirations in this direction were the subject of an exhaustive survey in a section of the first volume of this history entitled: "Economic Causes of the War."

The Allied Powers were more concerned about checkmating Germany's immediate commercial projects, for their success in that endeavor would wreck her ultimate grandiose ambitions. The first Paris conference of the representatives of the Allied Governments, held on March 27 and 28, 1916, by resolution affirmed their "complete community of view and solidarity," and confirmed "all the measures taken to realize unity of action on all fronts":

"They understand by that, at the same time, unity of military action, assured by the Entente, concluded between the general staffs; unity of economic action, the organization of which the present conference has regulated, and unity of diplomatic action, which is guaranteed by their unshaken will to continue the struggle to victory for the common cause.

"The Allied Governments decide to put into practice in the economic domain their solidarity of views and interests. They charge the economic conference, which is to be held soon at Paris, to propose for them appropriate measures for the realization of this solidarity."

The ground was thus cleared for the formulation of matters of weighty import by a compact of cooperation to insure harmony of operations in the whole conduct of the war. The next conference assembled on April 20, 1916, and remained in session four days deliberating on economic and commercial questions raised by the war, the chief of which was a proposal for a joint

tariff system establishing minimum rights among the allied confederation and their colonies, reasonable rates for neutrals, and strong discrimination against all dealings with hostile countries —that is to say, a tariff system favorable to the allied nations for the mutual exchange of commodities. This subject was only part of a comprehensive program, which included:

"(1.) An understanding concerning all legislation intended to regulate commercial relations among the belligerents, such as the execution of contracts, the recovery of credits, sequestration of goods, and the subject of patents.

"(2.) Precautionary measures to be taken against invasion of allied countries by German products after the passage from the state of war to the state of peace.

"(3.) Reparation of war damages.

"(4.) Reduction of postal telegraphic and telephone rates among the allied countries.

"(5.) Agreements relative to the international transport of goods.

"(6.) Creation of an international patent office.

"(7.) The commercial régime of the colonies of the allied countries.

"(8.) Internationalization of laws concerning stock companies.

"(9.) Measures intended to reduce metallic circulation of compensation and postal-check system.

"(10.) Uniform principles to be inscribed in the laws relative to false designation of merchandise.

"(11.) Failures.

"(12.) Legislation regarding the loss and theft of bonds payable to bearer."

The conference was a remarkable one, especially in not meeting to discuss military affairs—the only *raison d'être* for war councils—but rather questions really common to a condition of peace. All the "high commands," civil and military, of Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Japan, and Portugal, and representatives of the great over-sea commonwealths of Great Britain, met in what was really a legislative parliament of eight nations. Never before had the world seen so many na-

tions assembled together to legislate on their joint interests. Some of the subjects they deliberated upon bore only indirectly on the war, and others related to conditions that would exist after the close of hostilities. Constructive minds, for example, seized the opportunity for obtaining international action on such questions as an international patent office, the internationalizing of laws concerning stock companies and business failures, the loss and theft of bonds payable to bearer, false designation of merchandise, and for a reduction of telegraph, telephone, and postal rates between the various countries. All these subjects, but for the war, would not have been amenable to unity of action except through the tortuous channels of separate international congresses. The multifarious business of the conference showed that the Allies proposed to be Allies a long time after peace was concluded. Consciously or unconsciously the conferees afforded a striking example of what had been deemed a far-off event—the assembling of envoys of the peoples of a large section of the globe to legislate in a parliament of nations. It was seen to be the first approach to realization of a future World Congress. Did not the German tariff union of 1856 pave the way to the German Empire? So the conference was greeted by ardent peace seers as likely to be fruitful in bringing the nations affected into a real working union.

It was recognized that the fundamental purpose of the Allies, proposed tariff union—post bellum discrimination against Germany—did not make for world unity, but that was viewed as likely to be only a transient phase of conditions prevailing after the war.

The Allies' conferees, however, had no such exalting and altruistic aims in view except in so far as they came within their own community of interests. The program engaging their attention was so weighty as to call for a third conference apparently a continuation of the second, which concluded its arduous labors on June 17, 1916. By that time the fruit of their deliberations took documentary shape. By unanimous agreement sweeping measures were adopted under three heads—first, embracing the period during the war; second, the transition and reconstruction

period; and, third, the period of the war and reconstruction periods. The text of the resolutions adopted, and embracing these three divisions, constituted an international document of the highest import.

As to measures to be adopted for the duration of the war, the allied conference agreed on a unification of laws and regulations prohibiting trading with the enemy as follows:

"The Allies will forbid their nationals and all persons residing in their territory all commerce with:

"(1.) Inhabitants of enemy countries of whatever nationality.

"Enemy subjects wherever resident.

"Individuals, commercial houses, and companies whose business is controlled entirely or in part by enemy subjects or which are subject to enemy influences, and who will be listed.

"They will prohibit the entry into their territory of all merchandise originating in or coming from an enemy country.

"Endeavor will be made to establish a system for canceling contracts entered into with enemy subjects and detrimental to national interests.

"(2.) Commercial houses owned or exploited by enemy subjects on territory of the Allies will be placed under sequestration or control. Measures will be taken to liquidate certain of these houses as well as their merchandise, the sums thus realized remaining under sequestration or control.

"(3.) Besides the prohibition of exportation rendered necessary by the internal condition of each ally they will complete not only in their territory, but also in their dominions, protectorates, and colonies, the measures already taken against provisioning the enemy.

"By unifying lists of contraband of war and prohibitions of export, and especially in prohibiting the exportation of all merchandise declared as absolute or conditional contraband of war.

"By subordinating the granting of authorization for export to neutral countries whenever such exportation might be effected to enemy territory either by creating a controlling board in these countries through mutual agreement of the Allies or by special

guarantees, such as limiting the quantity exported, consul control, &c."

The transitory measures agreed upon for the commercial, industrial, agricultural, and maritime period of reconstruction of the allied countries were in the following terms:

"(1.) The Allies proclaiming their solidarity for the restoration of the countries, victims of destruction, spoliation, and abusive requisition, decide to investigate in common the means of restoring to such countries as a special privilege or of aiding them to renew their raw material, industrial and agricultural machinery, live stock, and merchant marine.

"(2.) Noting that the war has terminated all the treaties of commerce which united them with the enemy powers, and considering that it is essential that during the period of economic reconstruction which will follow the cessation of hostilities, the liberty of none of the Allies shall be hampered by the possible pretension on the part of the enemy powers of a claim to the most favored nation treatment. The Allies agree that the benefit of this treatment shall not be accorded to such powers during a number of years which shall be decided by means of a mutual understanding between the Allies.

"The Allies mutually agree for a number of years and in the greatest measure possible, to provide compensating outlets in such cases where disadvantageous consequences may result for the commerce by the application of the agreement mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

"(3.) The Allies declare themselves united in preserving for the allied countries in preference to all others their natural resources during the period of commercial, industrial, agricultural, and maritime reconstruction, and to this end they agree to establish special arrangements which will facilitate an exchange of resources.

"(4.) In order to protect their commerce, industries, agriculture, and navigation against an economic depression resulting from dumping or against any other unfair method of competition, the Allies decide to come to an agreement to fix a period of time during which the commerce of the enemy powers shall be

subjected either to prohibition or to a special system which shall be efficacious. The Allies shall reach an understanding by diplomatic channels regarding the special regulations to be imposed during the period above mentioned upon ships of the enemy powers.

"(5.) The Allies shall seek measures to be taken in common or separately to prevent the exercise in their territories by enemy subjects of certain industries or professions of interest to the national defense or economic independence."

Next came the framing of permanent measures of mutual aid and collaboration between the Allies:

"The Allies are resolved to take without delay the necessary measures to rid themselves of dependence on enemy countries as regards raw material and manufactured articles which are essential to the normal development of their economic activity.

"These measures should tend to assure the independence of the Allies not only regarding those matters concerning the sources of supply, but also those touching the financial, commercial, and maritime organization.

"In order to carry out their resolution the Allies will adopt such means as seem to them most appropriate according to the nature of the merchandise and following the principles which govern the economic policies.

"Especially they may have recourse to subsidized enterprises under the direction or control of the Governments themselves or to payment to encourage scientific and technical researches, the development of industries, and natural resources, or to customs tariffs, or to temporary or permanent prohibitions, or even to a combination of these various means.

"Whatever means may be adopted, the end sought by the Allies is to increase in large measure the production of the whole of their territory, so that they may maintain and develop their economic situation and independence with respect to the enemy.

"So as to permit a reciprocal sale of their products, the Allies engage to take measures destined to facilitate exchange thereof as much as by the establishment of direct and rapid services of

transportation by land and sea at reduced rates as by the development and amelioration of postal, telegraph, and other communications.

"The Allies agree to bring together technical delegates to prepare measures suitable to unify as much as possible their laws concerning patents, marks, or origins, and trade-marks.

"The Allies will adopt in regard to the inventions trade-marks, literary, and artistic works created during the war in an enemy country a system as uniform as possible and applicable after the cessation of hostilities. This system shall be elaborated by the technical delegates of the Allies."

Finally immediate action on the foregoing measures was agreed upon:

"The representatives of the Allied Governments, realizing that for their common defense against the enemy they have resolved to adopt a similar economic policy under conditions determined by resolutions taken, and recognizing that the efficiency of this policy depends absolutely upon the immediate putting into effect of these resolutions, agree to recommend their respective Governments to take without delay all suitable measures for enabling this policy to produce immediately its full and entire effect, and to communicate to each other the decisions reached for the attainment of this purpose."

The delegates at the Paris conference which combined on these sweeping measures did not possess plenipotentiary powers. Hence how far and in what degree their agreement could be translated into action remained a question for further deliberation and legislative action. Their deliberations had resulted only in the framing of a program, with an assortment of planks that would tax the ingenuity of statesmen to transfer to the statute books of their respective nations. British free traders, to go no further, were not prepared to abandon their principles, and disclosed symptoms of unrest indicating that any action tending to commit the British Government to a policy of commercial boycott would be closely scrutinized. A press view saw in the recommendations of the conference "a bright vision of a union of states for peaceful purposes, several countries, large and

small, agreeing to substitute cooperation for competition in their commercial aims and economic methods—a pleasing prospect which contains the germ of permanent peace." But this bright vision had a dark shadow:

"A union of States is to be set up against another union of States. Such proposals challenge our enemies to continue an economic war after this war is finished. If Germany shows no repentance for her plot against the world's freedom; if she manifests no change of mood, then this painful thing might have to be. If Germany uses her commercialism as the cat's-paw of her militarism, then we must fight her commercialism, for the whole spawn of militarism is poisoned with the evil of its origin. So if the German nation were sullen after this war over being beaten, but not convinced of the wrong of militarism, and if the nation set out to prepare for a permanent war, why, then such proposals for a permanent division of interests might become necessary, but what would that mean? It would mean that we had failed to reach our goal in this war. We might win the war, but we should not have destroyed militarism and that is what we are trying to do."

A similar view, which more or less reflected American criticism of the Allies embryonic plans of reprisal, was taken by the New York "Times":

"The surest basis of war is a conflict of interests, and the Allies' economic program plots just that. It is either a bluff designed to induce a surrender through fright or it is something invented to be surrendered for a consideration. It is little likely to frighten such an enemy as Germany, and nothing can be bought with it. When peace comes it will be because it is welcome as a relief from war, and not as a lever for further war of another sort.

"A national tariff may conceivably be protection in self-defense, just as it is lawful for a trust to develop itself to any dimensions in methods of sound trade. But a conspiracy of nations to engross trade cannot be a measure of self-defense under the guise of so-called protection. It is aggression."

CHAPTER XVIII

NEW FRONTIERS THE ONLY BASIS

TOWARD the close of May, 1916, official Germany, in its own devious way, disclosed more definitely than hitherto the ground on which it stood regarding peace. Germany, it appeared, had no fixed peace program. Rather were her conditions a variable quantity, dependent upon the duration of the war and the fortunes of German arms. Herein lay a strong hint that a bargain could be struck with the Allies now; but she invited "quick takers," as the price of peace would advance as the war proceeded, and would further expand the longer Germany's enemies fought shy of coming to terms. The price of peace would also tend to increase with any further German gains of territory, and would likewise be affected by the sacrifices Germany might suffer to hold her present advantages. Whether later or soon, peace negotiations must be fundamentally based on this latter condition, that is, the military situation prevailing at the time. Proposals on any other basis could not be recognized as within the sphere of possible negotiations. On this point the German chancellor delivered an uncompromising dictum in Munich:

"The present war map must form the basis of peace. Let the statesmen of the Entente Powers look at the facts as presented by this map and they will know Germany's terms."

The "Lokalanzeiger" interpreted these words to mean that "the trenches which the Central Powers have erected east and west are an impenetrable German wall of soldiers which must be the frontiers of a peace treaty. In no war yet has this been the case, but a military achievement, which has been gained with so much blood, must form the starting point for any negotiations for peace."

Nor would Germany countenance the inclusion of what she regarded as the nation's purely private affairs as factors in any peace parleys. Her face was sternly set against permitting any

foreign influences to be exerted on her internal concerns through the medium of a peace conference. Apparently this meant that Germany would not brook the thorny question of any abatement of her military policy being subjected to the dictation of her foes as a condition of peace.

Finally, no offers of mediation or efforts to pave a way for peace parleys could be entertained if they involved taking into account who was to blame for the outbreak of the war; and only a strictly nonpartisan mediator would be persona grata to the German Government.

Gradually, unobtrusively and skillfully German public opinion was being prepared for the eventuality of peace in general and mediation by President Wilson in particular. Out of the currents of peace talk and peace rumors flowing through Germany, this condition emerged in clear outline. Through the political censorship, the Imperial Government could not only mold and influence public opinion to its way of thinking on peace, but, what was more important, it was doing so. The political censorship, it was recorded, never worked more admirably or sanely than during the late spring of 1916 in its manipulations of the all-absorbing peace theme.

The censorship raised its embargo on this topic, which had long been almost taboo, and gave a free rein to the German press to print peace news and indulge in peace discussion. Though any expression of specific peace terms and war aims was forbidden, the comparative freedom of the press in this respect was welcomed as a notable advance on the road to peace. The German people were made familiar with the prospect that President Wilson might offer his aid as a mediator the moment conditions were ripe, and they knew, too, that the Pope and the King of Spain were also eager to intervene.

President Wilson was credited with holding the view that, while the time had not come to make any direct overtures to the belligerents, continued suggestions of peace, kept constantly before the world, would induce both belligerents and neutrals to discuss them, until an atmosphere was created helpful to the formulation of real peace proposals.

In a speech the President delivered at a banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, in Washington, on May 27, 1916, he enunciated what he believed to be the fundamental things the American people espoused for preserving the peace of the world. They were:

"First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.

"Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.

"Third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard for the rights of people and nations."

This affirmation of national liberty for all peoples came as a prelude to a significant utterance regarding the possible rôle the United States might play as a pacificator among the warring nations:

"If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people of the United States would wish their Government to move along these lines:

"First—Such a settlement with regard to their own immediate interests as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace and its future guarantees.

"Second—A universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war, begun either contrary to treaty convenants or without warning, and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence."

The British view of this declaration was that President Wilson's aspirations coincided with the objects for which the Allied Powers were fighting. "His dream of universal peace," said

one commentator, "lies in the lap, not of the gods, but of the Allies."

The unofficial peace propaganda the inner counsels of Germany were supposed to be deftly engineering, which had seemingly inspired much of President Wilson's utterances, was not permitted to pass without a vigorous assault in the Reichstag. Nor did President Wilson escape unscathed. One National Liberal member averred that the German people did not want as a mediator, "The protector of America's arms and ammunition shipments and of the English hunger war." This attack was incidental to a concerted onslaught the Pan-German annexationists made on the Government, particularly on the chancellor. An ultra-conservative member, Herr von Graefe, in the harshest terms charged that the Government was using the censorship to falsify public opinion. "If the censorship wanted to avoid the evil effects of German press products abroad, it ought, above all, to forbid the chancellor's speech and interviews. Through the medium of the censorship a distortion of falsification of public opinion is sought to be brought about. In the chancellor's speeches the enemy press sees a masked retreat, and that curious peace angel, Wilson, is thereby encouraged first to 'knock out' Germany, then to extend the hand of peace. If this is the effect of the chancellor's speeches abroad, the sharpest censorship ought to start right here. The effect of such speeches is unavoidable as long as the censorship prevents every expression of force in the German nation."

This stern critic complained that a clique surrounding the kaiser prevented the real will of the people reaching him:

"We demand that the censorship do not erect a Chinese wall about the man who must know the true feelings of the German nation. The German people have given unto the kaiser what is the kaiser's due. Now give to the people what is their due. The people have their right to help in determining the nation's future."

That Herr von Graefe was ranged on the side of the war extremists, that he leaned toward an unlimited use of the submarine, that he charged the chancellor with bending the censor-

ship to a peace propaganda which he said had heartened the enemy and misrepresented the spirit of the German people—all this was deemed to be of minor importance compared with the fact that he had advocated freedom of popular expression. Therein he stood solidly with the Socialists, who, though entertaining ideas of peace antagonistic to his, equally denounced the censorship, which hindered also the expression of their sentiments. Indeed, on specifically different grounds, all the incohesive elements of the Reichstag denounced the censorship, but all for the same reason, namely, that it kept the German people from knowing themselves, and, therefore, could not interfere intelligently in their own affairs.

Nothing more significant of political undercurrents in Germany had hitherto been aired than this heated debate on the censorship, in view of the fact that the conservatives and other annexationist elements stood for a strong Bismarckian policy, and not only condemned the chancellor for a spineless attitude toward the United States on the submarine issue, but were also in revolt against the chancellor's readiness to make peace on moderate terms.

Events wrought a quick reversal of the chancellor's views. The naval battle off Jutland was fought. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg in a swashbuckling speech before the Reichstag on June 5, 1916, five days after this indecisive encounter between the German and British fleets in the North Sea, sternly withdrew the informal peace proposals, which had filtered through his previous utterances and through other channels. He hurled defiance at the Fatherland's enemies, declared that any further suggestion of peace by Germany would be futile and evil, and appealed to the nation to hold fast till victory was theirs:

"We did what we could to pave the way to peace, but our enemies repelled us with scorn. Some statesmen, in England and elsewhere, have made attempts to feel the pulse of our people, and while making contrasts between our different states as political units, have tried to console themselves into the belief that our striking force was near the breaking point. These gentlemen are indulging in strange notions. If they do not

desire to deceive themselves, they will notice only how firmly beats the heart of the German people. There is no external influence that can shake our unity even in the slightest degree.

"My belief in my people and my love for my people give me a conviction firm as a rock that we shall fight and conquer as we have fought and conquered hitherto. Our enemies wish to let it go on to the end. We fear neither death nor devil, not even the hunger devil which they wish to send into our country. The men who fight out there around Verdun, who fight under Hindenburg, our proud bluejackets, who showed Albion that rats bite, are fashioned from a breed that knows how to bear privations also. These privations are here. I admit it calmly and openly, even to foreign countries, but we will bear them.

"In this fight against hunger we will also make progress. Gracious heaven will not be worse, but better, than in the previous hard year. This calculation of our enemies on our economic difficulties will prove deceptive.

"Another of their calculations was sharply corrected by our young navy last week. This victory will not make us boastful. We know that it does not mean that England is beaten. But it is a token of our future wherein Germany will win, for herself and also for smaller peoples, full equality of rights and lasting freedom of sea routes, now closed by England's sole domination."

The German chancellor appeared to have found strength in his conflict with his conservative enemies in the Reichstag by the German rejoicing over the naval battle. The conservatives chiefly assailed him for the abandonment of unrestricted submarine warfare; but the manner in which the High Seas fleet had acquitted herself as seen through the roseate lens of German spectacles—had refuted the conservative contention that by submitting to the American demand the German navy had been reduced to a condition of inglorious inactivity. The actual result, however, on the chancellor's own admission, was that the North Sea battle had brought no adequate compensation for what might possibly be attained by a ruthless U-boat campaign. The British blockade had not been relaxed. The German fleet, as hitherto, was immured in the confines of Kiel. Hence the

rousing plaudits the Reichstag accorded his speech seemed only to register a fleeting advantage for the chancellor which the wayward and unheralded events of the war could easily dissipate.

The chancellor's speech was viewed as unlike any other he had made, indeed, unlike any made in Germany by any statesman. He went to great pains to uphold and justify the censorship, though, in the face of violent denunciations of the censorship, he himself acknowledged and complained of some of its reacting evils. His speech accepted for the government a defensive political position, recognized the existence of an uncontrollable public opinion; appealed for what the world had supposed were Germany's bulwarks—unity, unlimited patriotism and an unwavering willingness for self-sacrifice; admitted the failure of the official peace propaganda; abandoned the hope of imminent peace with victory, and prepared the German mind for the contemplation of greater privations to come.

The stimulus for the chancellor's deliverance, apart from these bearings, lay in the effect of the naval battle on the emotions of the German populace. The battle brought a sudden stiffening to the war extremists. All talk of Germany being willing to end the war on the basis of the ante bellum status quo ceased. Through neutral Europe drifted intimations that Germany would now require "a slight rectification of her frontier at the expense of Belgium," a strip of Serbia in order that the railway to Constantinople should always run through "friendly" territory, and, in addition to the return of all her colonies, "compensation for German losses in the Congo."

One of Henry Ford's peace emissaries, the Rev. Dr. Charles F. Aked, of San Francisco, after a visit to Berlin at the time of the North Sea fight, presented a gloomy report to the Stockholm Peace Conference regarding peace prospects. Amended peace terms formulated by the now dominant war party, coupled with the German chancellor's intimation that peace was only obtainable upon a recognition of the military situation of the opposing armies, chilled the most ardent of the peace advocates abiding in the Swedish capital. Everywhere in Germany Dr. Aked found the deeply rooted conviction that the German armies could not

be beaten, and that the Allies could not exhaust German resources.

Thus was the outlook for peace in Germany up to the beginning of July, 1916, when the Allies began to make their drives on all fronts, breaking those military lines which Germany insisted should be the basis for any further peace proposals.

CHAPTER XIX

SOARING WAR DEBTS

TWO years of war cost roughly the various belligerents $50,000,000,000, or $107,500,000 a day—$40,000,000,000 being loans, and $10,000,000,000 spent from their own exchequers or from new issues of paper money. The aggregate debt of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Turkey, increased from $27,273,000,000 to $66,638,000,000. Over $28,000,000,000 was added to the sums Great Britain, France, and Germany were bound to pay, the first-named country leading with over $11,000,000,000 of war indebtedness. This table gives the respective debts of the various countries in 1914 and 1916:

	Pre-War Debt.	Pres. Debt.
Great Britain	$3,485,000,000	$15,106,000,000
France	6,607,000,000	14,966,000,000
Russia	4,537,000,000	10,363,000,000
Italy	2,836,000,000	4,301,000,000
Total for Allies....	$17,465,000,000	$44,736,000,000
Germ'y (Emp. and Sts.)	$5,198,000,000	$14,291,000,000
Austro-Hungary	3,970,000,000	6,757,500,000
Turkey	640,000,000	854,000,000
Central Powers	$9,808,000,000	$21,902,500,000
Grand Total	$27,273,000,000	$66,638,500,000

Here is shown a division of the aggregate cost of two years' war among the various countries engaged in it, and the outlay by the day:

Great Britain's heavy war obligation was partly due to her rôle as banker to her allies, to whom she was a liberal lender of credits. She was the economic mainstay of the Allied cause, holding the purse, and with it the power to command the world's goods, especially food. By reason of her natural wealth in material and her great industrial equipment she was able, besides, to produce for the uses of war a surplus of manufactures above her own requirements.

Great Britain's exports and reexports, which took a striking upward rebound in 1916, therefore included both goods produced from her own resources and supplied directly to her allies, and other goods bought outside in the markets of the world for their account.

France was a large customer for British coal and iron, her own resources of such raw material having been conquered by Germany. Great Britain's other allies, being industrially inferior to France, required enormous quantities.

All this trade with her allies in her war expenditures was embraced by the entry of "advances," not representing money loaned to them, but almost entirely goods supplied to them on credit.

At the close of the British fiscal year, March 1, 1916, this trade amounted to $1,840,000,000. In the current fiscal year, according to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's estimate, it would be increased by $2,150,000,000.

Thus, on March 31, 1917, if the war lasted till then, Great Britain's allies would owe her almost $4,000,000,000 for goods obtained on credit, or roughly, one-quarter of Great Britain's estimated aggregate war expenditures incurred by then, which were expected to reach $16,500,000,000.

These accommodations, therefore, constitute a considerable discount on the various loans so far raised by the empire during the war, viz:—

First war loan 3½s on 3.97 per cent basis	$1,750,000,000
Second war loan 4½s on 4.58 per cent basis	2,970,000,000
Treasury bills to June 24	3,518,330,000
Exchequer 5s to June 30	1,383,098,000
Exchequer 3s, due 1920	239,710,000
War expenditures certificates to June 30	50,663,000
Other war debt to June 30	121,000,000
Estimate to August 1	600,000,000
Half of Anglo-French loan in United States	250,000,000
Banking credit in Canada	101,000,000
Banking credit in United States	50,000,000
Canadian ten-year 4¼s in London	25,000,000
Canadian one and two year 5s in United States	45,000,000
Canadian five, ten, and fifteen-year 5s in the United States	75,000,000
Canadian ten-year internal 5½s at 97½	100,000,000
Indian Government internal 4s	15,000,000
Indian Treasury bills in London	17,500,000
Australian 5s, at 99, in London	10,000,000
Australian internal loan	50,000,000
Australian second internal loan	250,000,000
Total	$11,621,301,000

On the credit side, according to Chancellor McKenna, was an increased yield by new taxation, which gave the nation's creditors every assurance that they were properly secured. Not a pound, he said, was borrowed without making provision for interest and a liberal sinking fund.

The war liabilities incurred by the other allies were as in the following table:

FRANCE

"Loan of Victory" 5s at 87 on 5.75 per cent basis	$3,100,000,000
National defense bonds	1,700,000,000
National defense obligations	300,000,000
Advances from Bank of France to June 29	1,580,000,000
Estimated to August 1	500,000,000
Advances Bank of France to foreign Governments	228,000,000
Bonds and notes in London	506,000,000
Half of Anglo-French loan in U. S.	250,000,000
Collateral loan in United States	100,000,000
One year 5 per cent notes in U. S.	30,000,000
Banking credits in New York	50,000,000
Advances from Bank of Algeria	15,000,000
Total	$8,359,000,000

RUSSIA

First internal 5s at 95 on 5.35 per cent basis	$257,500,000
Second internal loan	257,500,000
Third loan, five-year 5½s	515,000,000
Fourth loan, ten-year 5½s at 95	515,000,000
Fifth loan, 5½s at 95	1,030,000,000
Four per cent bonds	309,000,000
Treasury bills, 5 per cent	2,000,000,000
Issues discounted in England	642,886,860
Issues in France	120,896,250
Special currency loan	103,000,000
Loan in Japan	25,000,000
Three-year 6½ per cent credit in United States	50,000,000
Total	$5,825,783,110

ITALY

Twenty-five-year 4½s at 97	$200,000,000
Twenty-five-year 4½s at 95	190,000,000
Twenty-five-year 5s at 97½	800,000,000
English credit for war supplies	250,000,000
One-year 6 per cent notes in U. S.	25,000,000
Total	$1,465,000,000

BELGIUM

From French and English Governments	$218,000,000

JAPAN

Internal loan of 1914	$26,000,000
Loan to refund bonds in France	20,000,000
Total	$46,000,000

SERBIA

From French Government	$33,000,000

The war loans raised by the four belligerents in the Teutonic alliance amounted to $12,124,500,000, composed of—Germany, $9,093,000,000; Austria-Hungary, $2,787,500,000; Turkey, $214,000,000; Bulgaria, $30,000,000. Germany provided the two last-named countries with their sinews of war, and of the Austrian war debt almost $300,000,000 were loans and credits obtained through German channels. The Teuton loans were as follows:

GERMANY

First war loan 5s at 97½ on 5.32 per cent. basis	$1,115,000,000
Second war loan 5s at 98½	2,265,000,000
Third war loan	3,025,250,000
Fourth war loan 5s at 98½	2,667,750,000
Bank loan in Sweden	10,000,000
Note issue in United States	10,000,000
Total	$9,093,000,000

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austrian 5½s at 97½ on 6.10 per cent basis	$433,000,000
Hungarian 6s at 97½ on 6.70 per cent basis	237,000,000
Austrian second war loan	534,000,000
Hungarian second and third	230,000,000
Austrian third war loan	815,000,000
Hungarian war loan	240,000,000
Loan from German bankers	113,500,000
Second loan in Germany	125,000,000
Credit in Germany	60,000,000
Total	$2,787,500,000

The net total Allied loans raised amounted to $27,066,756,110. Added to the sum the Teutonic Alliance borrowed, namely, $12,124,500,000, the cost of the war to all the belligerents, in loans alone, amounted to $39,191,254,110 up to August 1, 1916.

Germany resorted to many urgent and special appeals to her people in floating her various loans. The Government, through the press, went to great pains to assure hesitating investors of the absolute safety of money deposited in war loans. It was impossible, the people were told, "for anything to happen to the Imperial loans," and their safety was all the greater as the road to victory was more confidently expressed. Final victory was the goal, the attaining of which was helped by every loan subscriber.

"Victory is also founded on the riches of Germany," ran one appeal, made to induce a response to the issue of the fourth war loan. "The value of the capital of the German people is reckoned at 350,000 million marks; and the total yearly income is about 40,000 millions. The first three war loans reached 25,000 millions and was only the fourteenth part of the people's capital and the yearly amount of interest of 1,250 millions is only the thirty-second part of the total income. Without doubt, the magnitude of

the sum of money required for the war is such as Germany has never before experienced. But the people have the proof that the German Empire is able to fulfill these extraordinary conditions. These are sacrifices which pay; for German industry has the capacity of making capital out of every condition of life.

"The German Empire will pay its interest even under the most unfavorable circumstances. This duty is the first commandment which must be kept. There are things which exceed the bounds of imagination; to these belong the idea that a debt of the German Empire could ever become unsafe." The appeal, however, yielded less than the third war loan.

Of the estimated daily cost of the war to all the belligerents, $107,000,000, two-thirds were incurred by the Allies. The cost to Great Britain alone ran in the neighborhood of $30,000,000 a day, but had probably reached its zenith at that unsurpassed point. But the borrowing continued. Austria-Hungary, at the close of the war's second year, was seeking subscriptions to a fourth loan; France and Russia negotiated new credits in the United States; Great Britain projected another great loan to refund the series of treasury bills she had issued, and contemplated inviting American investors to take bonds on the security of her great municipalities, just as many British investors had placed blocks of their capital in American city bonds, the proceeds of such issues in the United States to be devoted to war purposes; and Germany was devising further forays on the sorely tried popular purse, being unable to raise money in foreign countries for the conduct of the war.

CHAPTER XX

REAL CONSCRIPTION

THE thorny question of conscription, which more than once had placed the British Coalition Cabinet in danger of collapse, again became acute in April and May, 1916. The compromise arrived at, under the Derby system, was not working satisfactorily. Modified compulsion there was, with exemption to married men until all available single men had responded to the call to the colors, either of their own motion or under duress. Both groups had been "attested" or listed by a national canvass, so that, theoretically, there was no escape from the call sooner or later. But the married men complained that the authorities had not requisitioned all the single men available before calling upon them, and threatened to resist being drafted into the army with so many single men remaining at large either through laxity or under the numerous exemptions the new law allowed. The recruiting situation was fully described in the previous volume of this history.

The anti-Government press, which aimed at the downfall of the Asquith Cabinet, charged that the Derby scheme had broken down after weeks of muddle and delay. There was no doubt that recruits were too few. A proposal to inaugurate general compulsion by amending the military service act, which provided for modified conscription, gained strong support. The chief cause of the recruiting failure was laid to reliance on one class of men before calling on the other. The demand now was that all eligible men should be required to enlist, regardless of whether they were married or single, or whether they had attested their willingness to enlist when called upon.

The cabinet wrestled with the problem, which split it wide asunder, and was on the verge of disintegration. Lloyd-George, Minister of Munitions, took an uncompromising stand for general compulsion; but a majority of the cabinet was believed to hold that any fresh measure of compulsion was not necessary.

In the middle of April, 1916, a committee of the cabinet, composed of two Unionist Ministers, Lord Lansdowne and Austen Chamberlain, and two Liberals, Premier Asquith and Reginald McKenna, after inquiring into the available sources of men for the army, navy, and war industries, had unanimously reported against the compulsory enlistment of unattested married men. Earls Kitchener and Curzon supported Lloyd-George for compulsory service of all men of military age.

The cabinet passed through a critical stage on April 18 and 19, 1916. Premier Asquith kept promising statements to the House of Commons as to the decision reached; but a deadlock prevailed. That a break-up of the coalition government threatened was indicated by a remark the premier made to the House:

"The Government is united in believing that such an event would be a national disaster of the most formidable kind."

Political tension was acute, but became allayed by this statement, which indicated that the cabinet had determined that an agreement was imperative, and the hope grew that the premier with his usual skill would again weather the storm. Whatever happened, there must be no disruption.

The Labor party ended the crisis. It was the only political group really united against further measures of compulsion. It now recognized the seriousness of the situation by agreeing to a further trial of the existing semivoluntary system of enlistment, with the understanding that the Laborites would consent to a gradual extension of compulsion should that be necessary to secure the additional number of men the military authorities deemed essential.

Disclosure of the agreement the cabinet arrived at, to which the Labor members paved the way by their concession, called for a secret session of Parliament on April 26, 1916. The bare plan was revealed later, but the debate was screened from public record. The official statement later announced that the premier, on behalf of the Government, presented proposals foreshadowing general military compulsion unless success attended "immediate efforts to obtain men required by voluntary enlistment from among unattested married men."

"The Government," Mr. Asquith said, "will forthwith ask Parliament for compulsory power, unless at the end of four weeks, ending May 27, 1916, 50,000 unattested married men have been secured by voluntary enlistment. The same course is proposed if in any one week after May 27, 1916, 15,000 men have not been secured by direct enlistment. These arrangements are to hold good until 200,000 unattested men have been obtained."

The plan was discarded before it was tried after the Government apparently had discovered the futility of placing reliance upon it as a last prop to the preservation of the so-called voluntary system. A week later Mr. Asquith told an expectant Parliament that the Government had decided upon immediate general conscription for the duration of the war, and that the 200,000 unattested married men essential to the maintenance of the armies in the field were not to be requisitioned by any voluntary plan. A condition which he had all along stipulated as the only justification for such a step as general compulsion, the premier told the House, namely, general consent of the nation, had, he felt, now been obtained by the speeches delivered in the House of Commons the previous week. Here the premier revealed that the secret debate on the plan withdrawn showed the sentiment of the House to be in favor of real conscription, an influence which doubtless aided the cabinet to close all breaches obstructing a final agreement. All the ministers agreed that the needful men could not be obtained by the existing machinery; but they were available and could be spared from the industries essential to the successful prosecution of the war.

The British army was now composed of eighty-three divisions, including the naval division and the contributions from the dominions, but excluding India. At the beginning of the war the army only consisted of twenty-six divisions. Since then 5,000,000 men had been added by more or less voluntary efforts under the Derby system of "attesting" for enlistment groups of married and unmarried men. This field of recruiting had evidently become exhausted, and levy was made on "unattested" men, of whom the benedicts alone had shown a ten-

dency to evade service, complaining that there were ample single men who could be drawn upon before it became their turn. The Government decided to draw upon both without further discrimination.

The situation was at this stage when the whole army was agitated with a profound grief over the tragic death of Field Marshal Earl Kitchener, the inspirer and pioneer whom Great Britain had to thank for the raising of her new legions. He met his death by drowning off the Orkneys, when the cruiser *Hampshire,* which was bearing him on a military mission to Russia, was struck by a mine, falling like a mythical war god in the embraces of the angry seas his country dominated at an awful cost. But his chief work was done; the armies he had labored to raise were in being, and bent on fulfilling all he asked of them under the spur of his magic name. Lloyd-George succeeded him as Minister of War.

CHAPTER XXI

CASE OF CAPTAIN FRYATT

GERMANY, in her search for means of reprisals against Great Britain's conduct of sea warfare, invented a new crime. The captain of a British merchant steamer who, in March, 1916, tried to ram a German submarine on being attacked by it without warning, had committed "a franc-tireur crime against German armed forces." The skipper in question, Captain Charles Fryatt, was captured by German torpedo boats in June while piloting a passenger steamer, the *Brussels,* across the North Sea from Rotterdam to Tilbury. The vessel was carrying a number of Belgian refugees to England. A month later he was tried at a German court-martial at Bruges for the aforesaid offense when master of another ship, sentenced to death, and immediately executed.

Testimony was submitted by German witnesses to show that he did not belong to the British armed forces. The German sub-

marine he attempted to ram while being attacked was the *U-33*. For this exploit, the court heard, he had received a gold watch from the British admiralty, and his "brave conduct" was mentioned in the House of Commons. The submarine, according to the official account of the trial, had signaled to the British steamer to show her flag and to stop. Captain Fryatt did not heed the signal, but turned at high speed toward the submarine, which escaped only by diving immediately several yards below the surface. The prisoner admitted following the instructions of the British admiralty in so acting. This was the German evidence in the case.

The deed stirred Great Britain as deeply as did the execution of Miss Cavell for aiding allied soldiers to escape in Belgium. As to the evidence regarding the watch, the British Foreign Office learned that when captured Captain Fryatt had neither a watch nor any letter to indicate that he had tried to ram a submarine. The conclusion was that the charge was based solely on press reports.

"One of the many franc-tireur actions of English merchant shipping against our war vessels," said the German account of the execution, "has thus found late but merited expiation."

The second Hague Convention provided that the crews of merchantmen who legitimately resisted capture were to be treated as prisoners of war.

The British admiralty, in holding that Captain Fryatt's execution was in violation of all law and precedent, stated:

"There is no such thing known as a franc-tireur at sea. We have officers of German submarines whom we have taken as prisoners of war, who rammed merchant ships without warning and fired upon merchant ships without warning, but they are treated as prisoners of war. We also have naval officers who dropped bombs from Zeppelins on harmless and undefended towns and killed civilian inhabitants."

The German contention was that the charge against Captain Fryatt amply justified his execution. The court-marshal's action, it was said, needed neither defense nor explanation. It was apparently based upon revised prize regulations, whereby officers

and crews of armed merchantmen attacking or resisting German warships were "placed beyond the pale of the law and were to be regarded simply as pirates and freebooters."

"Obviously legal and right," a German official defense of the execution said. "As a court-martial on land protects the soldier of the arms against murder by bushwhackers by threatening the death penalty, the same military law protects members of the sea forces from murder at sea. Germany will continue in the future to apply this military law in order that submarine crews may not become the prey of bushwhackers at sea."

Like the Cavell execution, the outside world saw no justification for the deed. A Dutch paper called it "a dastardly murder of spite and hatred." It appeared that the case came before the kaiser and the Imperial War Council, who agreed as to the justice of the sentence. Germany, it was said, had merely extended to sea warfare the principles already controlling franctireur activity on land. But all that Captain Fryatt had done, as master of a merchant vessel attacked by a submarine without warning or regard for the safety of her passengers and crew, was to take the one step which appeared to afford the only chance of saving not only his vessel but the lives of all on board. The British could see no crime in such a resort to self-preservation.

"It shows that the German high commanders," Premier Asquith told the House of Commons, "under the stress of a military defeat have renewed their policy of terrorism. It is impossible to conjecture to what further atrocities they may proceed, but the Government desires to repeat most emphatically their resolve when a time comes that these crimes shall not go unpunished.

"When the time arrives they are determined to bring to justice the criminals, whoever they may be and whatever their position. In a case such as this the man who authorized the system under which the crime was committed may well be the most guilty of all."

The premier's reference appeared to be to the kaiser. Another British view of the execution was expressed by A. J. Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty.

"Doubtless," he said, "the Germans knew that Captain Fryatt was doing his duty and they resolved at all costs to discourage imitation. They are always wrong, because they always suppose that if they behave like brutes they can cow their enemies into behaving like cowards."

CHAPTER XXII

THE IRISH REVOLT

GRAVE disturbances broke out in Dublin on Easter Monday; April 24, 1916, and troops from outlying barracks were hastily sent there to quell them. A bold announcement to this effect was made to the House of Commons the next day by Augustine Birrell, Secretary for Ireland, and the startled country thus knew that the long-rumored insurrection in the Emerald Isle had really come.

Great Britain immediately proclaimed martial law over the city and county of Dublin, and later, as the outbreak gathered force and spread to other centers, extended the order all over the country. Lieutenant General Sir John Maxwell, former commander of the British forces in Egypt, was sent to Ireland to suppress the revolt with plenary powers under martial law—remorselessly exercised—and strong forces were dispatched to reenforce the troops already on the scene but inadequate to cope effectively with the rebels.

The uprising was known as the Sinn Fein Rebellion. At the stroke of noon on Easter Monday a mob of armed men, mainly young, with fixed bayonets, bandoliers slung across their shoulders, and wearing soft felt hats as the nearest approach to uniformity of dress, burst into the general post office, drove out its staff of 200 workers, and took possession of the building. The district was suddenly thrown into the wildest turmoil, and soldiery and police hurriedly assembled to dislodge the insurgents. Other bands made an assault on Dublin Castle, but the attack

was not pressed in the face of the resistance offered by troops stationed there. They then occupied Stephen's Green, held up troops which were returning from the barracks, fired on them from the roofs of buildings, seized the city hall, the Four Courts, and the Western Road and Amiens Road railway stations, and cut off telegraphic communication. The Four Courts were the principal courts of justice in Ireland, and the two railway stations the main arteries of communication with England.

The Sinn Feiners had assembled at their usual rendezvous as though for one of their Easter parades. Many of the rank and file did not know that their foregathering had any other purpose until a body of their companions, some 600 strong, set out to capture the Sackville Street district.

The raid on the post office was beyond the power of the police to cope with. Small detachments of lancers appeared on the scene, but after several of them were wounded and their horses shot they withdrew. Thereupon the Sinn Feiners hoisted the flag of the Irish Republic over the building. Various corners of Sackville Street were occupied and barricades of barbed wire placed across the thoroughfare. Many windows were smashed and stores looted. Stephen's Green, which was surrounded by a high railing, was utilized by the Sinn Feiners as though they anticipated a siege; they locked themselves in and began digging trenches. Corner points covering the entrance to the Green were also occupied. Other rebels appeared, flourishing rifles from the windows of near-by houses. Several passing automobiles and taxicabs were commandeered and their occupants taken inside the Green, apparently as hostages, their cars drawn up on the roadway as barricades. Much firing from rifles and revolvers prevailed, apparently at nothing in particular, killing or wounding several persons out holiday-making. Officers and men in khaki were shot at in the streets.

Thus far the rebels had captured nothing by fighting. No adequate forces were on the scene to resist them, and they had merely occupied unprotected buildings.

The rising, as far as Dublin was concerned, was in the main restricted to a compact area in the heart of the city, with the

rebels in three main bodies which covered the important approaches. The whole plan bore evidence of having been carefully projected, alike in the positions seized and in the method in which they were rushed. There was little or no street fighting of a set, definite character, or between compact bodies of soldiers or rebels in the open. The belligerents took cover frequently, indulging in much shooting from housetops and other vantage points. Volleys rang out from unseen sources. Independent firing came from isolated and hidden marksmen.

A "Provisional Government of the Irish Republic" had been formed, which issued a proclamation to "the people of Ireland," containing these stirring passages:

"Irishmen and Irishwomen, in the name of God and of the dead generations from which you received the old traditions of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom, having organized and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organization, the Irish Volunteers, and the Irish citizen army.

"Having patiently perfected their discipline and resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America, and by her gallant allies in Europe, by relying on her own strength, she strikes, in full confidence of victory.

"We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be sovereign and indefeasible. Long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished that right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people.

"In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty. Six times during the past 300 years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right, and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a sovereign, independent state, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our

comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, its welfare, and its exaltation among nations."

The authorities were powerless, with the forces at their disposal, to dislodge an attempt to combat the rebels. But the latter had made one oversight which eventually cost them dear. They had neglected to capture the telephone exchange. This solitary means of communication was seized upon in an urgent call to Curragh Barracks, some thirty miles away, and brought an immediate dispatch of a considerable force of regular troops to the capital. Even these reenforcements effected little change to the situation. The available troops were still insufficient to turn out the rebels from their strongholds, where they appeared to have increased in numbers, and also spread in small parties about the city. The authorities waited for further forces from England.

The rebels consistently avoided a challenge in the open, but were content to lurk at all hours behind doors and windows in the centers they dominated. They were mainly armed with old-fashioned rifles and bayonets of all ages. No modern rifles—or few such—could be seen. Some of their bullets were of a type which inflicted terrible wounds. They supplemented their ancient equipment by looting the quays, where they secured a haul of revolvers and ammunition.

Flour and other foodstuffs were seized and confiscated furniture was used as barricades. The citizens suffered from the pillaging, which caused a shortage of bread.

By Wednesday, reenforcements having arrived in adequate numbers, the authorities had formulated a plan of campaign. They spread an extensive cordon of troops around the city, and drew smaller cordons about the principal rebel areas—Sackville Street, Stephen's Green, and the Four Courts. These movements led to much fighting and bloodshed. Sniping was so general that civilians could not safely walk the streets or even appear at windows.

Machine guns were brought into action and trained on the rebel positions. The frontages of the premises they held were riddled with bullets, but the buildings themselves were not demolished. Around Liberty Hall, the Sinn Feiners' principal

headquarters, troops concentrated and seized the houses on opposite sides of the river. Field guns were leveled at the building and within five minutes some forty shells crumbled it to ruins. The rebels apparently had withdrawn by the rear of Liberty Hall when the troops revealed their purpose in collecting there, for the latter's onrush into the ruins with fixed bayonets was unchecked. Across the façade of the building ran a sign bearing the legend: "We serve neither king nor kaiser, but Ireland."

After four days' fighting some 1,500 armed Sinn Feiners retained their hold on the Irish capital, their rebel flag flying from a number of central points. They defended their strongholds against regular troops and Irish Nationalist Volunteers, desperately fighting for their lives, which they knew might be forfeited for treason. Government forces now commanded all the rebel positions, the fall of which was only a question of time.

The streets were deserted except for military patrols and sentries. Business was at a standstill. Civilians peeped anxiously from behind curtained windows. Field guns barked, machine guns rattled, and rifles pattered their bullets, apparently from every quarter at the same time. Soldiers and rebels fired at each other from street corners, wharves, roofs and windows. Sentries with fixed bayonets on loaded rifles, stationed every few yards, shouted their command to halt at passers-by. Naval guns added to the deafening artillery fire.

Among the isolated positions the rebels held was a flour mill and a distillery. The latter was the scene of one of the sharpest little battles of the uprising. The rebels were forced out of the flour mill by bombardment, and many were seen, covered with flour, making their way to the distillery. Once there they hoisted the rebel flag which floated from the corner of a square tower.

Soon a naval gun opened fire. The first shot hit the tower on which the rebel flag was flying, and then half a dozen in succession struck the roof around it. The flag still flew, and the rebels replied with rifles and a machine gun.

The bombardment ceased after a dozen shots, but was renewed later. Hit after hit was scored, but the flag remained hanging from its pole. One shot hit a water tank just below it,

and for a time a miniature cascade sprinkled down the walls of the distillery.

When night fell and all firing except with rifles ceased, the flag was still flying defiantly over the side of the little tower.

On the fifth day of the revolt, Friday, April 28, 1916, sniping by rebel sharpshooters had become so prevalent in the Sackville Street district that the military leaders decided to shell the post office and the houses in the vicinity. A dozen shells had been sent when a cessation was ordered, as several premises had caught fire, and it was feared the entire city might be in danger of a general conflagration. The rebels, in fact, set scattered fires in the hope, it was said, of the flames reaching the castle. By night the sky was illuminated for miles round from flames darting upward at a number of points. The green rebel flag that fluttered over the battered post office was sharply outlined by the glow. Rebels were seen walking on the roof. From the roof flames appeared, gathering in intensity, which added to the brilliance enveloping the Sackville Street district. The rebels, it appeared, had decided to evacuate the building, being unable to withstand the shelling, but before doing so had set fire to it after freely sprinkling petroleum over the interior. The building was burned down.

A week of fighting of this character, with the cordons of troops drawn closer round the rebel section, sufficed to convince the chieftains that they were leading a forlorn hope. On April 30, 1916, a proclamation was issued by "Provisional President" Pearse advising surrender in these terms:

"In order to prevent the further slaughter of unarmed people, and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers, who are surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, the members of the Provisional Government at headquarters have agreed to unconditional surrender, and the commanders of all the units of the Republican forces will order their followers to lay down their arms."

The main body of the rebels promptly obeyed this proclamation.

Among the prisoners taken was the Countess Markievicz, sister of an Irish baronet and married to a Polish nobleman, who,

clad in a green uniform, took a prominent part in the rebellion. She was one of the leading sympathizers with James Larkin in the 1913 street car riots, and her house was raided by the police, who were said to have seized a printing press and type with which pro-German literature was printed. She was later sentenced to a life term of imprisonment after receiving a death penalty.

Rebels in the counties of Galway, Clare, Wexford, Louth, and in the outlying districts of County Dublin, followed the example of their defeated compatriots in the capital. Small bands here and there in the disturbed localities, especially in Meath, obstinately continued the unequal warfare after the general surrender, but the worst was over, and normal conditions gradually returned.

The reckoning was heavy. Fourteen men who took a more or less leading part in the insurrection were tried by court-martial and shot, and some seventy or more of others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Among the leaders tried for treason were seven men who signed the "Proclamation of the Irish Republic" already quoted—Thomas J. Clarke, S. MacDiarmid, Thomas MacDonaugh, J. H. Pearse ("Provisional President"), E. Ceantt, James Connolly ("Commandant General of the Republican Army"), and Joseph Plunkett. All were executed except MacDiarmid and Ceantt, who received short prison terms.

The casualties of the abortive rising in Dublin numbered about 800, comprising 200 persons killed and 600 wounded. The victims included soldiers, insurgents and civilians. The prisoners included 1,619 persons, five of them women, interned in England after conviction under the Defense of the Realm Act.

A public outcry in England called for the immediate resignations of Lord Wimborne, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and Augustine Birrell, the Irish Secretary, who submitted to being regarded as scapegoats by acceding to the demand. An investigation of the revolt followed. Mr. Birrell frankly admitted having made an untrue estimate of the Sinn Fein movement and the possibility of disturbances, especially in respect to the mode of

warfare pursued and the desperate folly displayed by the leaders and their dupes.

The investigation disclosed that the Government was aware of secret plans being under way for a revolt with German aid. It was known that an attempt would be made to land arms in Ireland from German submarines; that rifles had been purchased from Irish soldiers on home leave, while other weapons had come into the country in passengers' baggage. The real danger, it appeared, was found in a small disloyal section of the Irish National Volunteers, a body formed as a foil to the Ulster Volunteers. The leaders of this group accumulated arms and ammunition; but the authorities feared that any attempt at disarming the volunteers might lead to bloodshed. Sir Matthew Nathan, who resigned as Under Secretary for Ireland, with Mr. Birrell, defended the Government's failure to disarm the volunteers on the ground that such action might have alienated the sympathies of many loyal volunteers. A manifesto issued by the disloyal section before the uprising said that henceforth Ireland should provide for its own defense by means of a permanent army and a trained force of volunteers. The manifesto also intimated a purpose to resist by force any attempts to compel Irishmen to join the British army prior to the establishment of a free national government of Ireland.

When war conditions showed that hostilities would be prolonged the expectation arose and spread in Ireland—not without a tangible basis—of a German invasion, with partial risings in various sections of the country. Promises of German assistance, in Mr. Birrell's view, provided the real stimulus to the outbreak.

In the end Mr. Birrell was blamed. The investigators reported:

"The main course of the rebellion appears to be that lawlessness was allowed to grow up unchecked, and that Ireland for several years past had been administered on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave the law in abeyance if a collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided.

"Reluctance was shown by the Irish Government to repress by prosecution written and spoken seditious utterances, and to suppress drilling and maneuvering of armed forces known to be under control of men who openly were declaring their hostility. There developed a widespread belief that no repressive measures would be undertaken by the Government against sedition. This led to a rapid increase of preparation for insurrection and was the immediate cause of the recent outbreak."

Lord Wimborne was exonerated, and later was reappointed to the Lord Lieutenancy.

CHAPTER XXIII

SIR ROGER CASEMENT

SEVERAL days before the outbreak of the revolt a British patrol boat near Tralee, northwest of Cork, observed and frustrated an attempt to land arms and ammunition made by a vessel in the guise of a neutral merchantman. In reality the strange craft was a German auxiliary working in conjunction with an unseen German submarine. The latter had put off a collapsible boat manned by two Germans and bearing three men, who succeeded in landing. Two of the men were later arrested. One of them was Sir Roger Casement.

The activities of this notable Irish zealot on behalf of his disaffected compatriots since the war began had earned him a peculiar fame. He had been a trusted official of the British Government as a consul and consul general for eighteen years, and had been knighted for his services. Since 1913, when he resigned from the British Consular Service, he identified himself with the Irish Nationalists in their struggle for home rule, though an Ulster Protestant. His ardor took him to Berlin, supposedly with the aim of effecting a cooperation between the German Government and the Irish revolutionists. The British Government then realized that Sir Roger Casement by this act

had turned open traitor; and his dramatic and unexpected entry on the soil of his native country with a German entourage removed all doubts of the nature of his Berlin enterprise. His arrest thwarted an ambitious project just as it was about to be set in train, and proved to be his final adventure.

Casement came to Ireland from Germany in a submarine, which accompanied as a hidden escort a tramp steamer, the *Aud,* sailing under the Norwegian flag and laden with 20,000 rifles, as well as machine guns and ammunition. She was manned by a crew of twenty-two picked men from the German navy. Leaving Kiel harbor, the two vessels headed toward the Baltic, crept through the Cattegat, across Bohus Bay, up the coast of Norway, and thence north and west, leaving the Orkney, Shetland, and Faroe Islands far to the south. The German captain of the bogus trader succeeded in eluding a British patrol boat, which intercepted her, but found the ship's papers in order. Even her crew spoke English, expressed sympathy with the Allies and the hope that the patrol boat would not meet a submarine. The British vessel was near enough to one, the submerged German U-boat accompanying the trader.

The *Aud* escaped further molestation in her roundabout course far up the North Atlantic; but when she only reached the west coast of Ireland trouble befell her. Near Tralee, early on Good Friday morning, she was held up on suspicion by a British naval patrol ship, the *Bluebell,* and was being taken to Queenstown when she was sunk by her own crew, supposedly in obedience to an undertaking they made before leaving Germany that they would do so as a last resort rather than permit her to fall into the hands of the British. It appeared that the *Aud,* on being signaled by the *Bluebell,* said she was bound from Bergen to Genoa. The *Bluebell* ordered the *Aud* to follow her; but the latter refused to do so until a warning shot had been fired across her bow. Presently the *Aud's* engines suddenly stopped. While smoke was seen issuing from her afterhold, and two German ensigns appeared on her masthead, two boats were lowered from her and came toward the *Bluebell,* which was only a cable's length away. The boats bore the German

crew of nineteen men and three officers. Flags of truce were waved. The men threw up their hands in token of surrender and they were made prisoners. The *Aud* sank ten minutes later. A diver's examination revealed the Norwegian flag painted on her hull and a large hole in her side twelve to fourteen feet in diameter. "On the bed of the sea," the diver testified at a court hearing, "I saw a lot of rifles and ammunition."

Meantime the submarine, from which the *Aud* had apparently separated to pursue her own devices to find a safe landing for her cargo, fulfilled its own mission of depositing Casement on Irish soil. Offshore the submarine commander appeared to have transferred him and two companions to a collapsible boat, which put in at Tralee. The boat was abandoned. Its presence puzzled the police, who, on hearing the story of an Irish farmer that he had seen three men furtively land from it, proceeded to scour the neighborhood for suspicious characters. In an old fort near Tralee Casement and one of his companions, an Irish soldier named Bailey—the other escaped—were subsequently found and arrested. Casement described himself as an author named Richard Morton, who had written a life of St. Brendan. He endeavored to lose a paper, which the police picked up, containing a code and these words: "Await further instructions. Have decided to stay. Further ammunition and rifles are needed. Send another ship." Handbags were found buried on the shore where Casement and his companions had landed. They contained the green Irish rebel flag, a number of cartridges, and several maps of Ireland, two drawn in the fourteenth century.

Casement and Bailey were removed to London and indicted for high treason in these terms:

"They did between the 1st day of November, 1914, and on divers other occasions between that day and the 21st day of April, 1916, unlawfully, maliciously, and traitorously commit high treason within and without the realm of England, in contempt of our sovereign lord the king and his laws, to the evil example of others in like case and contrary to the duty and allegiance of the said defendants."

The case for the crown bore mainly on proving that Casement, when in Germany, had conducted a systematic campaign among Irish prisoners captured in German engagements with the British forces, with the aim of "seducing them from their allegiance." Bailey was one of them and, according to his evidence, had been thus swayed by Casement into joining the Irish rebel cause. He was regarded as a dupe of Casement's, and, having turned informer, escaped punishment.

Casement, it was recorded, appeared among the Irish prisoners in their camp at Limburg as an organizer of the Irish Brigade, the purpose of which was to aid in rescuing Ireland from British rule. He sought to induce the captive to join this regiment, promising those who did so that they would be liberated and sent to Berlin as guests of the German Government. In the event of Germany defeating the British fleet in a sea battle Casement proposed to land the brigade in Ireland to defend that country against England. But, if Germany lost the war, the German Government would give each man $50 to $100 and free passage to the United States. Of 4,000 Irish prisoners confined at Limburg, according to witnesses, some fifty or sixty yielded to Casement's persuasions and joined the brigade. His presence angered others, and on one occasion, after making a fruitless exhortation, he was hooted out of the camp. Some members of a Munster regiment struck him and were punished by their rations being reduced. Two were said to have been shot. It was charged that all the prisoners, save the few who had been drawn under Casement's banner, were placed on short rations, and that many men were sent to punishment camps.

The celebrated case was tried before Viscount Reading, Lord Chief Justice of England, and Justices Avory and Horridge, at the High Court of Justice, and was an historic one in English annals.

In a heated defense Casement appeared chiefly concerned about repudiating to the jury the charge that he induced Irishmen to espouse the German cause, or that he had depended on German aid for furthering his projects:

"First, I never at any time advised Irishmen to fight with the Turks against the Russians, or to fight with the Germans on the western front.

"Second, I never asked an Irishman to fight for Germany. I have always claimed that he has no right to fight for any land but Ireland.

"Third, the horrible insinuations that I got my own peoples' rations reduced to the starvation point because they did not join the Irish Brigade is an abominable falsehood. The rations were necessarily reduced throughout Germany owing to the blockade, and they were reduced for the Irish prisoners at exactly the same time and to the same extent as for the German soldiers and the entire population of Germany.

"Fourth, gentlemen, there is the widespread imputation of 'German gold.' I owe it to those in Ireland who are assailed with me on this very ground to nail the lie, once and for all. Money was offered to me in Germany more than once, and offered liberally and unconditionally, but I rejected every suggestion of the kind, and I left Germany a poorer man than when I entered it. . . . I must say, categorically, that the rebellion was not made in Germany, that it was not directed from Germany, that it was not inspired from Germany, and that not one penny of German gold went to finance or assist it."

Casement was found guilty by the jury on June 29, 1916, after a four days' trial and sentenced to death. His counsel vainly pleaded that his object in going to Germany—that is, to raise an Irish Volunteer Corps—was not treason. The verdict was appealed and the case went before the Court of Criminal Appeal, only to be dismissed. The Lord Chief Justice, in charging the jury, had held that Casement "had given aid and comfort to the king's enemies," which was treason by assisting the "king's enemies in the war with this country, and that any act that strengthened or tended to strengthen the enemy in the conduct of this war against us" or "weakened or tended to weaken the power of this country to resist the attacks of the enemy" was aiding and comforting the king's enemies. This view was upheld by the higher tribunal. Casement then sought

to have the verdict reviewed by the House of Lords; but the attorney general, exercising his legal discretion, declined to grant his fiat permitting this further appeal. No doubtful point of law remained that called for further elucidation.

The Government turned a deaf ear to all appeals for a reprieve. Only royal clemency could be exercised to save the degraded knight—he had been shorn of his title—from being hanged as a felon. Petitions poured into the Home Office. One was signed by a number of Irish bishops; many distinguished authors were signatories to another. The American Senate passed a resolution asking the President to urge upon Great Britain to extend leniency to "political offenders." But that was a designation which Great Britain declined to apply to a culprit guilty of high treason in the course of a war. The British Cabinet, as the date fixed for the execution neared, decided that none of the pleas advanced on Casement's behalf—one was mental abnormality—justified mitigation of the penalty. Lord Robert Cecil made this defense of the Government's relentless attitude:

"The only ground for a reprieve would be political expediency, a difficult ground to put forward in this country. This country never could strain the law to punish a man for the same reason that it could not strain the law to let one off.

"The Irish rebellion began with the murder of unarmed people, by both soldiers and police. No grievance justified it, and it was purely a political movement organized by a small section of Irish people who still hate England and were assisted by Germany. There is no doubt that Casement did everything possible to assist this rebellion in cooperation with the Germans.

"Casement was much more malignant and hostile to this country than were the leaders of the rising who were caught with arms in their hands. He visited military prisons in Germany with the intention of persuading Irish soldiers to throw off their allegiance. All sorts of promises were made for the improvement of the condition of these men to induce them to join the Irish legion. An enormous majority thus approached refused

and thereafter were subjected to increased hardships by the Germans. From among these Irish soldiers a number have since been repatriated as hopeless invalids, and they subsequently died. They looked upon Casement as their murderer."

Casement was hanged in Pentonville Prison, London, on the morning of August 3, 1916.

PART IV—THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS

CHAPTER XXIV

WAR CLOUD IN CONGRESS

A CONFUSED situation prevailed in Congress on March 1, 1916, the date on which Germany decreed that her submarines would sink all armed merchantmen of the Allied Powers without warning. The promulgation of this decree had abruptly interrupted the imminent settlement of the *Lusitania* case, the Administration having taken a serious view of Germany's latest step, which injected new elements into the whole submarine dispute with that country. Once more the old question of the danger to Americans traveling on belligerent vessels arose in an aggravated form. The Administration was steadfast in upholding the right of Americans to travel the seas when and whither they chose, immune under international law from interference or menace on the part of any belligerent power. Strong factions in Congress, in the face of Germany's new decree, feared that the Administration's stand was driving the country into certain war with Germany. Americans were bound to be among the crews of passengers of the armed merchantmen that Germany was determined to sink on sight, and this country had already clearly indicated to Berlin what would happen if any fatality befell them.

Hence, as mentioned in the previous volume of the history, a feverish agitation developed in Congress for the passage of resolutions forbidding Americans to travel on belligerent ships at all during the war. German-American influences, especially

congressional delegations from districts, chiefly in the Middle West, where the German vote was a decisive factor, assiduously fanned this movement, but there was a scattered sentiment, wholly American at heart, and unallied with pro-Germanism, which also held the view that Americans ought not to jeopardize the peace of their country by traveling in belligerent vessels. Resolutions pending in the House and Senate prohibiting them from doing so had been pigeonholed in committee. President Wilson had interposed, urging that no action be taken on them. He held that the executive and legislature ought not to be at cross-purposes on a question of foreign policy, and any antagonistic step by Congress against the Administration would weaken the United States in the sight of the world. The Congressional leaders, at heart opposed to the President, reluctantly agreed that the two branches of the Government should not be rent by divided counsels on such a dangerous issue as the country's relations with Germany.

The President faced a critical and exasperating situation. He changed his earlier view that Congress should not put itself in the position of wrangling with the executive over the armed-merchantmen issue. If divided counsels there were in Congress regarding his submarine policy, let them now declare themselves, and let the stronger prevail! Hence, instead of any longer desiring that the armed-merchantmen resolutions should remain smothered in committee, he challenged the leaders in Congress to bring them to a vote so that the world might know whether Congress was with him or against him. The President would not brook the continuation of an impasse which lent a spurious color to the manufactured impression current abroad, that he was playing a lone hand in his submarine policy, unsupported by Congress and the country. He strove to emphasize that his insistence on the right of Americans to travel on belligerent merchant ships, whether armed for defense or otherwise, would not mean war with Germany, the latter would rather surrender to the American demands to avoid war.

The immediate effect of the President's demand for a vote on the armed-merchantmen resolutions was to clear the air regard-

ing the strength of their supporters in Congress. The overwhelming sentiment in their favor rapidly diminished—if it ever really existed—under the searchlight of careful canvassing by the Administration's supporters, until it began to be manifest that, far from Congress ranging itself against the President, the latter would carry the day. Then came a reversal of tactics by the congressional factions opposed to the President. When the belief or illusion prevailed that the armed-merchantmen resolutions would pass the House by a big majority, strident demands were heard for submitting them to a roll call and unrestrained resentment against the President was expressed for thwarting such action. But now, when national sentiment ranged itself in support of the President, and many Congressmen had heard from their constituents, there was a disposition in Congress to turn the tables on the President by preventing the resolution being put to the vote that is, by keeping them in the limbo where they had been consigned at the President's original request, since, to be sure, the vote would compel Congressmen to go on record as to their pro-German leanings, and would, moreover, be defeated. This and other influences deferred action by the House for a week.

Meantime national sentiment had rapidly crystallized to a simple viewpoint, and Congressmen could not wisely ignore it. The general view was that if Congress opposed the executive on the armed-merchantmen issue, and proscribed the present rights of American citizens to travel on the trading ships of belligerent nations, the whole diplomatic negotiations with Germany on the submarine dispute would be reduced to chaos. No president, oppressed by such a precedent, could enter with confidence on any contention with a foreign power. His most earnest representations and most solemn protestations might be rendered meaningless by the intrusion of a Congress influenced by incorrect reports or overcome by personal antagonism. Such a condition of executive impotence was viewed as endangering rather than safeguarding the country's tranquillity. The paramount need then was that Congress should support the presidency, not the temporary occupant of the White House.

The country was in a controversy with a European power and the American stand had been taken on definite and well-understood principles.

In the midst of that dispute the demand had been voiced that the American attitude be radically changed and the conditions seriously altered. The inevitable effect of such a change in American policy, it was felt, would be to hearten the power that was at issue with the United States, to embarrass the President, and encourage the belief that those to whom he must look for support would withhold it from him. That injury could only be repaired by the repudiation by Congress of the influences at work within it aiming at the overthrow of the President's policy, and by a convincing exhibition of the unity of the republic.

The Senate was the first to act. The armed-ship resolution, forbidding Americans to travel on such craft, was introduced by Senator Gore, of Oklahoma, who thus explained his purpose in doing so:

"I introduced this resolution because I was apprehensive that we were speeding headlong upon war; perhaps, I ought to go further and say what I have hitherto avoided saying, that my action was based on a report which seemed to come from the highest and most responsible authority, that certain Senators and certain members of the House, in a conference with the President of the United States, received from the President the information, if not the declaration, that if Germany insisted upon her position the United States would insist upon her position, and that it would result probably in a breach of diplomatic relations, and that a breach of diplomatic relations would probably be followed by a state of war, and that a state of war might not be of itself and of necessity an evil to this republic, but that the United States, by entering upon war now, might be able to bring it to a conclusion by midsummer and thus render a great service to civilization.

"Mr. President," added the Senator, "I cannot say what the truth may be. I tell you the tale as it was told to me. This came to my ears in such a way, with such a concurrence of testimony, with such internal and external marks of truth,

that I feared it might be the truth, and if such a thing be conceivable I did not feel that, discharging my duty as a Senator, I could withhold whatever feeble service I might render to avert the catastrophe of war."

The President immediately authorized an unqualified denial to be made that he had expressed any utterance to which such a meaning could be attached. On the contrary, the President, in his talks with members of Congress, had insisted that war was the last happening he wanted and that his and not Congress' course would best insure peace. One version of what transpired at the conference referred to by Senator Gore credited the President with making these statements to the Senators and Congressmen who consulted him: That the way to avoid war was to convince the rest of the world that the people of the United States were standing solidly behind the executive; that the course Congress was seeking to pursue would lead toward war rather than away from it, because yielding to Germany on the present issue would result in further curtailments of American rights; that the only course the United States could safely pursue now was to abide by international law; that any other course would result in making circumstances themselves the sole guide, and this policy would eventually cause the fabric of international law itself to crumble and disappear; that any concession to Germany, abridging the right of Americans to travel on the seas, would necessitate a concession to Great Britain; and that such a weakening of American policy would cause the country to drift toward war. Asked what would happen if a German submarine sank an armed merchantman with the loss of American life, the President was quoted as intimating that in that event only a break in diplomatic relations would follow; further asked as to the effect such a rupture would probably have, he carefully replied that "it had been represented that this would lead to war," and that the participation of the United States in the European upheaval might result in ending hostilities in six months.

The effect of the disputed disclosure of the President's views on the issues with Germany, coupled with his disavowal of

Senator Gore's statements, was an accession of congressional support to the Administration, and the dooming of the Gore resolution to certain failure. After a couple of days' debate the resolution was put to the vote and defeated March 3, 1916, by sixty-eight to fourteen. But this only meant an overwhelming rejection of the intent of the Gore resolution, for its proposer, foreseeing that it could not pass, confused the President's supporters at the last minute by resorting to a parliamentary maneuver changing its purport. The resolution, as put before the Senate, had been reversed; instead of forbidding Americans to travel on belligerent vessels, it had become a hypothetical declaration of war against Germany—a bellicose affirmation in irreconcilable contrast with the senator's well-known pacifism. Originally the resolution read:

"Whereas a number of leading powers of the world are now engaged in a war of unexampled proportions; and

"Whereas the United States is happily at peace with all of the belligerent nations; and

"Whereas it is equally the desire and the interest of the American people to remain at peace with all nations; and

"Whereas the President has recently offered fresh and signal proofs of the superiority of diplomacy to butchery as a method of settling international disputes; and

"Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on unarmed belligerent vessels has recently received renewed guarantees of respect and inviolability; and

"Whereas the right of American citizens to travel on armed belligerent vessels rather than upon unarmed vessels is essential neither to their life, liberty, or safety; nor to the independence, dignity, or securing of the United States; and

"Whereas Congress alone has been vested with the power to declare war, which involved the obligations to prevent war by all proper means consistent with the honor and vital interest of the nation; therefore be it

"Resolved, by the Senate (the House of Representatives, concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole power to declare war, that all persons owing alle-

giance to the United States should, in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of the United States, forbear to exercise the right of travel as passengers upon any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes; and it is the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or renewed by the Secretary of State, or by anyone acting under him, to be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for purpose of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power."

As voted upon by the Senate, this resolving clause had disappeared and the following substitute with the preamble unaltered, had taken its place:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the sinking by a submarine without notice or warning of an armed merchant vessel of her public enemy, resulting in the death of a citizen of the United States, would constitute a just and sufficient cause of war between the United States and the German Empire."

CHAPTER XXV

THE PRESIDENT UPHELD IN ARMED-MERCHANTMEN ISSUE—FINAL CRISIS WITH GERMANY

THE issue in the Senate, as far as the text of the resolution was concerned, was beclouded. Senators on both sides vainly sought to ascertain what the change meant. Senator Gore himself even voted against his amended proposal. But out of the confusion the upshot was plain. The debate before the Senate had been on the question whether Americans should be allowed to travel on armed belligerent ships, and, whatever the resolution finally expressed, that was the question on which Senators really declared their aye or nay. Technically, the Senate had failed, if it had not actually refused, to adopt a resolution hostile to the Administration's foreign policy. Another resolution similar to

that originally proposed by Senator Gore, sponsored by Senator Jones of Washington, was withdrawn by him, and a bitter debate continued for hours without any measure pending. Hence the Senate had technically gone on record against declaring war on Germany if any of her submarines sank an armed merchantman without warning, thereby causing the death of any American on board. Actually it supported the Administration in its policy upholding the right of Americans to travel on belligerent ships, and the handful of Senators who voted for the amended resolution were hostile to the President's stand.

Meantime parliamentary tactics by the President's opponents in the House of Representatives successfully delayed the submission of the McLemore resolution to a vote. The Foreign Relations Committee had decided, by 17 to 2, to report it, with the recommendation that it be "tabled." The resolution had even been abandoned by its author, Representative Jeff McLemore of Texas, who was of opinion that it had really served its purpose without being adopted. "The main object of the resolution," he said, "was to prevent this country being plunged into war with one or more of the belligerent nations, simply because of the heedless act of some indiscreet American citizens, and I feel sure that this object has now been attained."

But the object the President sought, which was a virtual vote of confidence, by both Houses of Congress, on his submarine policy, had not been attained, and would not until the resolution had been brought into the open House and squarely voted upon. The issue between the House and the President had gone too far for further cross-fires of parliamentary moves to succeed in preventing the resolution from coming to a vote, and, on March 7, 1916, it reached this crucial stage and was defeated by 276 to 143, after six hours of turbulent debate.

The majority of 133 in favor of shelving the resolution, achieved by the aid of many Republican votes, was interpreted as a decisive compliance with the request of the President.

The voting in both the House and Senate on the armed-merchantmen issue ranged more on geographical than on political divisions, and indicated that on questions of foreign policy

Congressional sentiment was governed by sectional, not by party lines. Thus, of the fourteen votes cast in the Senate against "tabling" the Gore resolution twelve were recorded by Senators from States west of Indiana and Lake Michigan, while a geographical analysis of the House vote revealed that President Wilson met the strongest opposition from the Middle West delegations, and derived his chief support from the Atlantic Seaboard States.

Secretary Lansing later issued a ruling of the State Department defining the status of armed merchant ships. Germany was thereby notified that the United States recognized the equity of her argument—that if a vessel was armed and used its armament to attack a submarine the latter could not be called upon to give warning in advance, for in so doing the safety of the submarine and its crew was imperiled. But the United States reiterated what it had frequently pointed out before as the only criterion governing such occurrences—each case must be judged by itself. Only a belligerent vessel which had been proved guilty of such an offensive use of armament could be regarded as a warship. The presence of armament could not of itself be construed as a presumption of hostility. Summarized, the State Department's ruling laid down:

(1) That the status of an armed merchantman must in each case be determined before it could be regarded as a warship—a neutral government, on entry of the ship into port, presuming that the armament was aggressive unless the belligerent proved otherwise.

(2) The belligerents on the high seas must assume that the armed ship carried armament only for protection, and, unless resistance or an attempt to escape was immediately made, the merchantman could not be attacked without receiving due warning.

(3) That Americans and all others who took passage on armed ships intermittently engaged in commerce raiding could not expect to be immune, for such vessels acquired a "hostile taint." This was Germany's contention; but the United States refused to agree to the German idea that, because a few British vessels

might be guilty of wrongful use of armament, all British ships must consequently be regarded as warships.

(4) The right of "self-protection" could be exercised by an armed merchantman; and this was different from cruising the high seas for the special purpose of attacking hostile ships.

(5) If belligerent vessels were under orders to attack submarines in all circumstances they lost their status as "peaceful merchantmen." Germany claimed England had so ordered. England denied the charge. Evidence in each case must reconcile the difference of opinion.

The Administration's position in the submarine issue with Germany, now that Congress had upheld the President, seemed to be that Germany's decree condemning armed merchantmen curtailed the liberty of Americans to travel on the high seas. The status quo had not been affected. Germany, in the *Arabic* case, had undertaken that merchant vessels would not be torpedoed without first being warned, and that pledge the United States looked to her to respect, whether the vessels were armed for defense or not. What, then, would now happen, with Germany's latest decree sent ringing round the world with resounding bombast, by way of telling neutral noncombatants, including Americans, to stay at home, as though cataclysmic destruction awaited all vessels which dared to show a gun at the stern? The United States waited. Nothing, so far as the German armed-merchantmen decree was concerned, did happen. There was no appreciable increase in the number of vessels sunk by Teutonic submarines, and armed merchantmen did not especially figure among the victims.

In the face of this tame execution of the terrible decree, providing a sorry anticlimax to its noisy proclamation, the German press called for a policy of no compromise with the United States. The "Berliner Tageblatt" announced that Germany intended to wage a ruthless U-boat war against her enemies, whatever the American attitude might be. Apparently the German people believed that a renewal of submarine activity was vitally necessary, and were convinced of the propriety of their stand, both from the point of view of ethics and international law.

Germany's armed-merchantmen decree, as indicated, was not immediately followed by any submarine activity of a character in keeping with the dire threat made; but toward the close of March, 1916, a sudden indiscriminate outbreak of destruction came against merchantmen of every type. Many were sunk without warning, the question of whether they were armed or not seemingly being disregarded in the new crusade. The United States began to take stern cognizance of these reckless operations when four ships having Americans on board, either among the crews or passengers, became targets for the kaiser's torpedoes, without warning. These were the *Eagle Point*, the *Manchester Engineer*, the *Englishman*, and the *Sussex*. All were sunk except the last-named vessel, and the Americans were saved except one on the *Englishman*, though not, in several cases, without injury.

The circumstances of the torpedoing of the *Sussex* provoked a final clash between the United States and Germany. This vessel plied as a Channel ferryboat between Folkestone and Dieppe. On March 24, 1916, at 4.30 p. m., while near the latter port, with 436 persons on board, including seventy-five Americans, she was struck by a torpedo from a submarine. The captain observed a torpedo about 100 meters from the side and immediately maneuvered to avoid it; but the vessel was struck in the forward part, which was destroyed. Rescuing craft towed the disabled boat to Boulogne, where a majority of the passengers were landed. About fifty persons lost their lives, and three Americans were hurt.

The State Department at once instructed the American ambassador at Berlin to inquire whether the torpedo which almost sunk the *Sussex* came from a German submarine, though the Government entertained little doubt that this was the case. The American suspicions were later confirmed by incontestable evidence; but the Government first sought to give Germany the opportunity of having her day in court before acting.

Unofficially came reports from Berlin scouting as impossible the assumption that a German submarine was the culprit, the assurance being repeated that Germany in no circumstance

would violate her pledge to the United States not to destroy enemy vessels except after full warning to enable crews and passengers to save their lives. No official statement was forthcoming. The German admiralty declined to "deny or explain" until all the submarines operating off the French coast had returned and reported.

The American procedure in the *Sussex* case differed from that followed in previous issues with Germany arising from submarine warfare. There were no official representations made to Berlin; Ambassador Gerard was merely asked to ascertain informally and transmit to Washington any pertinent facts he could gather bearing on Germany's culpability. The submarine issue, in fact, had reached a stage where explanations and excuses were of minor importance. Evidence showing whether Germany had or had not broken her pledge not to torpedo passenger vessels without warning was alone of interest to the President. Proof of Germany's guilt foreshadowed an unqualified threat by the United States to break off diplomatic relations. The United States determined to be the judge with Germany in the dock as a defendant, instead of arguing an issue with Berlin, as in the past. This attitude placed Germany in the position of having to prove her innocence in the face of damaging evidence of her guilt. No discussion was even invited with the German ambassador over the case, and Count von Bernstorff apparently did not want to make his usual extenuatory or defensive pleas.

Germany assumed a mien of innocence. Her spokesmen by implication declined to consider that she was in any way involved in the *Sussex* case; hence there could be no need for Count von Bernstorff to make it a subject of discussion with the American Government.

"I cannot help it," said the ambassador unofficially. "One cannot blame Germany because the *Sussex* struck a British mine. Why should we discuss it? It does not concern us."

This was Germany's first informal explanation. The readiest means of exculpating Germany from complicity in the *Sussex* affair was eagerly seized upon and clung to. What other cause

except a British mine would there be for the calamity the *Sussex* had encountered when Germany had pledged herself not to make such attacks?

Meantime information reached Washington that the German secret orders to submarine commanders relating to the armed-merchantmen decree did not conform to the pledges given to the United States, but urged the importance of a policy of concealment in their operations, so that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay the proof at Germany's door, if any vessel was sunk contrary to pledge. By this means the German Government could decline to acknowledge responsibility for any attack unless the United States could prove that the submarine was of German nationality.

Whether Washington was correctly informed or not, Germany's attitude gave color to the theory that she had predetermined on repudiating having any hand in submarine attacks if she could successfully cloak the operations of her U-boat commanders. The situation embarrassed the United States and influenced the procedure of the diplomatic negotiations necessary to elucidate any given case. Germany's attitude, in short, placed the United States in the position of either assuming that the word of a friendly government could not be accepted at its face value, or of abandoning further inquiry, as happened in the case of the *Persia*, recorded in the previous volume. The President boldly undertook to act on the first of these alternatives.

Before the crisis reached this stage, the German point of view regarding submarine warfare was, despite pledges, more than ever unalterably opposed to modifying that warfare to conform to the wishes of any foreign power. For eleven days after the attack of the *Sussex* the Berlin Foreign Office preserved an attitude of ignorance regarding the torpedoing; but the seriousness with which the case was viewed in the United States, coupled with the instructions from Washington to Ambassador Gerard, at length caused the Foreign Office to call upon the admiralty for a report on the destruction of the *Sussex* if any submarine commander could throw any light upon it. No hope, however, was entertained that a satisfactory statement would be received

from Berlin. A resort to evasion, a professed lack of information, the familiar assumption of an English or French mine being to blame, were expected to be embodied in any defense Berlin made, and an explanation of this tenor was rejected in advance.

Germany's answer was received on April 10, 1916, and fulfilled expectations. The United States was informed that the admiralty had subjected the affair to the fullest investigation, with this result—that no German submarine attacked the *Sussex,* but that one torpedoed another vessel, about the same time in the same vicinity, with the same result. A sketch the submarine commander made of the vessel he struck was submitted to show that it was not the *Sussex,* as the sketch differed from the published pictures of that ship. The submarine commander, the German note said, had been led to attack the "unknown" vessel in the belief that it was a warship, that is, "a mine layer of the recently built *Arabic* class." A violent explosion occurred in the fore part of the ship after the torpedo had been fired, which "warrants the certain conclusion that great amounts of ammunitions were on board." The German note proceeded:

"No other attack whatever by German submarines at the time in question for the *Sussex* upon the route between Folkestone and Dieppe occurred. The German Government must therefore assume that the injury to the *Sussex* is attributable to another cause than an attack by a German submarine.

"For an explanation of the case the fact may perhaps be serviceable that no less than twenty-six English mines were exploded by shots by German naval forces in the channel on the 1st and 2d of April alone. The entire sea in that vicinity is, in fact, endangered by floating mines and by torpedoes that have not sunk. Off the English coast it is further endangered in an increasing degree through German mines which have been laid against enemy naval forces.

"Should the American Government have at its disposal further material for a conclusion upon the case of the *Sussex* the German Government would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material also to an investigation.

"In the event that differences of opinion should develop hereby between the two Governments, the German Government now declares itself ready to have the facts of the case established through mixed commissions of investigation, in accordance with the third title of 'The Hague agreement for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, November 18, 1907.'"

In explanation of the sinking of the *Manchester Engineer*, the *Englishman*, and the *Eagle Point*, which vessels had Americans on board, the German note professed to be unable to say whether the first-named ship was attacked by a German submarine, but in the case of the two last-named they were attacked after attempting to escape and disregarding signals to stop.

The communication made the worst of impressions on the Washington Government. The clumsy prevarication of attempting to show that a steamer other than the *Sussex* had been torpedoed in the belief that it was a war vessel merely sufficed to complete the accumulating circumstantial evidence in the possession of the Government that the *Sussex* had been torpedoed by a German submarine without warning in violation of an express pledge. The Administration had become weary of Germany's protestations of innocence and good behavior, and of shallow excuses for breaking her word, and had lost faith in any German utterance. The cabinet view of the situation, as expressed at a meeting called the day following the receipt of the German note, was that a nation which would accept perjured affidavits as a basis for a note charging that the *Lusitania* was armed would not hesitate to enter a blanket denial of any act if perpetrated.

The tension created by Germany's unconvincing alibi caused alarm in Berlin, and government officials were reported as showing a nervous anxiety to strain every nerve to avoid a rupture with the United States. A loophole had been provided in the German note for a possible withdrawal of her denial of responsibility for the destruction of the *Sussex* as will be seen from this passage:

"Should the American Government have at its disposal further material for a conclusion upon the case of the *Sussex* the German

Government would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material also to an investigation."

This saving clause gave the German note the aspect of a preliminary to the usual backdown and to an admission of liability, with the palliating excuse of ignorance of the vessel's identity. At any rate signs were not wanting that Germany recognized, had she had a choice to make, with the American Government reenforced with clinching testimony, to be duly presented, that a German submarine and none other torpedoed the *Sussex* and jeopardized the lives of twenty-five Americans on board.

On April 19, 1916, President Wilson had the issue with Germany before Congress and addressed that body in person, solemnly informing the legislators that "a situation has arisen in the foreign relations of the country of which it is my plain duty to inform you very frankly." This he proceeded to do, speaking, he said, on behalf of the rights of the United States and its citizens and the rights of humanity in general. He announced that he had notified Germany that "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

The President's address was more or less a paraphrase of the note he had that day sent to Berlin, and was in fulfillment of a promise he made to notify Congress of any action he took to bring Germany to realize the serious condition of her relations with the United States.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM —GERMANY YIELDS

THE American note was an indictment of Germany's conscienceless practices and broken faith. Secretary Lansing informed the kaiser's advisers that their note denying any attack on the *Sussex*, but acknowledging that another vessel had been torpedoed under identical circumstances as to time, place, and result, confirmed the inferences the American Government had drawn from information it possessed establishing "the facts in the case of the *Sussex*."

A "statement of facts" relating to the *Sussex* accompanied the virtual American ultimatum. It set forth a chain of testimony, citing the source thereof, showing that the passengers of the *Sussex*, which included about twenty-four American citizens, were of several nationalities, many of them women and children, and half of them subjects of neutral states; that the *Sussex* carried no armament; that the vessel has never been employed as a troopship, but solely as a Channel ferryboat, and was following a route not used for transporting troops from Great Britain to France; that a torpedo was seen driving toward the vessel and the captain was unable to swing the vessel out of the torpedo's course; that on a subsequent inspection of the broken hull a number of pieces of metal were found which American, French, and British naval experts decided were not parts of a mine, but of a torpedo, with German markings, and were otherwise different from parts of torpedoes used by the French and British.

Regarding the sketch made by the German submarine commander of the steamer which he said he torpedoed, showing that it did not agree with a photograph of the *Sussex* as published, the American statement made this comment:

"This sketch was apparently made from memory of an observation of the vessel through a periscope. As the only dif-

ferences noted by the commander, who relied on his memory, were the position of the smokestack and the shape of the stern, it is to be presumed the vessels were similar in other respects.

This conclusion was the more certain because no other German submarines, on the day the *Sussex* was wrecked, attacked steamers in the same locality. Hence, in the American views, "as no vessel is reported to have been torpedoed without warning by a submerged submarine other than the *Sussex,* it is beyond question that that vessel was torpedoed by the submarine whose commander's report is relied upon in the note of April 10, 1916."

The United States had spoken its last word. No attempt was made to disguise the gravity of the situation, and there was a quiet recognition of the fact that the continuance of friendly relations rested wholly on the action of the German Government. Just now, however, political conditions in Germany were believed to be such that the Government itself, even if it desired to give full satisfaction in word and deed to the United States, would be facing a problem in finding a way of doing so. The Imperial Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, representing the civilian part of the federated government, had so far succeeded in holding the concessions to the United States. But the military element, including the naval and submarine advocates of a continued campaign of "frightfulness," headed until recently by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, had nevertheless pursued its course of ruthless destruction, either with the reluctant and tacit consent of the chancellor or in spite of his opposition. There thus existed a fundamental cleavage of policy between these two factions of the German Government. The chancellor made pledges to the United States and the naval authorities disregarded them, the kaiser apparently being helpless or lukewarm in his support of the chancellor's commitments. Presently, however, when Admiral von Tirpitz's retirement was announced, the civilian element appeared in the ascendant. His resignation smote the German people with the startling effect of a coup d'état, and was plainly the outcome of a long and silent struggle

in the inner councils of the Government. All the political influence of the chancellor, supported by the romantic weight of the kaiser's name, was exercised to stifle an outburst of criticism in the Reichstag. Meantime, under the German system of censorship, the submarine warfare was reported to the German people in boastful terms, which made them almost a unit in demanding its continuance without abatement. They heard little of the hundreds of noncombatants killed by their submarines, or else these casualties were explained as the result of the explosion of cargoes of munitions. They had been told week by week of the steady reduction of British tonnage, that the pinch of hunger which they had experienced was also being felt in England, and that the German submarine was the only shield between Germany and starvation. So the German people were behind the military and naval element for an unrestricted U-boat warfare. The situation was such that the gravest doubt was felt whether the chancellor, even with the kaiser's support, could adjust the submarine issue in a way satisfactory alike to the United States and to the clamorous radical militarists upheld by a misled people.

The German Government brooded over the ultimatum of the United States for fifteen days before it decided upon a declaration that averted a rupture of diplomatic relations. The German note, dispatched May 5, 1916, grudgingly admitted "the possibility that the ship mentioned in the note of April 10, 1916, as having been torpedoed by a German submarine is actually identical with the *Sussex*." It characteristically withheld an unreserved admission, but "should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the vessel to be a man-of-war, the German Government will not fail to draw the consequences resulting therefrom." This hesitating and qualified acknowledgment was accepted as about as near to a confession of guilt as Germany was then capable of making.

On the vital question of the conduct of submarine warfare, a change in which the United States was determined upon forcing Germany to make, the note was more explicit and thus yielded to the American demand:

"The German Government will only state that it has imposed far-reaching restraint upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in consideration of neutrals' interests, in spite of the fact that these restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. No such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and her allies.

"The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct the submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare against enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain.

"With regard to these no assurances have ever been given to the Government of the United States. No such assurances are contained in the declaration of February 8, 1916.

"The German Government cannot admit any doubt that these orders were given or are executed in good faith."

Having said so much, the German note proceeded to cloud the issue by virtually blaming the United States for the continued existence of conditions calling for the sea warfare Germany practiced:

"The German Government has made several proposals to the Government of the United States in order to reduce to a minimum for American travelers and goods the inherent dangers of naval warfare. Unfortunately, the Government of the United States decided not to accept the proposals. Had it accepted, the Government of the United States would have been instrumental in preventing the greater part of the accidents that American citizens have met with in the meantime.

"The German Government still stands by its offer to come to an agreement along these lines."

As though this reproach did not go far enough, the German note, while affirming that the German Government attached no less importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the American Government did, accused the United States of showing favoritism in its humanitarian sympathies:

"As matters stand, the German Government cannot but reiterate regret that the sentiments of humanity, which the Government of the United States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine warfare, are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to many millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention of the British Government, shall be starved, and who by sufferings shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into ignominious capitulation.

"The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to understand this discrimination, all the more as it has repeatedly and explicitly declared itself ready to use the submarine weapon in strict conformity with the rules of international law as recognized before the outbreak of the war, if Great Britain likewise was ready to adapt the conduct of warfare to these rules.

"The German people knows that the Government of the United States has the power to confine the war to armed forces of the belligerent countries, in the interest of humanity and maintenance of international law. The Government of the United States would have been certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist against Great Britain on the incontrovertible rights to freedom of the seas. But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, struggling for existence, shall restrain the use of an effective weapon and while making compliance with these demands a condition for maintenance of relations with Germany, confines itself to protest against illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies. Moreover, the German people knows to what considerable extent its enemies are supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States.

"It will, therefore, be understood that the appeal made by the Government of the United States to sentiments of humanity and principles of international law cannot, under the circumstances, meet the same hearty response from the German people which such an appeal otherwise always is certain to find here."

This complaint was an allusion to the refusal of the United States to involve its issues with Great Britain with those it had with Germany or to mediate the proposal that Great Britain raise her food blockade against Germany, who would then discontinue her submarine war on British merchantmen. The tone of an injured party Germany assumed in taking this attitude, as though she had a just cause of complaint against the United States, was accepted as a plaintive prelude to her final surrender; but even this surrender she did not make without again clogging her concessions with the same proposal which the United States had already flatly rejected.

"The German Government, conscious of Germany's strength, twice within the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe. The German Government feels all the more justified in declaring that responsibility could not be borne before the forum of mankind and in history if after twenty-one months of the war's duration the submarine question, under discussion between the German Government and the Government of the United States, were to take a turn seriously threatening maintenance of peace between the two nations.

"As far as lies with the German Government, it wishes to prevent things from taking such a course. The German Government, moreover, is prepared to do its utmost to confine operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes, now as before, that it is in agreement with the Government of the United States.

"The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that German naval forces have received the following orders:

" 'In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area de-

clared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance.'

"But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use of an effective weapon if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States repeatedly declares that it is determined to restore the principle of freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated.

"Accordingly, the German Government is confident, that in consequence of the new orders issued to the naval forces, the Government of the United States will also now consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of a mutual cooperation toward restoration of the freedom of the seas during the war, as suggested in the note of July 23, 1915, and it does not doubt that the Government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, as are laid down in the notes presented by the Government of the United States to the British Government, December 28, 1914, and Nov. 5, 1915.

"Should steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision."

The first feeling aroused by the German note, with its wounded tone and qualified compliance with the American demand, was one of irritation. But after closer study the President was willing to accept the German undertaking on probation, without taking a too liberal view of the phraseology employed, and to regard the intrusive strictures on the United States as intended

for German, not for American reading. The disposition was to be charitable and to take cognizance of the matter rather than the manner of Germany's backdown, and to wait and see if her government would live up in good faith to its new instructions to submarine commanders, without recognizing the impossible conditions imposed.

But in the country at large public opinion was less ready to interpret the German note except as it read textually. It was denounced in scathing language as shuffling, arrogant and offensive, or as insulting and dishonest. One paper deemed its terms to be a series of studied insults added to a long inventory of injuries. Said another, Germany's mood is still that of a madman. A third comment on the note described it as "a disingenuous effort to have international petty larceny put on the same plane as international murder and visited with the same punishment." A fourth paper remarked: "If an American can read the note without his temples getting hot then his blood is poor or his understanding dense." The weight of American press opinion was against Germany, especially in the South, and either called for the breaking of diplomatic relations or considered such a course inevitable.

For the United States even to contemplate, as Germany proposed, "an alliance between Germany and the United States to break a British blockade that Germany cannot break" was viewed as unthinkable. Intellectual dishonesty, characteristic of Germany in its attitude toward the world since the war began, and especially shown in negotiations with the United States, was seen in the effort to place upon Great Britain the responsibility for wrongs committed by Germany against the United States and in the renewed attempt to convict the American Government of lapses because it has not controlled Great Britain's sea policy. In fact, the attempt to dictate the American attitude to Great Britain in return for a promise to restrict submarine warfare was generally resented as an impertinence.

When all was said, however, the German reply, although having the appearance of being as little conciliatory as words could make it, did in fact yield to President Wilson on the main issue.

The President, in considering this view, was guided by Ambassador Gerard's dispatches reporting his interview with the kaiser on the submarine crisis. The kaiser, he said, was animated by a keen desire that relations between the two Governments should continue amicable, but he felt that German public opinion must be considered in making concessions to the United States. From the kaiser's concern for popular approval the ambassador gathered that the German Government faced the necessity of so wording its answer to the United States that the German people would not feel that the Government had been forced to modify the rules under which submarines operated. The Administration received the impression that Germany would go to great length to avoid a rupture with the United States, and the German note must therefore be construed in the light of this feeling. The kaiser's views, as transmitted by the ambassador, tended to soften the irritating tone and language of the German note, and was not without effect on the President and cabinet when they determined to accept it provisionally.

The President decided to ignore the pointed suggestion of Germany that the United States should now seek to prevail on Great Britain to abandon her blockade of Germany. One source of irritation caused by the note was the statement that should the United States fail to raise the British embargo "the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of action." The Administration had no intention of accepting any conditional compliance with its demand for the abandoning of illegal submarine warfare; but the opinion officially prevailed that this effort of Germany to lecture the United States as to its duty toward another nation might be overlooked in view of the accomplishment of the main object for which the Administration had been contending.

Nor would the Government heed Germany's proposal that it undertake the rôle of peacemaker in the absence of any indication that the Allied Powers were willing to respond to Germany's willingness to make peace—presumably on Germany's own terms.

The promises in the German note were accepted per se, and the qualifications and animadversions Germany attached to them ignored. This determined upon, the intimation was made plain to Germany that should another ship be sunk in contravention of her new pledge no exchange of notes would ensue, but a severance of diplomatic relations would automatically be effected by the forbidden act. German submarine commanders held in their hands the key to the situation. Any infraction of Germany's latest word would not call for a disavowal or punishment of the commander; the United States would merely act on the presumption that Germany could not or would not control her own naval forces. Berlin would not be consulted again.

The American response to the German note was sent three days later. It was brief, and swept aside the considerable debating ground Germany had invitingly spread to inveigle the United States into discussing mediation in the war. Its principal passage ran:

"Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.

"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction.

"In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the

rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

Secretary Lansing, in a comment on this reply, said the German note was devoted to matters which the American Government could not discuss with the German Government. He took the ground, as the American reply indicated, that the only "questions of right" which could be discussed with the German Government were those arising out of German or American action exclusively, not out of those questions which were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and any other country.

"So long as she (Germany) lives up to this altered policy," he explained, "we can have no reason to quarrel with her on that score, though the losses resulting from the violation of American rights by German submarine commanders operating under the former policy will have to be settled.

"While our differences with Great Britain cannot form a subject of discussion with Germany, it should be stated that in our dealings with the British Government we are acting, as we are unquestionably bound to act, in view of the explicit treaty engagements with that Government. We have treaty obligations as to the manner in which matters in dispute between the two Governments are to be handled. We offered to assume mutually similar obligations with Germany, but the offer was declined."

The treaty Mr. Lansing referred to was that negotiated by his predecessor, W. J. Bryan, under which the two nations agreed that any dispute arising between them was to be submitted to an investigating commission for one year before entering into hostilities.

Mr. Lansing's comment appeared to be more enlightening to German opinion than the official communication. But while the German was frankly puzzled by the American contention—holding that there was an intimate connection between England's "illegal blockade policy" and the submarine war—and wondered

naïvely whether or not he was the simple victim of an American confidence game, or strongly suspected that he had been hoodwinked by President Wilson into parting with the effective submarine weapon, with no guarantee of getting any action against England in return, hard German common sense discerned through these doubts, and made the most of the one all-important fact it could comprehend—that the dreaded break had been avoided.

With the air thus cleared the usual anticlimax came to the situation—the tumbling down of Germany's elaborate and grandiose defense of her misdeeds—by a tardy confession of error, which swept everything she had previously said into the discard. On May 8, 1916, the same day on which the American note had been dispatched, Germany sent a further communication acknowledging that, as result of further investigation, her previous contention "that the damage of the *Sussex* was to be traced back to a cause other than the attack of a German submarine cannot be maintained." It now seems that the *Sussex* had been mistaken by the submarine commander for a British transport. Nothing could be more complete than Germany's belated resort to an amende honorable after the United States had proved her guilt:

"However, on the basis of the American material, the German Government cannot withhold its conviction that the ship torpedoed by the German submarine is in fact identical with the *Sussex,* for in accordance with this material the place, the time, and the effect of the explosion by which the *Sussex* was damaged agree in the essential details with the statements of the German commander, so that there can no longer be any question of the possibility of two independent occurrences. An additional reason is constituted by the fact that officers of the American navy found fragments of an explosive in the hold of the *Sussex* which are described by them upon firm grounds as parts of a German torpedo.

"In view of the general impression of all the facts at hand the German Government considers it beyond doubt that the commander of the submarine acted in the bona fide belief that he was facing an enemy warship. On the other hand, it cannot be de-

nied that, misled by the appearance of the vessel under the pressure of the circumstances, he formed his judgment too hurriedly in establishing her character and did not, therefore, act fully in accordance with the strict instructions which called upon him to exercise particular care.

"In view of these circumstances the German Government frankly admits that the assurance given to the American Government, in accordance with which passenger vessels were not to be attacked without warning, has not been adhered to in the present case. . . . The German Government does not hesitate to draw from this resultant consequences. It therefore expresses to the American Government its sincere regret regarding the deplorable incident, and declares its readiness to pay an adequate indemnity to the injured American citizens. It also disapproved of the conduct of the commander, who has been appropriately punished."

CHAPTER XXVII

THE DEUTSCHLAND—BRITISH MAIL SEIZURES

THEREAFTER much less was heard of the German submarine as an offensive weapon, though its activities by no means ceased against the Allied Powers' shipping. The next occasion when Germany's principal naval reliance impressed itself on the American people was the sudden appearance of a submarine in an American port as a peaceful trader!

According to its skipper, Captain Paul Koenig, the *Deutschland* left Bremen on June 24, 1916, and proceeded to Helgoland, where she remained for four days, training the crew for the long voyage, testing the equipment and trimming the cargo. On leaving Helgoland and passing into the North Sea the vessel submerged five times, in the English Channel six times, and in the open ocean three or four times. On one occasion the vessel remained under water for ten hours in the Channel. On sight-

ing a vessel the submarine instantly disappeared and only came to the surface when the coast was clear. Sinking and rising, the *Deutschland* proceeded on her voyage, making about thirteen knots on the surface and half that speed under water. The passage, however, was mainly accomplished above water, as on the entire voyage the vessel only traveled ninety miles submerged.

The *Deutschland* was officially classified as an unarmed merchant vessel. The only arms she carried were five revolvers among her stores for the use of her officers. The State Department ruled that no valid reason existed why she should be considered a war vessel and that she was therefore entitled to all the rights and privileges belonging to a peaceful merchant flying the flag of a belligerent country in a neutral port. The decision was based on a navy report that she could not be converted into a war vessel or armed without extensive structural alterations.

The ruling by no means cleared up the situation. A new problem loomed in the not remote contingency of the *Deutschland* coming to close quarters with British patrols on leaving American waters. In that event, was the *Deutschland* entitled to the same consideration as a peaceful merchantman from a hostile warship as the United States had insisted Allied merchantmen should receive from German submarines? Germany had perpetrated a grim jest by injecting a topsy-turvy element into the submarine issue. A "peaceful submarine" sounded like a contradiction in terms; but the *Deutschland* had been so designated by the United States, who, therefore, if harm befell her from a British shell, would be called upon to determine whether the conditions it had exacted from Germany for the conduct of sea warfare equally controlled a British cruiser's procedure on meeting a peaceful submarine that could disappear at will.

After its long and tangled dispute with Germany the United States had wrung renewed pledges from her not to sink unarmed merchantmen without first warning them so as to ensure the safety of their passengers and crews. Germany now had the opportunity of requiring that similar conditions should apply to a peaceful submersible craft if it fell in with a hostile war-

ship. Hence any enemy cruiser hovering round the American coasts should not be permitted to fire at will on the German submarine, but must first send a blank shot to signal her. Then, applying the British rule, which was recognized by the United States, a merchantman (the submarine being thus classed) always had the right to attempt to escape, with the penalty, of course, of being in that case fired upon. But the peaceful submarine could readily elude both pursuit and destruction by submerging.

The application of the "warning" rule to submersible merchantmen as well as to surface craft would make the Allied warships powerless to destroy commercial submarines, especially if the latter were totally unarmed, as the *Deutschland* was. But it was difficult to suppose that the Allied Powers would yield to the German contention in view of the ease with which a merchant submarine could disappear under water. A press survey of the problem inspired these observations:

"Should they (commercial submarines) enjoy the same freedom of the seas as belongs to other traders? It has been decided that they ought not to have unlimited rights as warships, and thus one step has been taken toward limiting their rights as merchantmen.

"Perhaps the British will sink a submarine merchantman upon suspicion, and then the question will arise whether that is murder or justifiable homicide. That might come to a decision in a British court. Conditions can be imagined in which the question might arise in the case of an American passenger in an American court. As the case stands, there is nothing in the German practice with submarine warships to incline the world to favor German submarine merchantmen. It is clever of the Germans to reverse themselves, and to rely upon the law which they have outraged. The German point of view is entitled to consideration, but not to adoption without thought."

The prominence given to pending American disputes with Great Britain during the clash with Germany, primarily caused by the apparently insoluble difficulty over the German blockade as it affected American commerce, duly projected in sharper re-

lief owing to increasing protests from American business interests against Great Britain's rigid censorship of neutral mails.

The charge was made in the Senate that the British mail censorship was being used to obtain trade information for the benefit of British merchants. It appeared that a confidential circular had been issued by the British postal censor to his mail examiners, and the interpretation placed on his instructions was that the British Government sought to discover the trade connections of neutral foreign firms in order to wrest their legitimate business from them.

Great Britain promptly retorted that this deduction was an erroneous one. Her officials pointed out that the examination of letters in the trade branch of the postal service was confined to the following objects:

(a) Direct trading with the enemy.

(b) Indirect trading with the enemy.

(c) Trading by unauthorized persons in the British Empire in munitions of war.

(d) The discovery of intermediaries, that is evidence that persons or firms in neutral countries are acting as intermediaries for the enemy in correspondence or business.

(e) The procuring of statistics relating to direct shipments or shipments on through bills of lading to neutral countries in Europe of certain commodities which it was the specified purpose of the Allied Governments to exclude from Germany. The object of ascertaining this information was to obtain some idea of the quantities of important goods coming from an overseas countries to the neutral countries adjoining Germany so that any abnormal movement could be detected sooner than could be revealed through formal statistical returns.

(f) The transfer of enemy steamers to a neutral flag.

(g) Patent specifications, since recent patent specifications or particulars of inventions may not be transmitted from the United Kingdom when the receipt of such is likely to benefit the enemy.

(h) The exposure of attempts to deceive the customs or defraud the revenue or to take any course of action against public interest or the interest of the Allied Powers.

(i) The intercepting of any information of interest concerned with trading or finance in relation to the war, such as the economic condition of enemy countries, or the supply of or demand for or price of important commodities and munitions.

The sole objects of these instructions were military, Great Britain explained, and were aimed at preventing news of military interest from reaching the enemy and to place obstacles in the way of enemy trade. The regulations were described as similar to those which would be employed by any nation conducting a war. They were directed solely against an enemy belligerent, and, in the British view, did not in their tenor suggest that the interest of neutrals was of any interest to the British Government or to the censorship officials except where neutral countries or neutral persons lent aid to the forces of the enemy by acts of unneutral service.

Great Britain appeared to have found ample warrant for her seizures of parcel mails. According to Lord Newton, an official of the British Foreign Office, one steamer carried 69 parcels by the parcel mails service containing 400 revolvers destined for Germany via Amsterdam. On eight ships bound for Hamburg were discovered 1,302 parcels containing 437,510 kilograms of raw rubber; on another vessel, the *United States*, bound for Scandinavia, mails were confiscated containing 1,594 parcels of fur skins, 221 parcels of military boots, 418 parcels of strip iron, and 80 parcels of ferro-vanadium. In the parcel mails of the *Oscar II* were found 21 packages of machinery tools. These instances were cited as typical of numerous enemy consignments concealed in parcel mails.

All these articles were of military value. The Allied Governments contended that in seizing them, an action which could not be disputed as illegal, they were solely guided by sound military considerations which overrode their disinclination to inconvenience the legitimate business interests of neutral countries.

In the course of this scrutiny of the mails, however, the sanctity of genuine letters, which could not be classed as parcels, was not respected, but Lord Newton justified interference with

them. Private mail communications from the United States, inviolable under The Hague Conference, were seized or detained, and in many cases were lost or destroyed, since they did not reach their destination.

The American Government sent a strong protest to Great Britain on May 24, 1916, warning her that the United States would be compelled to press claims for damages against the Allied Governments for serious mail losses suffered by American citizens. Secretary Lansing thus set forth the complaints American firms had made against the British practices:

"Important papers which can never be duplicated only with great difficulty, such as United States patents for inventions, rare documents, legal papers relating to the settlement of estates, powers of attorney, fire insurance claims, income tax returns, and similar matters, have been lost.

"Delays in receiving shipping documents have caused great loss and inconvenience by preventing prompt delivery of goods.

"Business opportunities are lost by failure to transmit prompt bids, specifications and contracts.

"Checks, drafts, money orders, securities, and similar property are lost or detained for weeks and months.

"Business correspondence relating to legitimate and bona fide trade between neutral countries, correspondence of a personal nature, and also certain official correspondence, such as money order lists, and other matter forwarded by Government departments, are detained, lost, or possibly destroyed."

The Allied Governments' method of seizing mails was described in indignant terms:

"They compel neutral ships without just cause to enter their own ports, or they induce shipping lines, through some form or duress, to send their mail ships via British ports, or they detain all vessels merely calling at British ports, thus acquiring by force or unjustifiable means an illegal jurisdiction. Acting upon this enforced jurisdiction, the authorities remove all mail, genuine correspondence as well as post parcels, take them to London, where every piece, even though of neutral origin and destination, is opened and critically examined to determine the 'sincer-

ity of their character,' in accordance with the interpretation given that undefined phrase by the British and French censors. Finally the expurgated remainder is forwarded. Ships are detained en route to or from the United States or to and from other neutral countries, and mails are held and delayed for several days, and in some cases for weeks and even months, even though not routed to ports of North Europe via British ports."

The American position with regard to the treatment of certain classes of sealed mails was stated as follows:

"The Government of the United States is inclined to the opinion that the class of mail matter which included stocks, bonds, coupons, and similar securities is to be regarded as of the same nature as merchandise or other articles of property and subject to the same exercise of belligerent rights. Money orders, checks, drafts, notes, and other negotiable instruments, which may pass as the equivalent of money, are, it is considered, also to be classed as merchandise. Correspondence, including shipping documents, money order lists, and papers of that character, unless carried on the same ship as the property referred to, are, in the opinion of this Government, to be regarded as genuine correspondence and entitled to unmolested passage."

Great Britain took the view that the two countries did not differ so much upon the principle under which mail seizures were made as upon its application, and undertook to facilitate the passage of innocent mails with a minimum delay after inspection.

The United States had not so far been successful in bringing the weight of its opposition to bear on Great Britain to compel her to abate her high-handed methods of policing the seas. But one incident which occurred in Chinese waters at least resulted in representation being made which eventually forced Great Britain to surrender to the American demand. A British cruiser had stopped an American vessel, the *China,* somewhere off Shanghai, and took from her thirty-eight men, Germans, Austrians and Turks—who were taken to Hongkong and confined to military barracks. As the American Government understood that none of these subjects of the Central Powers belonged to the war forces of their respective countries, the action of the

British cruiser in seizing them, despite the protest of the American captain, was deemed to be an unwarrantable invasion of the sovereignty of American vessels on the high seas. The British Government was so informed in emphatic terms by Ambassador Page, who was instructed to demand the immediate release of the men.

The *China,* it appears, was bound for Manila. Great Britain, in defending her action, suspected that the arrested men were involved in a plot to make Manila the base for the perpetration of unneutral acts against the Entente Allies, their activities in Shanghai having been discovered.

The United States, however, repeated its demand for the release of the men on the ground that none of the British arguments in favor of their detention had any validity. The State Department declined to consider any contention upholding their arrest which did not seek to prove that the men were combatants, actually on their way to a military field, and refused to recognize the charge that they were engaged in plots against the British Empire. Great Britain in May, 1916, released the men after holding them as prisoners for almost three months. Her government ascertained that the suspects, although en route for Manila, could not have reached that port on the *China,* but would have to be transshipped at Nagasaki, where they would have come within the jurisdiction of Japan, and that therefore their seizure was on an exact parallel to the case of the *Trent.*

CHAPTER XXVIII

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY

GREAT BRITAIN had adopted drastic measures to prevent commercial transactions of whatever character with Germany through firms in other countries. British firms were forbidden to trade with foreign concerns suspected or known to have dealings with German agencies in any part of the world,

and more than one firm was prosecuted for disregarding the ordinance.

The Trading with the Enemy Act, under which Great Britain strove to cripple and choke channels of trade with Germany that could not be reached by her physical blockade of the latter's ports, was dubiously regarded by the United States. Early in 1916 Secretary Lansing broached the subject to Great Britain in a communication to Ambassador Page, asking him to convey the view to her Government that the act was deemed to be "pregnant with possibilities of undue interference with American trade."

The act had been framed with the object of bringing regulations controlling British trade with the enemy in greater harmony with those adopted by the French Government. France, and other countries too, held the doctrine that their nationals could not trade with an enemy, no matter where he was domiciled. The old British theory had been that trading with the enemy could only be forbidden if the enemy was domiciled in enemy countries. But the British revised this view. Modern conditions of credit and commerce had made it possible for an enemy outside belligerent territory to trade with his country. Hence the British Government was urged to abandon its traditional doctrine; but it hesitated to go to this extreme. It decided to prohibit persons domiciled in the United Kingdom from trading with a limited number of individuals, firms, or companies of enemy nationality under the same penalties as though they were actually trading with the enemy.

In devising legislation to this end the British Government sought to avoid any definition of "enemy trading" that would impose enemy status upon all persons of enemy nationality and associations in neutral countries. It was animated by the desire to exercise discrimination, and only contemplated the application of purely commercial restrictions "to those persons from whom it was necessary in British interests to withhold the facilities provided by British resources."

The British answer to Secretary Lansing's objections, in explaining the Government's motives for devising the Trading

with the Enemy Act, readily admitted the right of persons of any nationality resident in the United States to engage in legitimate commercial transactions "with any other persons." But the British Government declined to concede that "this right can in any way limit the right of other governments to restrict the commercial activities of their nationals in any manner which may seem desirable to them by the imposition of prohibitions and penalties which are operative solely upon persons under their jurisdiction."

On July 17, 1916, the British Government "blacklisted" eighty-two firms or individuals, domiciled in the United States, with whom British subjects were forbidden to trade. The list mainly bore German names, the firms and corporations appearing to be under the management of persons of German birth or descent. But a number were also American citizens. The British Foreign Office explained that the blacklist had been compiled with a view to proscribing four classes of enemy trading firms on American territory, which it thus designated and commented upon:

"First—German firms with head offices or control in Germany.

"Second—German firms incorporated in the United States, and therefore technically American entities. We have dealt with these firms on their merits. In these cases something more has been required to qualify them for the statutory list than German nationality, either assisting the enemy by loans, propaganda or in regard to contraband.

"Third—Except in so far as covered by the first or second qualifications, United States citizens as a rule have not been placed on the list. If any are there it is because they are sole agents for enemy firms resident in enemy territory.

"Fourth—When, however, clear abuse of cable facilities has been proved, a firm or individual may be found on the list. By abuse is meant the use of a secret code or of cloaks to cover the fact that cables are being used in a particular interest. In very few such cases will there be found to be United States citizens."

American business interests, specially those concerned in the import and export trade, were disturbed and indignant. They

FORMS OF DEFENSE AND ATTACK

ON BOTH

LAND AND OCEAN · GERMAN SUBMARINES AND SEA PATROLS
FRENCH TRENCHES · MINES · ARMORED TRAINS AND RUINS

Copyright, International Film Service

The "Deutschland," first submarine merchantman to cross the ocean, entering the harbor of Baltimore escorted by tugs. She discharged a cargo of dyes and carried back nickel and rubber

Copyright, Paul Thompson

French soldiers in a "checkerboard" trench—covered and open spaces alternating. The enemy's aviators scouting above are not likely to distinguish the line of the trench. The trench itself is most carefully constructed and thoroughly drained

Copyright, Central News Photo Service

British sailors and officers boarding the captured U C-5 German mine-laying submarine. The open grating shows one of the openings through which mines are laid

Copyright, American Press Association

A strangely wrecked château near the French battle front. Shells have entirely destroyed the middle of the house, leaving the ends standing. Shell holes near the edge of the stream testify to the bombardment suffered

Copyright, Medem Photo Service

A row of French military kitchens near the front. They are devised with all possible care for safety from shells, bombs and hand grenades, and flying debris

Copyright, Medem Photo Service

Guns in action on small armored trains in the Vosges region. The trains move backward and forward, constantly changing position and thus make it difficult for the enemy's artillery to get the range and return their fire

Copyright, Underwood & Underwood

French soldiers coming out of their shelters in their eagerness to see the results of a mine explosion—a common, most effective and most terrible incident of modern warfare

Copyright, Central News Photo Service

A beautiful view of the meeting of two German torpedo boats engaged in maintaining an effective patrol of the Belgian coast—a duty for which swift boats of light draft are most valuable

protested that Americans did not derive their right to trade by the consent of the British Government. The blacklist, indeed, appeared to deprive the firms and individuals named of the right to trade, not only with Germany, but elsewhere.

But Great Britain held that under modern conditions of commerce, credit and communication a German firm in the United States could help Germany—at least as much as if not more than a firm of the same standing in Germany. Was it unreasonable, she asked, to refuse to allow the available capital of such German-American firms to be swelled or their business to be maintained and improved by the help of British trade? Since such firms were concerned in helping enemies of Great Britain, they should not be permitted to enjoy concurrently the benefits of friendly commercial intercourse with British firms.

The irritation caused in the United States by the publication of the blacklist, and the widespread misapprehensions rife regarding its real import, caused the British ambassador to make an explanation of what the measure did not contemplate. It appeared to have been construed as embracing trade restrictions which Great Britain did not, and, indeed, could not decree.

"There is no idea of blacklisting a neutral firm merely because it continues to do business with a firm that is blacklisted," Sir Cecil Spring-Rice told the State Department. "But if a neutral firm habitually and systematically acted as cover for a blacklisted firm, cases would be different.

"Regarding payments to blacklisted firms, our action does not affect payments by neutrals, and we habitually grant licenses to British firms to pay current debts to blacklisted firms, unless it is clear beyond doubt that such payments would be passed on to or create a credit for enemies in enemy territory."

The United States sent a protest to Great Britain on July 26, 1916, condemning the issue of the proscriptive "blacklist" as embodying a policy of arbitrary interference with neutral trade.

"The scope and effect of the policy are extraordinary," the American note said. "British steamship companies will not accept cargoes from the proscribed firms or persons or transport their goods to any port, and steamship lines under neutral own-

ership understand that if they accept freight from them they are likely to be denied coal at British ports and excluded from other privileges which they have usually enjoyed, and may themselves be put upon the blacklist. Neutral bankers refuse loans to those on the list and neutral merchants decline to contract for their goods, fearing a like proscription. It appears that British officials regard the prohibitions of the blacklist as applicable to domestic commercial transactions in foreign countries as well as in Great Britain and her dependencies, for Americans doing business in foreign countries have been put on notice that their dealings with blacklisted firms are to be regarded as subject to veto by the British Government. By the same principle Americans in the United States might be made subject to similar punitive action if they were found dealing with any of their own countrymen whose names had thus been listed."

American citizens, Great Britain was informed, were entirely "within their rights in attempting to trade with the people or the governments of any of the nations now at war, subject only to well-defined international practices and understandings which the Government of the United States deems the Government of Great Britain to have too lightly and too frequently disregarded."

Great Britain's boycott on all trade between her nationals and firms directly or indirectly having trade relations with enemy countries was world-wide in its ramifications.

In view of the fact that American interests had not been singled out alone by the British ban, the question was asked in Great Britain: What had the United States specifically to complain of? Other countries equally or greater affected by the blacklist had not done so. Said one British commentator:

"Japan does not talk of remonstrances and protests, and she is our ally. Neither, so far, has Brazil nor other countries concerned, except Argentina."

CHAPTER XXIX

THE APPAM

AN American federal tribunal was called upon to determine whether the British steamship *Appam,* which was captured by a German raider, the *Moewe,* and sent to Norfolk, Va., with a prize crew under a German naval lieutenant (see previous volume) was a lawful prize of Germany's, or should be returned to its British owners. Federal officers had taken possession of the vessel pending decision of a suit entered by the owners, the British and African Steam Navigation Company, for the recovery of the vessel. Judge Edmund Waddill, of the United States District Court at Norfolk, heard the case in May, 1916.

The German ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, protested to the State Department against the suit being permitted to proceed as the *Appam* flew the German naval flag and "belonged to the German Government," he wrote Secretary Lansing, and "as the possession of their captors is the possession of their sovereign, . . . the neutral sovereign or its court can take no cognizance of the question of prize or no prize, and cannot wrest from the possession of the captor a prize of war brought into its ports." The German ambassador requested the safe internment of the *Appam* in an American port for the remainder of the war under Article XIX of the Prussian-American Treaty of 1799, and besought the immediate dismissal of the suit through action of the Department of Justice.

Secretary Lansing informed the German ambassador that a strict interpretation of this article made it applicable only to prizes brought into American ports by vessels of war. The *Appam* was not so accompanied, but came into Norfolk alone in charge of a prize master and crew. The *Appam,* therefore, in the opinion of the American Government, did not fall within the evident meaning of the treaty provision, which contemplated temporary asylum for vessels of war accompanying prizes, "not the deposit of the spoils of war in an American port." The German

ambassador was notified that the American Government consequently considered itself free from any obligation to accord the *Appam* the privilege of asylum stipulated in the treaty mentioned. The only privileges the *Appam* could enjoy were those usually granted by maritime nations, including Germany, to prizes of war, to enter neutral ports only in case of stress of weather, want of fuel and provisions, or necessity of repairs, but to leave as soon as the cause of their entry had been removed.

The Hague Convention of 1907, on which the British owners relied to maintain their case, contained the following two clauses, which supported Secretary Lansing's view:

"Article 21. A prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel, or provisions.

"It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral power must order it to leave at once; should it fail to obey, the neutral power must employ the means at its disposal to release it with the officers and crew and to intern the prize crew.

"Article 22. A neutral power must similarly release a prize brought into one of its ports under circumstances other than those referred to in Article 21."

Both the United States and Germany, among some forty-three other powers, had assented to the inclusion of these two articles in the convention, though Great Britain had not. The acquiescence of the two countries showed that their policy was alike relating to the use of their waters and harbors for belligerent prizes. But the United States refused to accept Article 23, which authorized "the neutral to permit prizes to enter its ports and to remain there pending action on their cases by the proper prize courts."

The American delegates' comment on this article was:

"This is objectionable for the reason that it involves a neutral in participation in the war to the extent of giving asylum to a prize which the belligerent may not be able to conduct to a home port. This article represents the revival of an ancient abuse and should not be approved."

The United States Senate, when it ratified The Hague Convention of 1907, indorsed the view of the American delegates, and excepted and excluded Article 23.

Secretary Lansing's ruling was made part of the evidence in the case heard before Judge Waddill. Counsel for Germany relied on the Prussian treaty to show that the *Appam* was rightly a German prize and should not be returned to her British owners. But the judge, in giving his decision on July 29, 1916, was of opinion that Secretary Lansing's ruling was correct. As to an effort made by Germany's counsel before the court to show that the purpose of the Prussian-American Treaty of 1799 was to afford the United States an asylum for its prizes in Prussian waters, and vice versa, Judge Waddill ruled:

"Whatever may have been the views of those representing this country at that time, it seems clear to the court that no such enlarged and far-reaching view of the treaty as is now claimed for it can for a moment be entertained at this day in the light of the present methods of warfare and the laws, rules and regulations affecting the neutrality of nations in existence now for nearly a hundred years."

A decision by a German prize court that the *Appam* was a lawful prize was held to be without effect upon the proceedings of American courts. An argument had been made at the trial by counsel for Germany that the then pendency of the German prize court proceedings deprived, by weight of authority, the United States court of jurisdiction.

Judge Waddill held that the *Appam* lost her status as a prize when she entered American territorial waters to remain indefinitely. He rejected the German contention that the Prussian-American Treaty of 1799 permitted German prizes to be laid up in American waters. Prizes, he held, could be brought in only by a war vessel acting as convoy, and then only for the temporary causes recognized by international law.

"The court's conclusion," his decision read, "is that the manner of bringing the *Appam* into the waters of the United States, as well as her presence in those waters, constitutes a violation of the neutrality of the United States; that she came in without

bidding or permission; that she is here in violation of the law; that she is unable to leave for lack of a crew, which she cannot provide or augment without further violation of neutrality; that in her present condition she is without lawful right to be in and remain in these waters; that she, as between her captors and owners, to all practical interests and purposes, must be treated as abandoned and stranded upon our shores, and that her owners are entitled to restitution of their property, which this country should award irrespective of the prize court proceedings of the Court of the Imperial Government of the German Empire, and it will be so ordered."

The judge laid little stress on The Hague Convention and disposed of it briefly, holding that it was not applicable to the case of the *Appam*, as Great Britain had never accepted Articles 21 and 23; but he pointed out that the attitude of the American delegates was shown by their rejection of Article 23, as before mentioned.

The decision appeared to invalidate the Prussian treaty in so far as it could relate to prizes placed in neutral waters without a convoy. The German captors of the vessel had threatened that if the American courts decided that the *Appam* was not a legitimate prize of war they would take her out beyond the three-mile limit and sink her. But their liberty to do so was restrained by the fact that the vessel was in the custody of Federal officials. The German embassy took steps to appeal from Judge Waddill's decision and to carry the case to the United States Supreme Court.

PAUS

The famous "tanks" or "Willies"—huge steel monsters with which the British surprised and confounded the enemy in the great drive on the Somme. They are sometimes called "land dreadnoughts," and it is reported that they are indeed manned by naval forces. These new juggernauts are represented as huge caterpillar tractors—a type developed in America for agricultural purposes—but with caterpillar belts of unusual length and width. They are so heavily armored as to be injured only when directly hit by a shell from a powerful gun. The "tanks" climb or crush walls, smash down trees, plunge across shell holes, mine craters, and trenches, sometimes sitting down comfortably on the very top of an enemy trench and clearing it with machine guns. One of them is described as charging a house, passing right through its walls and leaving it a heap of splinters; another as smashing down the walls of a ruined factory and climbing over the débris into the midst of a machine-gun emplacement, where it crushed the guns and killed the gun crews. These heavy armored cars made their first appearance on September 15, 1916, when they led the infantry in the most effective attack yet made by British troops — through walls, trees, and wire entanglements, over craters and intrenchments, while British soldiers charged beside these strange auxiliaries, laughing as they ran. The attack was successful in piercing the third line of the German trenches, and the new weapons were reported as causing "indescribable demoralization in the enemy's ranks," while British aeroplanes joined the enterprise, flying low to drop their bombs right into the German trenches.

Great secrecy has surrounded the construction of these new weapons. They may mark as great a change in methods of land warfare as the "Monitor," John Ericsson's little floating fort, did in naval construction. Perhaps the armies of all nations will be provided with large fleets of these "land battleships," which are conquering so many lines of defense while proving impervious to usual methods of attack. The British armies have thus applied from our land, the land which developed the electric light, telephone, submarine, and aeroplane, still another device for their use in the Great War.

(Advance frontispiece. Detailed description of the "tanks" will appear in a chapter on Armored Automobiles in Volume XI)

TWO YEARS OF THE WAR

BY FRANK H. SIMONDS

THE purpose of this article is to review rapidly and briefly the history of the military operations in the European conflict during the first two years, from the attack upon Liege to the opening of the first general Allied offensive. Necessarily, in view of the space limitations it will be confined to a summary of events in the three more considerable campaigns, that of Germany against France in 1914, that of Germany against Russia in 1915, and the second German attack upon France at Verdun in 1916. All other land operations have been subsidiary or minor and will claim only passing comment.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM

In the years that lay between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the outbreak of the present conflict the Great General Staff of the German Army had carefully elaborated plans for that war on two fronts which the Franco-Russian alliance forecast. In company with the staffs of her two allies, Austria and Italy, Germany had formulated the methods by which she purposed to repeat the great success of 1870.

With Italy in the war, with Great Britain out of it, it was plain that with German efficiency and the numbers that she and her allies would possess, Germany could count on a permanent advantage in numbers as well as material. But the events of the early years of the century, the incidents beginning at Tangier in 1905, and extending to the Balkan Wars in 1913, clearly established the possibility that Italy might enter the war as an enemy. and the probability that Britain would decline to stay out while France was being destroyed.

If either of these things should happen, as both did, then German soldiers recognized that Germany and her Austrian ally would ultimately be outnumbered, although superior preparation would give them the advantage in the first and perhaps in the second years of the conflict. It was therefore the problem of German high command to prepare its plans in such fashion as to win the war, while it still possessed the advantage of numbers and before the enemy could equip and train its own forces.

In fact the problem was this: Should the Germans hurl the mass of their great army first at Russia or first at France, leaving only a small containing force on the other front? The question was much debated and remains a matter of dispute, now, when the attack ultimately decided upon has failed. (Vol. I, 85.)

The decision to attack France, which seems to have been reached well in advance of the actual coming of the war, involved new considerations. Russia's mobilization was notoriously known to be a slow thing, although it turned out far more rapid than Germany had calculated. But at the least German high command figured upon two months, during which it could safely turn all of its energies and resources against France. (Vol. I, 85.)

Unhappily in the years since the Franco-Prussian War France had built up a great barrier of fortresses from Luxembourg to Switzerland. Granted the great superiority of German heavy artillery, it was clear that this barrier could be forced, but defended by the mass of the French army this forcing would consume more than two months.

If France were to be attacked first, then it must be attacked by some other road than that leading from the valleys of the Rhine and the Moselle, the route of the 1870 invasion. And the route manifestly lay through Belgium. The fortresses of the Meuse were patently of little modern value, the Belgian army was weak in numbers and only at the beginning of a process of reorganization. By coming through Belgium the Germans could hope, even if the Belgians resisted, to get to Paris in six weeks, having delivered their decisive battle on the road. (Vol. I, 85.)

The element of additional opposition supplied by the Belgian army and the small British Expeditionary Army, if it came to

the Continent, did not offset in the German mind the strength of the French barrier fortresses from Verdun to Belfort, and Belgium seemed the line of least resistance even if that resistance were to be reckoned at the maximum. If France were crushed within six weeks it was safe to reckon that there would be time to turn east and deal with Russia, still unprepared and so far held up—if not defeated—by Austria. If Italy merely remained neutral up to the moment of the decisive battle in France, the outcome of this conflict would decide Italian policy. Here, briefly, is the basis of German strategy and the reason for German decision. (Vol. I, 87.)

THE BELGIAN PHASE

Germany declared war upon Russia on August 1, 1914. (Vol. II, 387.) She was already mobilizing, and in a more or less complete form all Europe had been mobilizing for at least a week. While there were delays in the exchange of other declarations this date may be accepted as the real beginning of the world war. Moreover, when the declaration of war was sent to Russia, Germany was already aware that France purposed to stand by her ally. (Vol. II, 388.)

The first step in German action, then, was to seize the road through Belgium. It might be had by diplomacy, but this hope was speedily extinguished when King Albert revealed his determination to defend his country. (Vol. II, 388.) Liege, the most important outer barrier, might still be won by a quick blow, and thus the opening move of the struggle was the dash of a few thousand German troops, not yet put on a complete war basis, westward from Aix-la-Chapelle and along the main Berlin-Cologne-Brussels railroad to the environs of Liege. (Vol. III, 641.)

As a *coup-de-main* this attack upon Liege failed. The forts resisted. For several days Belgian field forces held the open spaces between the eastern forts, and the first German troops suffered bloody repulses and were presently compelled to pause until heavy artillery could be brought up. Meantime German troops

moved north of the city and forced the crossing of the Meuse at Visé. Thereupon the Belgian field forces, which had been defending Liege, retired, to escape envelopment. The German army penetrated in the wide unfortified gaps between the Liege forts and occupied the city of Liege on August 7, 1914. The forts held out for another week, one by one succumbing to the new heavy German and Austrian howitzers, which were making their first noise in Europe. (Vol. III, 644-655.)

Meantime, behind Liege the German concentration was going forward, the main mass of the German army was getting ready for its great drive on Paris, while west of Liege German cavalry was slowly but methodically driving in the slender Belgian field forces, which took their stand behind the north and south flowing rivulets of the central Belgian plain. Here were fought some of the minor engagements which filled the press of the world in the early days, but had no actual value. (Vol. III, 641-643.)

Early in the third week of August the German preparations were complete and one great German army under Kluck, crossing the Meuse about Liege moved directly west upon Brussels, while a second, under Bülow, crossed the Meuse about Huy, between Liege and Namur, and advanced upon the latter place. Still a third army, under Hausen, moved across the Ardennes toward the Meuse crossings southeast of Namur, while a fourth under the Crown Prince of Württemberg aimed further south through the Ardennes at the Meuse crossings in France. (Vol. III, 657-658.)

Before this torrent the Belgian army was swept with little or no delay. (Vol. III, 659.) By August 19, 1914, it was fleeing back to the intrenched camp of Antwerp. (Vol. III, 659.) Brussels fell on August 20, 1914 (Vol. III, 662), and on August 22, 1914, the Belgian phase was over and the German troops had come to grips with French and British troops along the whole Belgian frontier from Luxemburg to Mons. (Vol. III, 669.) So far German plans had worked about as they had been expected to work, and at the end of the third week Germany was on the eve of the decisive battle, which she had planned.

ON AUGUST 18, 1914, WHEN THE BELGIAN RETREAT TO ANTWERP BEGAN

Allies.—A, Belgians; B, British; C, Lanzerac; D, Langle de Cary; E, Ruffey; F, Castelnau; G, Dubail; H, Pau
Germans.—I, Kluck; II, Bülow; III, Hausen; IV, Wurttemberg; V, Crown Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heeringen; VIII, Deimling

THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE

Meantime the French had mobilized with expected speed and before mobilization was completed had pushed a raid into southern Alsace, wholly comparable to the German raid on Liege. (Vol. III, 670.) This advance had taken, lost and retaken Mülhausen by August 15, 1914. (Vol. III, 673.) At this time the French were approaching the Rhine, in this sector, and had crossed the Vosges and come down the Rhine affluents for some distance.

But this was a minor operation. The main thrust of the French General Staff, the answer to the German drive through Belgium, had long been prepared. It was to be a swift and heavy advance through Lorraine, between Metz and Strassburg, rolling up the German forces here, cutting communications between these fortresses, and moving down the Rhine Valley and menacing the rear of the German armies which had invaded Belgium. (Vol. III, 675.)

While the German armies were beginning their main advance upon Brussels and Namur, the French thrust was pushed out, was very successful for several days until the French had reached the main Metz-Strassburg railroad, and from Delme to Saarburg stood far within the German boundary. But at this point came the first real disaster. (Vol. III, 676.)

Resting on the hills of Delme and the marshes of the Seille, the Germans had constructed strong fortified lines and furnished them with heavy artillery. When the French reached these positions they were assailed by artillery which was beyond the reach of their own guns, they suffered heavy losses, were thrown into confusion, and presently were flowing back upon Nancy and Lunéville in something approximating a rout, having lost flags, cannon, and many thousand prisoners. This was the Battle of Morhange, or of Metz—as the Germans name it—and it was over by August 22, 1914. (Vol. III, 676-677.)

At the same time another French army had pushed across the Meuse into Belgium from the district between Sedan and Montmédy, it had won minor initial successes, and about Neuf-

AUGUST 23, 1914, AFTER THE ALLIES HAD LOST ALL THE FIRST BATTLES

Allies.—A, Belgians; B, British; C, Lanrezac; D, Langle de Cary; E, Ruffey; F, Castelnau; G, Dubail; H, Pau
Germans.—I, Kluck; II, Bülow; III, Hausen; IV, Wurttemberg; V, Crown Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heeringen; VIII, Deimling

château it had suffered exactly the same sort of reverse that the French army to the south had met at Morhange, German heavy artillery had procured another French defeat, which again approximated a rout and this French army was also in rapid retreat, having lost flags and guns as well as many thousand prisoners.

Finally, still farther to the northeast, a French army had taken its stand in the angle between the Meuse and the Sambre, from Dinant, through Namur to Charleroi, and the British army prolonged the line to the east of Mons. Against this dike there now burst the full fury of the German advance made by the armies of Kluck and Bülow. (Vol. III, 678-681.) Again the French were defeated after a desperate battle about Charleroi (Vol. III, 686), this time without any rout and after having inflicted very heavy losses. But retreat was inevitable because the Germans succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Meuse at Dinant—that is, in the rear of the main army—while the fall of Namur (Vol. III, 687-691), another triumph for German heavy artillery and a complete surprise to the Allies, completed the ruin of their plans.

Meantime the British army about Mons, after a day of hard fighting which had compelled them to contract their lines somewhat, but left them unshaken, was thrown in the air by the French retreat from Charleroi (Vol. III, 692), tardily announced to it, and was compelled to begin its long and terrible retreat, which so nearly ended in destruction. (Vol. III, 698.)

By the middle of the third week in August the Germans had then made good their way through Belgium, defeated the French counterthrust in Lorraine, routed two French armies and heavily defeated a third, together with its British supports. (Vol. III, 641-700.)

It was not yet clear whether the French armies could rally for another general battle, but it was clear that if this should happen, the Germans had still time, accepting their original time-table.

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

In the fourth week of August, 1914, Joffre, the French commander in chief, was compelled to make a momentous decision. All his first plans had failed, all his armies had been defeated. It very promptly turned out that none of the defeats had materially affected the fighting value of his armies. Thus the army defeated at Morhange was promptly reenforced by the troops drawn out of Mülhausen and in turn defeated and repulsed its conquerors before Nancy, in one of the bloodiest battles of the war. The army defeated at Neufchâteau made good its position behind the Meuse from Verdun to Charleville and inflicted grave losses upon the Germans endeavoring to pass the river. Even the army defeated at Charleroi was able, a few days later at Guise, to pass to the offensive and throw back the Prussian Guard into the Oise. (Vol. III, 702-704.)

Meantime two new armies, one under Foch, the other under Manoury, were in the making and there was reason to believe that it would be possible to renew the battle on the line of the Aisne, the Oise, and the Somme. But there was one grave peril. German plans had not only taken the French by surprise in making the main thrust through Belgium, but had prepared to send this way a far greater number of men than France had expected and had sent them much farther to the west. The result was that the weight of the blow had fallen upon the British. The British army had been compelled to make a night and day retreat and had narrowly escaped destruction at Cambrai on August 26, 1914, "the most critical day." (Vol. III, 709.) The British army was too heavily outnumbered to meet the German attack, its retreat had been so rapid that the line of the Somme was about to be lost before the British could be supported by Manoury's army, which came up on its western flank too late. There was, therefore, the real danger that Kluck might get between Paris and the main mass of the Allied armies, enveloping them and producing a Sedan ten times greater than that which had wrecked the Third Empire.

Joffre, accordingly, decided to continue the retreat and brought

all his forces that were west of the Meuse, in good order and no longer heavily pressed back behind the Marne and on a line from Paris, through Meaux, Sézanne, La Fère Champenoise, Vitry-le-François, Bar-le-Duc, and thence north to Verdun. He thus stood with his forces in a semicircle, the concave side toward the Germans and his flanks resting upon Paris and Verdun, whose forts covered these flanks. (Vol. III, 715.)

By September 1, 1914, it was plain to the Germans that the French army had escaped its embrace and that no envelopment was longer possible. It remained possible to destroy them by main force, since German numbers were still superior, German artillery unchallenged, and the early successes productive of unbounded confidence. The German armies thus leaped forward for the final decisive battle, which had been just missed at the French frontier. (Vol. III, 716-717.)

But the new situation imposed new strategy. It was no longer possible to envelop the Allies, and accordingly, Kluck, on the western flank, turned southeast and marched across the face of Paris, crossing the Marne near Meaux and leaving only one corps to guard his flank toward Paris. This was a sound maneuver, if the French troops in Paris were too few or too broken to strike; it was perilous in the extreme, if the opposite were the case. And it was the case, for Joffre had concentrated behind Paris a new army, Manoury's, which was now to attack.

On September 5, 1914, the Germans having now fallen into Joffre's trap, the French commander in chief issued his famous order, and the whole Anglo-French army suddenly passed from the defensive to the offensive. (Vol. III, 734.) The first shots of the conflict, the great Battle of the Marne, were fired by some German field pieces, at Monthyon, just north of the Marne and less than twenty miles from Paris. They greeted the advance of Manoury's army coming east out of Paris and striking at Kluck's open flank. (Vol. III, 735.)

The next day Manoury rolled up Kluck's flank, drove his troops in on the Ourcq River, and threatened his army with destruction. Kluck saved himself by extraordinary clever work, he drew his troops back from the front of the British south of

SEPTEMBER 6, 1914, THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Allies.—A, Belgians; B, Manoury; C, British; D, Franchet d'Esperey (Lanrezac); E, Foch; F, Langle de Cary; G, Sarrail (Ruffey); H, Castelnau; I, Dubail

Germans.—I, Kluck; II, Bülow; III, Hausen; IV, Württemberg; V, Crown Prince; VI, Bavaria; VII, Heeringen

the Marne, put them in against Manoury and by September 10, 1914, had driven Manoury back toward Paris and was threatening him. The first blow had failed, but it had brought a chain of consequences fatal to German plans. (Vol. III, 731-742.)

First of all the British, once Kluck had drawn his main masses from their front began somewhat tardily to advance, threatening Kluck's other flank, and Franchet d'Espérey's army, to the east, about Montmirail, in turn, attacked Bülow's, whose position had been made dangerous by the retreat of Kluck. Bülow had to go back north of the Marne, suffering severe losses and his retirement uncovered the flank of Hausen's army fighting to the east from La Fère Champenoise to Vitry. (Vol. III, 739.)

Meantime things had been going badly on this line for the French, and their troops under Foch had been driven back many miles. The Germans, feeling the danger from the west, were making one final effort to break the French center and win the decisive contest. But Bülow's retreat opened the way for a supreme piece of strategy on the part of Foch, who descended from the heights, struck Hausen, almost routed him and sent him in quick retreat beyond the Marne. (Vol. III, 752-753.)

This settled the battle. Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen were now forced to retreat, their retreat communicated itself all along the line and by September 13, 1914, the Germans were all withdrawing, Kluck was over seventy miles north of the Grand Morin, just taking root behind the Aisne, the Battle of the Marne was over, and the great German plan to deal with France in six weeks had been completely wrecked. Actually the first phase of the war was over, unless the Germans could regain the offensive and restore the conditions existing before the Marne. (Vol. III, 752-755.)

THE END OF THE FIRST WESTERN CAMPAIGN

In this the Germans failed. They did succeed in rallying and beating down the Anglo-French pursuit with great skill and promptitude. The Battle of the Aisne (Vol. III, 762-778) marked



SEPTEMBER 20, 1914, THE DEADLOCK

Solid lines show trench fronts

Dotted lines show extension toward Belgium—"the race to the sea" in September and October

the beginning of the deadlock and the Germans took the positions they were to hold for the next two years between the Oise and the Meuse.

But the effort to renew the attack failed. It began with an effort, made by troops brought from before Nancy, where a new French defensive success had saved the Lorraine capital, to come south to Paris along the west bank of the Oise. It was continued in the so-called "race to the sea," when French and German commanders tried to outflank their opponents along the Oise, the Somme, and the Lys. But this resulted only in extending the lines of parallel trenches which now stretched to the Belgian frontier from Noyon.

Finally, having beaten down the Belgian resistance and taken Antwerp in the second week of October (Vol. III, 800-804), the Germans made a last attempt to interpose between the Allies and the sea, take Calais and Boulogne and come south through Artois and Picardy.

They were halted in the desperate battles along the Yser and the Lys. (Vol. III, 801-807.) The Belgian army, escaping from Antwerp, stood solidly behind the Yser, the British just managed to cling to Ypres (Vol. III, 803-804), and the French under Foch performed new miracles on the defensive. Two months after the German defeat at the Marne, the loss of the western campaign was made absolute by the unsuccessful termination of the Battle of Flanders and a war of movement had fallen to a war of trenches, a state of deadlock had succeeded to the operations in the open field and the German tide had been permanently checked. (Vol. III, 806-809.) But actually the check had been at the Marne and in this battle the original German plan had been decisively defeated. France had not been disposed of in two months, but had won the decisive battle that German strategy had prepared. But she had lacked the numbers and the artillery to turn the victory to best account and had failed wholly in the attempt to free her own territory as she was to continue to fail for two years.

NOVEMBER 15, 1914, THE END OF THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN

THE RUSSIAN PHASE

We have seen that it was the plan of the German General Staff to hold the Russian armies while the great attack upon France was being made. To do this the Germans had left a very small force in East Prussia, but had practically assigned to Austria the task of holding up Russia. (Vol. IV, 1009.)

German calculations as to Russian mobilization proved sadly inaccurate. While the German troops were still in Belgium and the Battle of Charleroi unfought, Russian troops crossed the East Prussian boundary and began an invasion which produced something approximating a panic. (Vol. IV, 1072.) One Russian army came due west from the Niemen, another north from Warsaw and all of Germany east of the Vistula seemed in grave peril. (Vol. IV, 1072.)

TANNENBERG AND LEMBERG

It was then that the kaiser summoned Hindenburg, gave him the task of defending East Prussia, and thus introduced one of the few famous and successful soldiers of the war. (Vol. IV, 1076.) Hindenburg cleverly concentrated his forces, leaving only a screen in front of the Russian army coming from the Niemen toward Königsberg, practically surrounded the other Russian army in the marshes about Tannenberg, brought into action great parks of German heavy artillery, and routed and destroyed the Russian army about September 1, 1914. (Vol. IV, 1076-1079.)

On "Sedantag" Germany was able to celebrate one of the most decisive of all her many victories and the Russian peril in East Prussia had been quickly abolished.

But the East Prussian incident was only a detail, due, it is still insisted, to the prompt yielding of Russian strategy to Allied appeals for some action in the east that might relieve the terrible pressure now being exerted upon the Anglo-French forces in the west. And if the East Prussian invasion did not, as was asserted at the time, compel the Germans to send troops

from Belgium to East Prussia, it did hold up new formations and seriously complicate the German problem, contributing materially to the French victory at the Marne thereby.

The real Russian blow was delivered against Austria. Faithful to her agreement, Austria had promptly undertaken the invasion of southern Poland and in the third week of August an Austrian army was approaching Lublin, while another stood in a wide circle about the Galician city of Lemberg. (Vol. IV, 1014-1017.)

Ignoring the first army, the Russians sent their main masses westward on a front extending from the Rumanian boundary to the Kiev-Lemberg railroad. Before Lemberg the Austrian army was overwhelmed in a terrible rout, which ended in a wild flight, costing some 300,000 prisoners and almost destroying the Austrian military establishment. (Vol. IV, 1023-1024.)

The Austrian army, which had advanced into Poland was left in the air, and its retreat was transformed into a new disaster. Lemberg fell about September 1, 1914, and meantime a Serbian victory at the Jedar had destroyed still another Austrian army and emphasized the weakness of Hapsburg military power. (Vol. IV, 967-973.)

At about the time the German blow at France was failing along the Marne, the Russian victories were mounting, Russian armies were sweeping through Galicia and approaching the San. (Vol. IV, 1036.) Serbian armies were across the Bosnian frontier (Vol. IV, 961), and the eastern situation was becoming perilous in the extreme for the Central Powers, despite the great victory of Tannenberg, which had cost the Russians an army of 100,000 men. (Vol. IV, 1076-1088.) Thus in the first six weeks of the war the whole German conception had been defeated, France had not been destroyed by one great blow, and Russia had not been held up by Austria, pending the delivery of this blow and the return of the German troops who had delivered it.

OCTOBER 24, 1914, THE BATTLE OF THE VISTULA

Arrows show Hindenburg's attack on Warsaw and Ivangorod

WARSAW AND LODZ

October brought the plain necessity to the Germans of coming to the aid of their ally. While they were still endeavoring to reopen the decision in the west it was necessary to send troops to Hindenburg and to take pressure off Austria. The blow took the form of a rapid advance upon Warsaw through Central Poland, which was destitute of Russian troops. (Vol. IV, 1092-1099.)

The thrust almost succeeded, German troops reached the suburbs of Warsaw, German guns were heard by the citizens of the town and Warsaw was in deadly peril, but Siberian troops arrived in the nick of time and Hindenburg was obliged to retire. (Vol. IV, 1100-1104.) Still his main purpose was achieved. Russian armies in Galicia had been weakened to save Warsaw and were compelled to retire behind the San and the Vistula. (Vol. IV, 1058-1065.)

Hindenburg's retreat was masterly, he flowed back upon Cracow and Breslau, pursued by a great Russian army. (Vol. IV, 1096-1100.) Meantime the Russian armies in Galicia again took the offensive and November saw Russian armies at the outskirts of Cracow and approaching the boundary of Silesia. (Vol. IV, 1051-1061.) Taken in connection with the German repulses all along the western front and the defeat in Flanders, which disclosed the final collapse of the original German plan, this moment marked the high-water stage of allied fortunes for many, many months.

Having led the Russian army after him to the German frontier, Hindenburg quickly moved his troops on strategic railroads to the north, invaded Poland again between the Vistula and the Warta (Vol. IV, 1100-1119), almost succeeded in interposing between the Russian army and Warsaw, and won the great victory of Lodz. (Vol. IV, 1104-1105.) But Russian numbers saved the day. After terrific fighting and tremendous losses the Russians got back to the Bzura line, which they were to hold for nearly a year and the German advance was beaten down in fighting wholly similar to that in Flanders. (Vol. IV, 1109-1116.)

THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN

Once more the Russian advance in Galicia was resumed. (Vol. V, 1464.) Russian armies never again approached Cracow, but they did come to the Dunajec line, while to the south they began the slow ascent of the Carpathians (Vol. V, 1461-1464), across which raiding forces of Cossacks had several times passed. They also concentrated against the fortress of Przemysl, the last Austrian stronghold along the San. This campaign endured throughout the winter. Finally Przemysl, with a garrison of 125,000 men, surrendered in early March (Vol. V, 1449-1457), and Russia was at last free to strike either at Cracow or through the Carpathians for the Hungarian Plain.

Her decision to go south was probably influenced by the great victory of the Serbs at Valievo. While German aid was taking pressure off the Austrians a new Hapsburg thrust had been delivered at Serbia, Austro-Hungarian troops had passed the Drina and penetrated deeply into Serbia, Belgrade had fallen, and the end of Serbia seemed in sight. But new Russian attacks having compelled Austria to recall many of her troops, the remaining Hapsburg forces in Serbia were almost destroyed in the bloody defeat of Valievo in December. (Vol. IV, 963-995.)

To offset this the Germans soon won one more great victory in East Prussia, at the Mazurian Lakes, where another Russian army was well nigh destroyed by the quick-marching, better-trained German troops. And this victory beat down another Russian invasion of East Prussia and, as it turned out, closed the period of immediate peril for the German territories in the east.

In March and April the Galician campaign reached its climax in the bloody battles of the Carpathians and Russian armies seemed slowly but surely pushing their way over the mountains and descending into the Hungarian Plain. (Vol. V, 1435-1476.) It was at this moment that Italy had chosen to enter the war on the allied side (Vol. V, 1580-1592), and there was every reason to believe that Rumania would follow.

THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

Instead there came a sudden and tremendous German victory which was to prove the prelude to more victories and to a summer of unparalleled success for German arms. This victory was won at the Battle of the Dunajec—named Gorlice by the Germans—which may well rank with the Marne as the second great struggle of the war, since it saved Austria, brought Russia to the edge of ruin and wholly transformed the horizons of the conflict. (Vol. V, 1464-1476.)

It will be recalled that at the outset of the war the German General Staff had to choose between two possible operations, an offensive against France or an offensive against Russia. It had chosen to attack France and had lost the campaign. It had in addition failed measurably in its defensive against Russia and the result had been the loss of most of Galicia with the incidental Austrian disasters.

But the campaign in the west had resulted in the occupation of advantageous positions far within French territory and in the conquest of most of Belgium.

Now the German General Staff was again able to decide whether it would turn its entire energies for the summer of 1915 against France or against Russia. If it chose to attack Russia there was solid reason for believing that neither in munitions nor in numbers would the Allies in the west reach a point where they would become dangerous before autumn and between May and October Germany could hope to put Russia out of the war, particularly as Germany knew what the rest of the world did not, that Russia was at the end of her munitions, and her long and terrible campaigns in Galicia, together with her defeats in East Prussia, had temporarily much reduced the fighting value of her armies.

Accordingly Germany decided to go east and put Russia out of the war as she had undertaken nine months before to go west and had tried and failed to put France out of the war. But she was again faced with the fact that failure would expose her to new perils, this time on the west.

For her first attack Germany selected the point in the Russian line between the Vistula and the Carpathians, about Tarnow, where the Russian line stood behind the Dunajec River. If the Russian line should be suddenly broken here, the German General Staff might hope to sweep up all the Russian armies which were facing south and endeavoring to push through the Carpathians.

Just about May 1, 1915, the blow fell and Germany, massing hitherto unheard-of numbers of heavy guns on a narrow front, and using untold ammunition, not merely routed, but abolished Radko Dmitrieff's army (Vol. V, 1467-1476), and moved rapidly in on the rear of the Russian Carpathian armies. With difficulty these extricated themselves and retired behind the San. (Vol. V, 1476.) But they were unable here to withstand Mackensen, who had assumed command in all this field, and fell back first upon Lemberg and then upon the Volhynian triangle of fortresses within the Russian frontier. Przemysl fell, Lemberg was lost and Dubno and Lutsk, two of the three Volhynian fortresses, fell. (Vol. V, 1476-1512.)

Having thus disposed of the Galician armies, Mackensen turned northeast from the San, struck at Lublin and Cholm (Vol. V, 1557-1565), and through them at Brest-Litovsk, far in the rear of the Russian armies in Poland. At the same time Hindenburg in East Prussia moved south, aiming at Grodno and Vilna, also behind the Warsaw front (Vol. V, 1556-1561), while a third German army invaded the Courland and aimed at Riga. (Vol. V, 1537.)

The Russian armies in Poland were thus threatened with complete envelopment; they were caught between the closing jaws of the pincers, which were Mackensen and Hindenburg. For a certain time it was not clear whether the gigantic double thrust might not result in the capture of the whole Russian army in Poland. But this did not happen. Warsaw was evacuated (Vol. V, 1556), Ivangorod, Novo Georgievsk, the fortresses along the Bobr-Narew-Niemen barrier fell (Vol. VII, 2058-2061), but the Russian armies drew back upon Riga, Vilna, and Brest-Litovsk. (Vol. VII, 2066-2068.)

OCTOBER 1, 1915, AT THE END OF THE RUSSIAN RETREAT

Dotted line shows Russian front on April 1, 1915

RUSSIA SURVIVES

At Brest-Litovsk there was only a brief halt and then the Russians resumed their retreat upon Pinsk and the Pripet Marshes. Behind the Dvina from Riga to Dvinsk the northern army stood fast. But the central armies, retiring upon Vilna, were nearly trapped and once were actually cut off by German cavalry. (Vol. VII, 2073-2103.)

By September the great campaign approached its end. The Russians at last took root on a line from Riga, through the Pripet Marshes to Rovno and thence to the Rumanian boundary. (Vol. VII, 2064-2135.) The czar sent the grand duke to the Caucasus and took command himself (Vol. VII, 2068), an allied offensive in the west in Champagne and Artois (Vol. VII, 1932-1961) made sudden demands upon German man power, as the Russian advance in East Prussia and Galicia had taxed German man power in the days of the Marne, and so, by October, it was plain that the second great German effort had also failed. Russia had not been destroyed, she had not been put out of the war for any long period; Russian armies were to resume the offensive the following June.

As in the west, Germany had conquered wide territories, she had taken fortresses, provinces, vast numbers of prisoners and guns, but a decision had escaped her. She was still confronted by the certainty that at some future time all her foes, superior in numbers and munitions, would beat upon all her fronts at once. But she was no longer able to push eastward to follow the pathway of Napoleon and meet a Russian winter on the road; moreover the situation in the Balkans demanded attention and the Italian offensive along the Isonzo, as well as Anglo-French pressure in the west, also claimed notice.

THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN

Early in the spring the Anglo-French fleets had made a desperate and almost successful attempt to force the Dardanelles. (Vol. VI, 1643-1656.) Their failure had been followed by a land



THE CONQUEST OF SERBIA, DECEMBER, 1915

Arrows show routes taken by Austrian, German, and Bulgar invaders
A—Route of retreating Serbs
B—Route of Allies from Saloniki in their unsuccessful attempt to rescue the Serbs

expedition, which took root at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula, made slight progress inward and was halted only a short distance south and west of the commanding hills. (Vol. VI, 1649-1657.)

A new effort in August directed from the Gulf of Saros through Suvla Bay had also just missed supreme success, through failures in preparation and command which were beginning to show in all British operations. (Vol. VII, 2224.)

For the moment Turkey had saved Constantinople, but the Turks' supplies of munitions were running short and there was reason to believe that the Gallipoli thrust might presently end in victory and open the straits to Russia, if Germany did not take a hand.

Thus spurred, Germany and Austria planned and executed the most successful single campaign of the war. German diplomacy succeeded in enlisting Bulgaria. (Vol. VII, 2149-2154.) Allied diplomacy chained Serbian action while there was yet time for Serbia to save herself, Greece deserted her old ally and in November a great Austro-German army under Mackensen suddenly burst into Serbia from the north and west (Vol. VII, 2143-2149), while a Bulgarian army entered from the east. (Vol. VII, 2149-2153.) The result was inevitable. Serbia was crushed. Her gallant army fled over the mountains after heroic resistance and reached the Adriatic, but as a mob rather than as an army. (Vol. VII, 2143-2187.)

Tardy Allied efforts to come to the rescue through Saloniki were blocked by the Bulgarians south of Uskub (Vol. VII, 2188-2196), all Macedonia was taken (Vol. VII, 2147-2214), and the Anglo-French expedition was driven south under the very shadow of the old walls of Saloniki, and the roads to Constantinople and to Albania were opened to Germany and Austria, the Balkans were conquered at a blow and Berlin began to forecast a German-led drive upon Egypt by Suez and even upon India by Bagdad.

As for the Gallipoli troops, December saw them hurriedly withdrawn after great losses and terrible suffering. (Vol. VIII, 2255-2266.) Germany and Austria had now broken the iron circle

about them; for the moment Germany had realized the German dream of expansion to the Near East, the conception of a Central Empire, a Mittel-Europa, fronting the Baltic and the Adriatic, overflowing the Sea of Marmora into Asia Minor and bound by the German-built railroad uniting Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople with Bagdad and Hamburg and Antwerp with Suez and the Persian Gulf. Here at last was a solid gain, a real victory after two great disappointments.

IN THE WEST

Meantime there had been a long trench struggle in the west. The German attack at the outset of the war had terminated in Flanders. It was not for several months that the Allies felt able to undertake any offensive. Then in rapid succession came French attacks in Alsace, in Champagne, and south of St. Mihiel, (Vol. V, 1351-1369), while the British made a desperate drive about Neuve Chapelle. (Vol. V, 1283-1298.) All these were checked by the Germans who passed to the offensive themselves in April, and made a new attack about Ypres, marked by the first use of poison gas. (Vol. V, 1299-1315.)

German success was inconsiderable, but it did reveal the fact that the Allies were not yet dangerous and Germany turned her whole attention toward the great Russian campaign just beginning. In May and June the French made terrific attacks under Foch in Artois (Vol. V, 1321-1325), and won some ground north of Arras. (Vol. V, 1355.) But the attacks had to be abandoned because they were too costly in men, while a British attempt to support the French failed dismally.

Not until late September, when Russia was just at the lowest ebb in her fortunes, did the western Allies try again. Then, starting on September 25, 1915, they launched terrific drives in Champagne and Artois, came within an ace of piercing the German lines, captured some 30,000 prisoners and many guns, but in the end failed to get through. (Vol. VII, 1941-2011.) German troops were recalled from Russia and Russia's escape was made certain, but this was the only considerable consequence of the

Allied attack, preparation for which had consumed many months. Again it was demonstrated that England was not ready and France, alone, could not free her own territory.

ITALY

Italy had entered the war just as Russia was suffering her first terrible defeats in Galicia. (Vol. VI, 1602-1612.) Had Italian decision been reached a few months earlier the effect might have been decisive. As it was, Italy came too late, her attack was halted south of Trent and along the Isonzo, after inconsiderable progress. A certain number of Austrian divisions, which conceivably might have been directed against Russia and contributed to making the outcome of that campaign decisive, were drawn off to the south. (Vol. VI, 1612-1622.)

In September, and again when the Austro-German attack upon Serbia was at its height, Italy attacked along the Isonzo. (Vol. VIII, 2301-2303.) Once more the result was limited to drawing off certain divisions, a useful but not highly important service. In opening another front Italy had contributed to the further consumption of the reserves of the Central Powers, she had begun an operation to be compared with that of Britain in Spain in the later days of the First Empire. She was taking off a portion of the weight that France and Russia were carrying, she was contributing to the exhaustion of Austria, but neither in the first nor the second year of the war was the contribution to be considerable and Italy was presently to require aid from Russia, when at last Austria decided to pass to the offensive in the Trentino.

VERDUN

With the coming of winter the German General Staff had to face a new situation, full of menace. Their first great conception, the destruction of the military power of France had failed, although it had won much territory and provided an admirable defensive position far beyond their own frontiers. Their second

major conception, the elimination of Russia from the war, had failed, but it had also given them much territory and they were not overoptimistic in assuming that their victories would keep Russia on the defensive for many months; their actual mistake, it turned out, was in overestimating the length of time.

Again, then, there was offered the original choice: Should the next blow be postponed until spring and directed at Petrograd or Moscow, or should it be prepared and delivered before spring and in the west? The decision for the west was made. Apparently the German reasoning was this: Britain was not yet ready, winter and defeat had reduced the value of Russia so low that it was safe to turn the best of their troops from the east to the west. Actually the whole weight of the military machine could be exerted against France.

From this second blow at France the Germans expected to derive the benefits missed at the Marne. If the French lines were broken, as the Russian had been at the Dunajec, then a wide swinging advance would carry German troops deep into the French territory, end French hope and compel French surrender. This was the maximum of possibility.

On the other hand, if there were no actual and deep piercing of the French lines, the pressure upon the French would lead them to call upon the British for help. British attack, while the British force was still unready, would lead to great losses and would exhaust the reserves in men and munitions of both France and Britain. At the worst this would mean that neither France nor Britain would be ready to take the field in their long-promised general offensive in 1916.

There was, of course, the possibility that the German attack would be repulsed, that the French and British would not undertake a premature offensive, and that Russia would rally and be able to storm the eastern lines stripped of reserves to strengthen the western attack.

If all these things happened then Germany might herself lose the offensive and conceivably the war. But no German soldier could believe these things would happen and the remote possibility did not weigh against the apparent opportunity to win a

sweeping and decisive vistory, while the British and Russians were still unready and France alone in the field.

THE FEBRUARY ATTACK

Accordingly Germany decided to attack in the west. She selected Verdun as the objective for reasons not at first clear but now well known. Verdun was in the public mind a great fortress, surrounded by impregnable works, the strongest point on the French front. In fact it was the weakest sector. The forts had been evacuated, the first line defenses some miles north of the town were strong, but the second and third had been neglected. The line was held by less than two army corps of territorials; there were other faults in preparation chargeable to the politicians. Worst of all of these was the lack of rail communications due to failure to build new lines to replace those cut by the Germans, who at St. Mihiel blocked the north and south line from the Paris-Nancy trunk line and at Montfaucon and Varennes interrupted the Paris-Verdun railroad by indirect fire.

There was every reason why the Germans could expect that a sudden and terrific blow would permit them to get to Verdun, take the forts on the east bank, and possibly cut clear through the French lines and break them into two parts. Not impossibly this would mean retirement as far as the old Marne battle field: certainly it would mean the extinction of French hope. So the Germans reasoned. (Vol. VII, 2012-2013.)

The first blow fell on February 21, 1916. The initial attack was made east of the Meuse on a very narrow front; it resulted in an immediate local success. The French trenches were abolished, the French line was threatened, and the German army overflowed south in great force. The possibility of a repetition of the Dunajec success was at this time plain. (Vol. VII, 2011-2022.)

Worst of all, from the allied point of view, there now came a difference in opinion between the French General Staff and the French Civil Government. The former wished to retire behind the Meuse and evacuate the eastern forts and trenches, thereby gaining a strong defensive line, but surrendering Verdun. The

Government felt that such a retreat would be accepted as a grave disaster, would depress the French people, and result in a political overturn.

At the outset the general staff seems to have adhered to its view, and for some days the German advance was steady. Even Fort Douaumont, on the outer rim of the old permanent fortifications, was lost (Vol. VII, 2022), and the German press announced the fall of the city itself. But in the end the army listened to the Government, Castelnau and Pétain went to the front to organize the defense. By the middle of March the first crisis was about over and the French had restored their line, the most expensive detail in their defense. (Vol. X, 2863-2871.) But they had not been able to retake Douaumont, and German possession was to prove a thorn in their side thenceforth.

With the great general attack of April 9, 1916 (Vol. X, 2867-2870), the first phase of the battle for Verdun was over. This check abolished all chance of a piercing of the French lines, of a second Dunajec. It assured to the French time to complete their second- and third-line defenses, and it gave ample evidence that the dangers of the first hours, due to failures and errors which cost many generals their positions, were at an end. Above all, it demonstrated that the wonderful motor-transport system which had been improvised had proved adequate to save a city deprived of all railroad communications.

LATER PHASES

Still the Germans kept on. Halted on the east bank, they transferred their attack to the west, and Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme became famous the world over. (Vol. X, 2884-2893.) But their advances were slight and their losses were tremendous. French tactics were now disclosed. It was the purpose of the French to exact the very heaviest price for each piece of ground that they defended, but they held their lines with very small contingents, and, save in the case of a few vital points, surrendered the positions whenever the cost of holding them was too great. (Vol. X, 2877.)

German high command had seen its larger aims fail. Why did it continue to assail Verdun after the chance of piercing the French lines had passed and when the cost was so terrific? The answer is not wholly clear, but we do know that the concentration of artillery and men had taken months; these could not quickly be moved elsewhere. Such a change in plans would mean the loss of several months, which would be improved by the British and the Russians; it would give France the "lift" of a great victory.

Conversely it was clear that, while the French lines could not be pierced, Verdun might be taken and the moral value of the capture would be enormous in Germany, France, and the neutral world, although the military value would be just nothing. Again, there remained the fair chance that the continued pressure upon France would lead the French to ask the British to attack, and the premature attack would spoil the allied offensive, obviously preparing.

Against this chance the Germans had massed not less than 800,000 troops along the British front. Meantime they told the world that Verdun was exhausting France, that it was making an allied offensive impossible, and they used their slow but considerable advances, which resulted from the French policy of "selling" their positions at the maximum of cost to the Germans and minimum of loss to themselves, to convince the world that they were systematically approaching Verdun and would take it at the proper moment.

This phase lasted from April 9, 1916, down to the opening of July. During that time the Germans pushed out from Douaumont and captured Vaux (Vol. X, 2889); they crowded up and over Dead Man's Hill and up the slope of Hill 304; by July 1, 1916, they had pushed the French right back to the extreme edge of the hills, on the east bank of the Meuse, and the French were just holding the inside line of forts—Belleville, Souville, and Tavannes—with their backs to the river and with German trenches coming right up to the ditches of these three forts. (Vol. X, 2892.)

By July 1, 1916, the French were in their last ditch before Verdun—that is, on the east bank—but on July 1, 1916, there

began that allied offensive at the Somme which changed the whole face of the western operations. (Vol. X, 2916-2951.) Thus, by August 1, 1916, the Germans had been compelled to remove many troops from Verdun and the French were able to take the offensive here again, and by August 6, 1916, had made material progress in retaking portions of the ground they had "sold" the Germans for so great a price in previous weeks.

GETTYSBURG

After the German checks in April the French compared the Verdun fight to Gettysburg. General Delacroix used that example to me in March, but it was not until June that General Joffre was ready to adopt it. By this time it was well established in all minds. Gettysburg had been the final effort of the South to win a decision on the field while superior organization gave her advantage over a foe that had superiority in ultimate resources, both of money and men. The failure at Gettysburg was promptly followed by the loss of the initiative, the North passed to the attack, and the rest of the war consisted in the steady wearing out of the Confederacy.

A victory at Gettysburg would probably have won the Civil War for the South. A victory of the Dunajec style might have won the Great War for the Germans. But the victory did not come, the struggle went on for many months, and presently the consequence of stripping the eastern lines was disclosed in new Russian victories, while the absolute failure to provoke a premature offensive in the west, or prevent any offensive, was disclosed in the Battle of the Somme.

Verdun, then, was the third failure of Germany to win the war by a major thrust. It was a failure which was wholly similar to the failures at the Marne and in Russia. Relatively speaking, it was a far greater failure, because it brought no incidental profit as did the other campaigns: it won only a few square miles of storm-swept hills, it has cost not less than 250,000 casualties, and allied statements placed the cost at half a million. From the military, the moral, the political points of view,

Verdun was a defeat for the Germans of the first magnitude. Conversely, the French victory filled the world with admiration. The French success at the Marne had been won in complete darkness, and after two years the world still has only a vague notion of the facts of this grandiose conflict. But there never was any possibility of concealment about Verdun. The fight was in the open, the issue was unmistakable, and French courage and skill, French steadiness and endurance, surprised the world once more.

THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE

While the German attack upon Verdun was still in its more prosperous phase the Austrians delivered a wholly similar attack upon Italy. (Vol. IX, 2732-2752.) Precisely as the Russian defeats had enabled Germany to turn many troops west, they had provided Austria for the first time with reserves that could be used against Italy. Conceivably, success would put Italy out of the war, for it was plain Italian sentiment was wearying of the long strain of sterile sacrifice.

For the attack the Austrians selected the Trentino district. If they could drive their masses through the Italian lines between the Adige and the Brenta, and enter the Venetian Plain, taking Verona and Vicenza, all the Italian forces to the eastward along the Isonzo would have to retreat and might be captured. At the least, Austria might hope to carry her front to the Po and the Adige, and thus stand on the defensive far within Italian frontiers, as Germany stood within French frontiers.

The same artillery preparation was made here as before Verdun, the battle opened in the same way (Vol. IX, 2733), and for many weeks, until June 1, 1916, the Austrian advance was steady, and finally passed the old frontier and actually approached the Venetian Plain about Vicenza. (Vol. IX, 2748.) For the first time Austria seemed within reach of a great victory, and Italian apprehension was great. As for the moral effect, an Italian ministry fell because of the reverses, and many Italian generals were retired.

By June 1, 1916, the Italian situation had become critical, (Vol. IX, 2746), just as the French situation about Verdun became critical on July 1, 1916. But at this point the Russian attack upon the east front changed the whole face of affairs, and Austria was forced shortly to abandon her offensive in Venetia and hurry her reserves eastward. (Vol. IX, 2753-2779.) Accordingly, in a brief time Italian troops were advancing again and regaining the lost ground. The Verdun attack actually failed in all but local value, the Trentino thrust was still succeeding when it had to be abandoned, but in abandoning it Austria confessed her great preparations and considerable sacrifices had been vain. Compared with Verdun, it was a minor defeat; but coming with Verdun, it was a further blow to Austro-German prestige.

GERMANY LOSES THE OFFENSIVE

At the outset of the war Germany found herself with greater numbers, superior artillery, and possessing a mechanical efficiency surpassing anything that war had known. She was able to mobilize more men, transport them more quickly, and employ them more effectively than her opponents. Her heavy artillery gave her a decisive advantage both in the matter of enemy fortresses and enemy armies. But they did not quite avail to give her the decisive victory she had expected.

The second year of the war revealed the enormous resources of Germany and the incredible fashion in which her people had been disciplined and her preparations made. The collapse of Austria and the defeat of the Marne did not deprive her of the offensive, and the weight of her initial blow sufficed to hold her western foes incapable of effective action, while she reorganized Austrian resources, put new armies in the field, and won the great battles in the Russian field, which carried her advance to the Beresina and the Dvina.

But the Russian operation in 1914 had been sufficient to deprive her of the troops needed to deliver the final blow in the west, and the French, Italian, and British attacks in September,

1915, had compelled her to stay her hand against Russia at the critical hour. When she chose to attack France at Verdun she had always to recognize that sooner or later Russia would again take the field, and that unless her second blow at France had already succeeded before this time came her position would be difficult, while if her blow at France did not suffice to prevent an allied offensive in the west, she might at last have to fight a defensive war on both fronts.

Hitherto she had been able to fight offensively on one front while holding on the other. Hitherto she had been able to move her reserves from one front to the other whenever the need was urgent. She reckoned that Russia would be incapable of a real offensive in 1916; she reckoned that Britain would not be able to train her armies for effective action in the same year, and she gambled on the probability that her blows at Verdun would dispose of France. In addition, she reckoned the Austrian attack upon Italy would dispose of Italian threats for the summer.

But long before the war Bernhardi had foretold a German defeat in her next conflict if all her foes were able to get their forces into the field at one time, and Germany should fail to dispose of at least one of her enemies before all were ready. It is not the time or the place to assert that what Bernhardi forecast has now come true, but it is clear that Germany, temporarily or permanently, as it may prove, lost the initiative following her defeat at Verdun, that she was compelled to accept the defensive on all fronts by July, and that up to the date this article is written, August 8, she has been losing ground on all fronts.

THE RUSSIAN ATTACK

Very briefly, now, in the remaining space allowed me, I purpose to discuss the remarkable change in the whole face of the war that had come by the second anniversary of the outbreak of the conflict. The first authentic sign of this change was the great Russian success in Volhynia and Galicia about June 1, 1916. (Vol. IX, 2642.) As far back as February Russian successes in Asia Minor had suggested that the Russian army was regaining



THE RUSSIAN SPRING OFFENSIVE, 1916

Shaded section shows ground gained, June to September

power and receiving adequate munitions. The captures of Erzerum and Trebizond were a warning that deserved, but did not earn, attention in Berlin and the British failure and surrender at Kut-el-Amara served to obscure the Eastern situation. (Vol. IX, 2806-2814.)

But about June 1, 1916, Russia suddenly stepped out and assailed the whole Austro-German line with fire and steel. The weight of the blow fell between the Pripet Marshes and the Rumanian frontier. From this front Germany had drawn many troops to aid in her Verdun operation, Austria had made similar drafts to swell her forces attacking Italy. Too late Berlin and Vienna realized that they had weakened their line beyond the danger point and had hopelessly underestimated the recuperative power of the Slav.

By July 1, 1916, the magnitude of the Russian success was no longer hidden from German or Austrian. An advance of over forty miles in the north threatened Kovel and Lemberg, twice as extensive an advance in the south had reconquered Bukowina (Vol. IX, 2650-2670), brought Cossacks to the Carpathians, and threatened Lemberg from the south. (Vol. IX, 2680-2686.) Lutsk (Vol. IX, 2647), Dubno (Vol. IX, 2651), and Czernowitz (Vol. IX, 2650) had been taken, Kolomea and Stanislau were threatened and were soon to fall. Upward of 400,000 prisoners were claimed by the Russians, whose estimates of prisoners had hitherto proven reliable; guns, supplies, munitions had been captured in incredible amounts, and an Austrian collapse like to that of Lemberg seemed at hand.

In this situation Germany, seemingly on the point of taking Verdun, had to turn her attention toward the east and direct new troops and new reserves of munitions and guns to Volhynia and Galicia to save Lemberg. (Vol. IX, 2686.) This effort was temporarily successful, and July saw the Russian sweep slowing down, although by no means halted. (Vol. IX, 2695-2700.) Since the German victory at the Dunajec there had been no such single success, and save for the Russian victory at Lemberg, the Allies had won no such offensive victory.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

But on July 1, 1916, just as the Russian drive was slowing down and while Germany was straining every nerve to meet the eastern crisis, the French and British along the Somme suddenly broke out in a terrific attack over twenty miles of front. (Vol. X, 2918.) The French rapidly approached Péronne, the British more slowly by steadily moving toward Bapaume. Here was the answer to the German assertion that Verdun had exhausted France and made an allied offensive in the west impossible. It was as complete a refutation of reckonings for the west as the Russian victory had been of the German calculations for the east.

And after six weeks the Somme drive is continuing, slowly, but steadily, actually recalling in every detail the slow but steady advance of the Germans before Verdun. (Vol. X, 2916-2951.) Meantime about Verdun itself a new operation has begun, the Germans have been forced to recall troops to use at the Somme and the French, passing to the offensive, have temporarily, at least, retaken much ground and abolished the grave danger that existed on July 1, 1915, when they stood in their last ditch, with the river at their backs.

GORIZIA

The Russian blow had fallen in the first days of June, 1916; the Anglo-French attack had opened in the early days of July, 1916; now, in the first week of August, 1916, Italy suddenly launched against the Gorizia bridgehead, the gateway into Austria between the sea and the Julian Alps, which recalls in a grandiose fashion the Spartan position at Thermopylæ, the most considerable and the most successful military effort in modern Italian history.

On a front of thirty miles from the Alps to the Adriatic, their flanks secured by the mountains and the sea, the Austrians had erected a formidable system of trenches which closed the Italian road to Austria and to Trieste, twenty miles to the south. (Vol. IX, 2777-2778.) Monte Sabotino on the north, Podgora Hill in the

AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS, MAY TO SEPTEMBER, 1916

Lined section shows ground gained by the Austrians in May and June, 1916
Dotted section shows ground gained by Italians in August, 1916

center, Monte San Michele on the south at the edge of the Carso Plateau were the main features of this position, and Gorizia lay in the cuplike valley of the Wippach behind Podgora.

After some days of bombardment, first directed at the whole front and then concentrated upon Sabotino and San Michele, the Italians swept forward, took both hills, turned the Austrians out of Podgora and Gorizia, took 15,000 prisoners and a vast booty of guns and munitions. They had completed the first phase of their task by August 7, 1916. It remained to be seen—and it remains to be seen now on August 15, 1916, when these lines are written—whether they will get Trieste and force the Austrians back from the whole position between the Adriatic and the Alps. If they do, then an invasion of Austria on a wide front will be inevitable; if they fail, they will have won a great local victory and made a new draft upon Austrian man power.

Finally, in the Balkans a great Anglo-French-Serb army is standing before Saloniki (Vol. IX, 2700-2703), only waiting until Germany shall have recalled her troops from the Peninsula and Austria summoned back her contingents to strike the Bulgarians and strive to reopen the road from the Ægean to Belgrade, thus cutting the railroad that binds Berlin to Byzantium and the Osmanli to the Teuton. Similarly the victorious Russians have passed Erzingan in Asia Minor (Vol. IX, 2825), completed the conquest of Armenia, and are pushing on toward Sivas and the Bagdad railroad. (Vol. IX, 2823-2827.)

AS THE THIRD YEAR BEGINS

For the first time since the war broke out Germany and her allies are everywhere on the defensive, and everywhere they have been and are ceding ground. Their enemies, imperfectly prepared two years ago, are now the rivals of Germany in preparation; England has millions of men where she had hundreds of thousands in August, 1914; France and Britain both have heavy artillery, and Russia is demonstrating her wealth of munitions and her resources in men. Such is the great transition that has come as the third year of the Great War begins.

Conceivably, Germany may still be able to forge a new thunderbolt, to pass to the offensive again, and win the war; conceivably she can hold her present lines until the fury of the Allies abates and losses and economic strain impose a drawn battle and a peace without victory for any contestant. But all these considerations are for the future. What it is now important to recognize is that the three great efforts of Germany to win the war in the Napoleonic fashion have failed. She has had neither an Austerlitz, a Jena, nor a Friedland. She has instead the Marne, Verdun, and the Russian failure. She has failed to eliminate any one of her great foes as Napoleon eliminated, first Austria, then Prussia, and then Russia. She has failed to win the war while she had superior numbers, incomparably greater resources in equipment, and unrivaled supremacy in artillery. She is outnumbered, outgunned, and her foes control the sea and possess vastly greater resources in money than she can boast.

The parallel of Napoleon before Leipzig, of the Confederacy after Gettysburg, is in many men's minds to-day. But it is for the future to disclose whether the parallel be true or false. What is clear as the third year of the war opens is that all three of Germany's major conceptions have gone wrong; all three of her great campaigns have failed to accomplish their main purpose, and that, as a consequence, Germany is now on the defensive on all fronts for the first time in the war.

A moment ago I mentioned Bernhardi's words. Perhaps they will serve as the best comment with which to close this review. The quotation is from his book, "On War of To-day":

"If at some future time Germany is involved in the slowly threatening war, she need not recoil before the numerical superiority of her enemies. But so far as human nature is able to tell, she can only rely on being successful if she is resolutely determined to break the superiority of her enemies by a victory over one or the other of them before their total strength can come into action, and if she prepares for war to that effect, and acts at the decisive moment in *that* spirit which made the great Prussian king once seize the sword against a world in arms."

CHRONOLOGY OF THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR, 1915

EVENTS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

August 9. British regain ground lost at Hooge on July 30.
August 22. French capture three important peaks in the Vosges region, after continuous assaults lasting for over a month.
August 31. Germans claim recovery of ground in the Vosges.
September 8. German forces under the crown prince make a violent attack on the French in the Argonne region, gaining considerable ground.
September 14-25. French and English forces carry out important offensive in Champagne and around Lens, taking about fifty square miles of ground, and capturing about 25,000 prisoners and many guns.
September 30. French capture Hill 191 in Champagne.
October 16-17. Germans make unsuccessful attack on Belgian line.
December 23. Germans gain some ground in the Vosges at Hartmannsweilerkopf.
December 26. Increased activities by French artillery in the districts south of Bailleul and south of Arras.
December 29. Struggle between French and German forces in the Vosges continues. Notable actions between the Fecht and Thur regions, fighting at Hartmannsweilerkopf somewhat favors the French. French gains at Rehfelzen and Hirzstein in the same region.

CAMPAIGNS ON THE EASTERN FRONT

August 6. German troops occupy Warsaw. The Russian forces withdraw without serious defense.
August 16. Germans capture Kovno, the northernmost Russian fortress on the second line of defense. They capture more than 400 cannon.
August 19. Novo Georgievsk is taken by the Germans with 85,000 prisoners, 700 cannon, and a great quantity of munitions.
August 22. The fortress of Ossoviec on the Bobr River was taken by the Germans. German forces advance across the border of Russo-Poland into the province of Grodno in Russia.
August 25. Brest-Litovsk is occupied by German forces. Germans also withdraw from Bialystok.
September 1. Russian fortress of Lutsk near the Galician border is captured by Austro-German troops.
September 2. The fortress of Grodno, the last of the fortified points in Poland, is evacuated by the Russians.
September 3. General Alexief is appointed chief of the Russian General Staff, and General Russky is given command of the armies in the north.

September 7. The czar takes active command of the Russian armies, transferring Grand Duke Nicholas to the army in the Caucasus.
September 8. Russian lines claim a victory over Austro-Germans at Trembolla in East Galicia. The fortress of Dubno is captured by the Austro-German armies.
September 14. The army of General von Hindenburg reaches the Grodno-Petrograd railroad between Vilna and Dvinsk.
September 15. German forces reach Pinsk in Poland.
September 18. Germans capture Vilna.
September 24. German offensive meets with reverses especially at Lutsk, which is recaptured by the Russians.
September 27. Austro-German forces recover Lutsk.
October 2. German offensive slackens and Russian resistance stiffens.
October 4. German armies assume the offensive in many sections.
October 12. Austro-Germans in Galicia are forced back across the Strypa River.
October 22. Russians claim capture of 15,000 Austrian and German prisoners, chiefly in eastern Galicia.
November 6. Russian reports claim 500 Austrian and German prisoners in a surprise attack on the Strypa River in eastern Galicia.
November 12. The offensive on the eastern front passes to the Russians. The Germans apparently have abandoned temporarily efforts to reach Riga and Dvinsk.
December 27. Heavy fighting along the Dniester River in Galicia. Austrian reports claim severe losses for the Russians.
December 29. Battles in East Galicia increase in violence. Austrian reports claim severe Russian losses.
December 31. Russians claim successful advance across the Styr River near Czartorysk. Russian successes are also claimed on the Strypa.

EVENTS IN THE BALKANS

September 20. Bulgarian army is ordered mobilized "in the interest of armed neutrality."
September 23. King Constantine orders a general mobilization of the Greek army.
October 4. British and French troops land at Greece.
October 7. Austro-German armies begin an invasion of Serbia.
October 9. Belgrade is occupied by Austro-German forces.
October 10. Serbian reports declare the repulse of the right wing of the Austro-German armies.
October 11. Bulgarian armies cross the border into Serbia, and Bulgaria formally becomes an ally of the Central Powers.
October 12. Austro-German forces capture city of Semendria.
October 19. Italy declares war upon Bulgaria. The capital of Serbia is transferred from Nish to Prisrend. The Bulgarian invading forces reach Vranya.
October 21. The coast of Bulgaria is bombarded by French, Russian and British warships.
October 24. Bulgarian forces capture Uskub.
October 26. German invasion of Serbia progresses fifty miles southward.
October 27. Austro-German and Bulgarian armies meet in northeastern Serbia.

November 1. German forces capture Kraguyevatz, the principal Serbian arsenal.
November 6. Bulgarian forces capture Nish.
November 9. French expedition in southern Serbia engages the Bulgarian forces around Beles.
November 19. Four-fifths of Serbia is occupied by the invading Austro-German and Bulgarian armies.
November 22. English and French troops land at Saloniki.
November 28. German war office announces the completion of the campaign in Serbia.
November 29. Austrian forces invade Montenegro from the north and west. Bulgarian forces capture 16,000 Serbians in an engagement at Prisrend.
December 2. Bulgarians occupy Monastir in southern Serbia.
December 14. Bulgarian reports claim that the entire Serbian and Anglo-French army have been driven out of Serbia.
December 23. Montenegrins defeat Austrians at Lepenacy, inflicting a loss of over 2,000. The Serbians under General Stephanovich numbering about 64,000 in Albania.
December 26. Additional successes by Montenegrins in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar.
December 27. German forces withdraw from Greek territory and strengthen defenses along the Macedonian frontier.
December 30. British troops land at Arphonos, sixty miles east of Saloniki.
December 31. Montenegrins win success near Rozai, repulsing Austrian attacks.

CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

November 19. British expeditionary force in Mesopotamia reaches Ctesiphon within eighteen miles of Bagdad, but is obliged to turn back.
December 4. British statement admits the defeat and retirement of the British expedition in Mesopotamia.
December 25. British forces at Kut-el-Amara heavily bombarded by Turks who secure a foothold, but are repulsed.
December 27. Turkish reports claim a supporting force of British driven away from Kut-el-Amara.
December 30. British force at Kut-el-Amara continues to hold its own against the Turks.

RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN

December 25. Russians claim a victory over Turko-German forces in the Caucasus.

OPERATIONS IN GALLIPOLI

August 11. British reports claim considerable ground gained by Australian and New Zealand troops.
September 20. Severe fighting on the Peninsula, in which both sides suffer great losses.
November 2. Sickness among British troops in Peninsula according to a statement of the House of Commons has required the removal of 78,000 officers and men. British submarine *E-20* sunk by Turks while operating in the Dardanelles.

December 20. Announcement made of the withdrawal of the Allied forces from the Suvla and Anzac regions on the Peninsula.

AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

August 15-November 2. Austrians began four offensives along the Isonzo front.

November 20-25. Heights behind Gorizia are bombarded. Several important slopes are captured.

CAMPAIGN IN AFRICA

October 22. Baranda, Kameruns, captured by the Franco-British forces.

November 23. British forces reach the Pugu River, and a French force occupies Makando.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

August 8. A German squadron is repulsed while attempting to threaten Riga.

October 22. City of Varna on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast is bombarded by the Russians.

November 17. Twenty-five British submarines pass from the North Sea into the Baltic.

December 30. Italian battleships defeat Austrian squadrons off Durazzo, Albania.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

August 1-31. Forty British and Allied merchantmen and six neutral ships are sunk in the war zone with a loss of sixty-three lives. Among the vessels sunk was the *Arabic* on August 19.

September 1-30. Thirty-one British and Allied merchantmen sunk in the war zone and the Mediterranean with a loss of thirty lives.

October 1-31. Thirty-one British and Allied merchantmen sunk in the Mediterranean and in the war zone.

November 1-30. Twenty-one Allied and neutral merchantmen, including the Italian steamer *Ancona* sunk by Austro-German submarines in the Mediterranean.

December 1-31. Twenty-seven Allied and neutral vessels sunk in the Mediterranean by Austro-German submarines.

WAR IN THE AIR

August 9. German airships make a night attack on the east coast of England. One man and thirteen women and children killed. British reports claim a Zeppelin destroyed.

August 17. A third German airship raid causes the death of ten persons near London.

August 26. The British naval aviator, A. W. Bigsworth, is declared to have destroyed a German submarine with bombs near Ostend.

August 28. A raid of six German aeroplanes checked by French aviators and one of the German machines is destroyed.

August 31. Alphonse Pégoud, a famous French aviator, is killed in an air duel with a German aviator.

September 8. German Zeppelin drops bombs in the heart of London. More than thirty persons being killed.
September 13. German airships make a sixth raid on the east coast of England. Rear Admiral Sir Percy Scott is placed in the defenses of London against airship attacks.
September 22. French aviators throw bombs on the palace and railway stations of Stuttgart, the capital of Württemberg.
October 13. A raid of Zeppelin airships over London and the eastern counties results in the killing of forty-one civilians, and fourteen persons connected with the military. The injured numbered 114.
October 24. Austrian aeroplanes throw bombs on Venice, damaging a church and destroying frescoes made by the artist Tiepolo.
November 14. Austrian aviators drop bombs on Verona, Italy, killing sixty persons.
November 15. Austrian aviators bombard Brescia, killing seven persons.
November 16-December 31. Continued activity along all fronts by airship squadrons.

POLITICAL HAPPENINGS

August 20. Italy declares war on Turkey.
August 21. Venizelos again becomes Premier of Greece.
September 2. The Rumanian Government places an embargo on gold and cereals.
October 4. Russia sends an ultimatum to Bulgaria.
October 5. Venizelos resigns as premier, on account of the refusal of King Constantine to adhere to the treaty with Serbia.
October 25. A new French cabinet is formed, with M. Briand as Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
November 6. M. Skouloudis forms new Greek cabinet.
November 30. Italy signs the "no separate peace" compact with the Allies.
December 9. The German chancellor announces in the Reichstag that Germany is ready for peace "if compatible with Germany's dignity and safety."
December 21. German Reichstag votes a war credit of $2,500,000,000.

WESTERN FRONT, 1916

January 2. A heavy French bombardment carried on in the Champagne district along the Forest of Malmaison and south of Roye. Germans bombard Nancy with long-range guns. In the Vosges there is spirited fighting about Mühlbach. Germans capture another trench at Hartmannsweilerkopf.
January 3. The Germans capture several allied trenches in the Artois region, following mining operations. French capture several German trenches in Argonne.
January 5. Heavy allied bombardment at Flanders, Artois, Champagne, and the Vosges.
January 8. Effective allied bombardment at Arras, Berry-au-Bac, and near St. Mihiél. German bombardment of Nancy with heavy guns.
January 9. French withdraw from Hirzstein, in the Vosges with a loss of over 1,000 men.

January 10. Germans carry on a determined assault of the Champagne region covering a five-mile front east of Tahure. Four attacks are halted by French artillery fire.

January 11. German offensive continues in the Champagne district. French claim large losses among the German forces. Germans claim gain of 100 yards of French advance trenches. Allied artillery active between the Aure and the Oise Rivers.

January 13. Germans make two surprise attacks, one a continuation of the Champagne attack, and the other between the Oise and the Somme Rivers. Both attacks were repulsed.

January 23. German gains held Neuville-St. Vaast, north of Arras, following mine explosions and bombardments. Germans capture 250 yards of French trench, but are driven out by counterattacks. They regain 200 yards forming a salient of the French line.

January 24. Severe German bombardment near Nieuport. Allied curtain of fire prevents infantry operations. Minor German attacks in the Artois and Champagne districts.

January 25. French claim recapture of lost trenches in the neighborhood of Nieuport. Germans shell and destroy Nieuport Cathedral, which they claim was used by the French as a post.

January 26. German activities in the Artois district, near the Neuville-St. Vaast. Germans occupy several mine craters. French unsuccessful in attempt to regain ground lost in this section.

February 3. Increased artillery activity near the Franco-Belgian border.

February 7. French carry on intense artillery engagements in Belgium, and in the Arras, Oise, and Somme sectors.

February 9. Germans carry over 850 yards of French trenches north of Arras and west of Vimy, taking over one hundred prisoners and several machine guns. French claim a recapture of several points.

February 9. French claim recapture of important trenches at Frise.

February 10. Fighting in the Vimy sector, north of Arras, continues with great intensity. Germans making vigorous attack on Hill 140. Belfort is bombarded by long-range German guns.

February 11. Germans claim failure of four French attacks to recapture trenches northwest of Vimy. French claim the capture of Butte-du-Mesnil.

February 12. French claim further capture of Butte-du-Mesnil, and the capture of 300 yards of German trenches.

February 13. Germans make attacks along the entire line from Belgium to the Vosges, but chiefly in the Champagne district and in the Vimy sector north of Arras. Germans claim gain south of Ste. Marie-à-Py in the Champagne district, where 700 yards of French positions are said to have been taken.

February 15. French offensive shifted to the sector south of Ypres where nearly half a mile of British trenches are taken with many prisoners.

February 16. Severe fighting continues at Tahure and Champagne. French claim recapture of trenches near this place.

February 17. Heavy French bombardment in the Steenstraete and Boesinghe regions in Belgium; also along the Aisne and north of Soissons. French occupy a German mine crater in Artois, on the road to Lille.

February 18. Germans report failure of British attempts to regain lost ground south of Ypres. Determined German attacks north of Largitzen.

February 20. Germans attempt to cross Yser Canal near Steenstraete. A gain of 385 yards is made, but French succeed in driving Germans from the captured trenches.

February 22. The Germans make considerable gains in the Forest of Givenchy in the Artois, gaining 385 meters of front-line trenches, and at Bravant-sur-Meuse, where front-line trenches were also taken.

February 23. German army under the command of the crown prince is reported to be in possession of six and one-fourth miles of French trenches with a depth of one mile and seven-eighths at Verdun. Over 3,000 French prisoners are said to have been taken.

February 24. Great German drive at Verdun continues with great losses. Several outlying positions are captured. Beaumont resists repeated attack.

February 25. The Germans unsuccessfully attack Champneuville, and advance south of Samogneux, but are obliged to halt by the hills of Côte de Talu, to the east of the Champneuville, and by the Louvemont ridge, north of the town of that name. German reports claim 10,000 prisoners, while the French claim German losses of 150,000. The French made several counterattacks in the sector and also in Champagne and in the Artois.

February 26. The capture of Fort Douaumont, the northeastern corner of the Verdun offensive, is officially announced. The Germans capture also several positions along the hills of Louvemont.

February 27. Germans report five French attempts to regain the fortress of Louvemont, all of which were repulsed with heavy losses. The village of the same name is still held by the French. Champneuville is taken by the Germans. Along the entire front there is intense mine and artillery activity. A heavy artillery duel went on at Hartmannsweilerkopf. The Germans claim the repulse of a British attack south of Ypres. The British line in the west is extended several miles to close up gaps in the French line from which support has been sent to Verdun.

February 28. German attacks at Verdun shift to the southeast and west. A desperate effort was made on the east to pierce the Eix-Chatillon railroad, east of Moranville. The railway changes hands several times, but finally remains in the possession of the French. Other German attacks are claimed by the French to have been repulsed. The Germans begin a new attack in the Champagne region, thirty miles west of Verdun. Gain is made of a mile of French trenches, with 1,000 prisoners north of Suain.

February 29. German attacks continue south and southeast of Verdun. Several small positions are taken. According to German reports 1,680 prisoners and seventy-eight cannon were captured.

March 1. German attacks north of Verdun diminish in intensity. Comparative quiet reigned in the Woevre district in the east. Artillery fire of considerable force is reported in the valleys of the Fecht and the Doller in Alsace.

March 2. The Germans renew assaults in the Woevre district. An attack upon Fresne is repulsed. Attempts are made in a new center between Malancourt and the loop of the Meuse around Le Mort Homme, and the Côte de l'Oise. Spirited artillery actions are carried all along the Yser front.

March 3. Germans capture village of Douaumont suffering great loss. To the east of this an unsuccessful attack was made upon Vaux. Minor French successes are reported in Alsace. Bombardment continues in the Yser region. French battle fiercely for the recovery of Douaumont. French claim the checking of a German movement east of Pepper Hill. Fighting near Ypres comes to a standstill. Germans claim to retain possession of the positions gained there early in February.

March 5. Two German attacks, one near Douaumont, the other east of Vacherauville are reported by French to be unsuccessful. Heavy artillery action continues in the Argonne and Woevre.

March 6. The first German attack is made against Verdun from the northwest on a front between Béthincourt, and Forges, in an attempt to take Forges and Goose Hill. The former is taken but the heights beyond it are not captured.

March 7. Germans make attempts on both flanks of Verdun capturing the village of Fresne, in the east, and gaining footholds on both sides of Goose Hill and to the west of Meuse. The French continue to hold the summit at Goose Hill, the village of Béthincourt, and the woods east of Crow Wood, and Bois de Cumières. The Germans capture Hill 265 with a force of 12,000 men. Attacks east of the Meuse are repulsed by the French.

March 8. The Allies claim that the French have checked the German progress west of the Meuse, and have recovered most of the Bois des Corbeaux. Germans claim gains between Dead Man's Hill and Goose Hill, and capture Hardaumont. The bombardment of Douaumont is renewed. Heavy artillery fire continues in the Woevre and Argonne districts. Additional French gains are reported in Alsace.

March 30. After a lull of twelve days activities are recommenced at Douaumont. The French claim repulse of German attacks at that place and in the Avocourt Wood. Germans gain in the region of Chaulnes, but are reported repulsed by the French.

March 31. The village of Malancourt on the west bank of the Meuse is evacuated by the French after a terrific artillery fire and infantry attacks. The Germans unsuccessfully attack in the neighborhood of Dead Man's Hill. An attack south of Somme in the Dompierre region also fails.

April 1. The German attack at Verdun shifted to the village of Vaux southeast of Douaumont. French troops are driven out of the village. German attacks on the British positions at St. Eloi are reported to have failed.

April 2. Germans advance in determined attacks on the line between Vaux and Douaumont. Ground is gained, but French claim this to have been recovered.

April 3. Battle for the possession of Vaux continues. The French gain slightly on the ground taken by the Germans.

April 4. An elaborate German attempt to pierce through the French line in Douaumont fails. Mass attacks south of the village are reported repulsed. Heavy artillery fighting is reported north of the Aisne and in the Argonne. French claim failure of a German attack on Haucourt west of the Meuse.

April 5. German attack at Verdun shifted to the west of the Meuse. Village of Haucourt is captured, but Germans fail to take Béthincourt.

French advance to the west of this offensive, capturing part of the woods north of Avocourt. In the Douaumont-Vaux sector the French gain 220 yards in a 550-yard front. Germans make another attack upon the British trenches at St. Eloi, but fail to make progress.

April 7. Germans attack French positions on a mile and a quarter front south and southeast of Haucourt. French reports claim failure of the operation. French gains are claimed between Béthincourt and Hill 265. German reports claim capture of British trenches south of St. Eloi, and following a repulse of the Canadian defenders.

April 8. Germans capture two small works between Haucourt and Hill 287 immediately to the south.

April 9. French are forced to yield advance positions at Béthincourt under pressure of the German salient at Haucourt. French claim successful resistance of the new line to determined attacks by the Germans.

April 10. Germans continue to attack the new French line, especially at Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304.

April 11. German attacks continue with great violence alternately at Dead Man's Hill and east of the Meuse, later east of the Douaumont-Vaux front. French claim no permanent gain. Germans, however, claim large gains in both operations.

April 12. German attacks on Hill 304 prevented by French curtain of fire.

April 15. Germans claim repulse of French offensive west of the Meuse.

April 16. The French offensive east of the Meuse results in a gain of several German trenches.

April 17. Two divisions of German troops on the east bank of the Meuse attack the French line at Douaumont and gain several small positions. Germans gain foothold in the Chafour Woods, west of Douaumont village.

April 19. German offensive around Verdun shifted toward extreme southeast centering about Les Eparges. Three successive attacks on the heights of the Meuse are made. The third "wave" penetrates the French trenches to a depth of 200 yards, but the French reports claim that the Germans are unable to hold this advantage.

April 20. The Germans deliver a powerful attack west of Vaux, and southwest of Douaumont, gaining a footing on the front of 2,200 yards of French trenches. French reports claim that Germans were driven out during the night. French made several attacks on Dead Man's Hill and Pepper Hill regions, making small gains.

April 21. German forces made three night attacks in the Verdun region at Dead Man's Hill, north of the Caurettes Woods, and on the Vaux sector. All these attacks were checked. The British reoccupy about one-third of the trenches captured from them in the St. Eloi District.

April 22. Germans make two strong attacks, between Dead Man's Hill and Hill 304, but the French claim a repulse.

April 23. French make an attack east of Haucourt, and northwest of Caurettes Wood.

April 24. Germany entirely closes the Swiss frontier, refusing even mails to pass across the border.

April 25. French captured at Verdun a portion of woodland section of the Buttes Wood. Germans attack Chapelotte in Lorraine, and according to French reports are repulsed.

April 26. Germans make an unsuccessful attack on the Senones sector in Lorraine.

April 27. The main German attack shifts to the British frontier, where for twenty-four hours, infantry, artillery, mining, and aerial attacks are carried on.

April 28. Bombardment at Verdun is resumed by the Germans east of the Meuse, between Pepper Hill and Douaumont. A contingent of Russian troops at Marseilles.

April 29. Germans made three attacks in the Verdun region. One of these was east of the river, where artillery, liquid fire, and fire curtains were employed. French claim that all these attacks were repulsed. Minor engagements are reported in Lorraine, and in the Vosges.

April 30. The Germans make four powerful attacks in close formation against French positions west of the Meuse. French claim that all were repulsed with enormous losses to the Germans.

May 1. French launch offensive east of Douaumont. A gain of 550 yards of front-line trench is claimed.

May 3. French continue counteroffensive at Dead Man's Hill in the Verdun district. Further gains are claimed and the capture of 100 prisoners. Germans claim a successful attack north of Dixmude. French continue to hold and consolidate positions captured at Dead Man's Hill, under a violent bombardment by the French. There is French offensive in the Cheppy Woods, in the Argonne, and a German attack on British lines at Monchy.

May 5. Germans continue to bombard Hill 304 district, and the Avocourt and Caurettes Woods. A bombardment of less power is maintained east of the Meuse.

May 6. Germans continue attacks on Hill 304. A gain of a few French trenches is claimed. French occupy a German trench near Fort Douaumont.

May 7. Germans make further gains at Hill 304. These include trenches on the east slope. German reports claim a failure of French attacks at Thiaumont, east of the Meuse. Artillery activities are reported on the British front.

May 8. The attack on Hill 304 shifts to the west, in a sharp assault on Hill 287, a portion of which was already in the hands of the Germans. French reports claim this attack was halted. Germans claim that the crest was reached, and all positions held. German attack in the region of Dixmude is checked by the Belgians.

May 9. French reports claim the repulse of three German attacks of great violence on Hill 304 and its immediate neighborhood.

May 10. Another heavy attack by the Germans on Hill 304 is claimed to have been frustrated by the French defense.

May 11. German offensive is resumed at Vaux Pond, west of the village by that name. French claim repulse of this attack. French offensive at Dead Man's Hill and southeast of Hill 304 are claimed to have been broken down by artillery fire. On the British front there is a severe bombardment in the region of the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

May 12. Germans capture 500 yards of British trenches of which only a portion is gained by counterattacks. The Germans claim to have repulsed an attack by the British upon their positions at La Fille Morte in the Argonne. French claim to have gained ground southeast

of Haucourt and Verdun, and the repulse of a German attack southeast of Fort Douaumont.

May 13. Two attacks were made by Germans for the Avocourt Wood, and Hill 304 in the night.

May 14. A strong German attack is made on the British lines north of Armentières near Ploegsteert Woods.

May 15. French by a sudden attack capture 220 yards of German trenches on the heights of the Meuse. A German trench is captured south of the Somme. A British counterattack on Hulluch is reported to have been repulsed by the Germans.

May 16. British capture 250 yards of front line trenches near Vimy and Artois. Germans claim that the French suffer heavy loss by an attack on Hill 304.

May 18. French recover ground near Hill 327, but are repulsed near Hill 304. Germans inflict heavy losses on British forces at Steenstraete.

May 19. Germans gain west of the Meuse, occupying French positions along the Haucourt-Essnes road.

May 20. French recover a mine crater at the Vimy Ridge from the Germans.

May 21. Germans capture a mile of French positions near Givenchy-en-Gobelle.

May 22. The French succeed in recapturing all except the northern part of Fort Douaumont. They also take trenches along Dead Man's Hill and several positions on the heights of the Meuse.

May 24. Germans capture the village of Cumières northwest of Verdun. German reports also claim the recapture of Fort Douaumont.

May 24. Germans claim small gains in the Loos salient.

May 25. Germans recapture Fort Douaumont. They also win ground in the village of Cumières, and on both banks of the Meuse.

May 26. German attacks on the French trenches south of Fort Douaumont are repulsed.

May 27. French regain Cumières and repulse German attacks near Douai. British claim the failure of German attacks in the Champagne district.

May 29. French claim the repulse of two heavy German attacks on Hill 304 and Cumières.

May 30. It is reported that reenforcements are being brought from the eastern battle line to Verdun. Germans claim gains along the front from Le Mort Homme to Cumières.

May 31. German troops succeed in surrounding Le Mort Homme. Germans claim to have penetrated nearly to Chattancourt.

June 1. French win over 400 yards of German trenches southeast of Le Mort Homme. French are obliged to yield to German attacks east of the Meuse, and lose a number of first line trenches between Fort Douaumont and Vaux Pond.

June 2. Germans gain a foothold on Damloup, but are unsuccessful in an effort to capture Fort Vaux.

June 3. Germans claim successful storm of ridges near Ypres and the capture of an English general and 350 men.

June 4. German attack on Fort Vaux is halted by the French who also defeat an attempt to turn the position from the southeast. Germans claim the capture of 500 French troops between Damloup and the Caillette Wood.

June 5. Germans claim the repulse of French attacks on the Fumin Ridge, southwest of Vaux.

June 6. Germans storm British lines east of Ypres, winning first-line trenches at Hooge. They are dislodged by counterattacks.

June 7. German reports claim the capture of Fort Vaux. The village of Hooge is occupied by Germans after the capture of a line of British trenches.

June 8. French admit the loss of Fort Vaux. British claim successful attack on trenches south of La Bassée Canal. Germans claim the capture of 500 French prisoners in the Fumin Wood, southwest of Douaumont.

June 11. Germans make an unsuccessful attack on Hill 304.

June 12. German attacks on the right bank of the Meuse are halted by French infantry.

June 13. Canadian troops after fierce fighting regain position lost earlier in the month at Hill 60 near Ypres.

June 14. Germans capture British positions southeast of Zillebeeke in the Ypres sector.

June 15. French capture a trench on Dead Man's Hill.

June 16. Two German attacks at Thiaumont and Boise de la Caillette are repulsed. Germans also fail to recapture ground lost on Dead Man's Hill.

June 19. German attacks on French positions north of Hill 321 are checked. Germans claim repulse of French attacks in Thiaumont Wood.

June 23. Germans capture Thiaumont after a series of terrific assaults. They continue to the village of Fleury, but are dislodged by the French and are compelled to retreat.

June 24. French in a counterattack drive Germans from Hill 320 and 321 as far as the Thiaumont field work.

June 26. The British begin a new offensive on the western front, and penetrate the enemies' line in ten places. Severe artillery activities are carried on in the Loos sector.

June 27. French claim small gains in the Thiaumont sectors.

June 28. The British attacks on German front in Flanders increase in force. German counterattacks are repulsed.

June 29. Bombardment continues on both sides. British patrols make raids along the front in Flanders in northern France.

June 30. French retake Thiaumont. It is recaptured by the Germans, but again retaken by the French. British pierce the German line near Neuve Chapelle. Germans retake Thiaumount.

July 1. French recapture Thiaumount. French and English forces begin a great offensive on both sides of the Somme, along a front of twenty-five miles, following a terrific bombardment of the German lines. Several villages and positions are taken from the Germans together with over 5,000 prisoners.

July 2. British offensive captures Theicourt and Curlu villages, taking 10,000 German prisoners.

July 3. Allies continue to advance in the Somme region, capturing a number of villages and a number of prisoners. French lines reach three miles from Péronne. British capture La Boisselle, with 4,300 prisoners.

July 4. French continue toward Péronne, capturing two lines of de-

fense and attacking a third. British offense is halted. Germans recapture Thiaumont after six assaults. French capture German second-line positions south of the Somme on a six-mile front.

July 6. German counteroffensive fails to retake ground won by the French in the Somme region. Allied troops resume the advance.

July 7. British take trenches at three points in the Somme sector. French capture German trenches east of La Boisselle.

July 8. British and French advance half a mile along the Somme, capturing some German trenches. The village of Hardecourt is captured by the French.

July 9. French capture two and one-half miles of German trenches east of Flacourt, and reach a point five-eighths of a mile from Péronne. Germans fail to retake the Trônes Wood captured several days previous.

July 10. British gain a foothold in the Mametz Wood. German bombardment of positions at Verdun continues. French occupy Hill 97 near Péronne.

July 11. Germans make small gains around Verdun gaining a foothold in the Damloup battery. Allies capture the whole of the Trônes Wood. Germans drive the British from several positions in the Mametz Wood.

July 12. German forces press close to Souville, on the right bank of the Meuse, capturing over 2,000 French prisoners. British regain ground lost in the Mametz Wood.

July 14. British forces sweep on along the Somme, capturing several important German second positions.

July 15. British drive continues, bringing the advance up to the third German lines.

July 16. French gain ground north of the Aisne, and near Verdun. The Anglo-French drive brings the Allied troops to six miles from Conveles, the German headquarters at the beginning.

July 17. Allied drive along the Somme continues to succeed. British capture 1,500 yards of German second-line trenches.

July 18. Fierce fighting in the region of Longueval salient northwest of Combes. French drive the Germans from several positions south of the Somme.

July 19. Germans by a counteroffensive gain a foothold in the Longueval. They are later driven out by British troops.

July 23. British capture works around Pozières.

July 24. British forces occupy a part of Pozières.

July 26. Allies complete occupation of Pozières.

July 31. Continued British gains in Somme region.

EASTERN FRONT

January 1. Russians capture heights above Czernowitz, and repulse a German counterdrive in Tarnopol. Russian advance threatens Kovel, Volhynia.

January 2. Russians continue to advance beyond the Strypa River.

January 3. Russians claim the failure of German attempts to cross the Dvina River.

January 4. Russians take over 1,000 prisoners north of Czernowitz.

January 5. Russians retire their base from Czernowitz toward Kolomea. Russian reports claim fortifications about Czernowitz captured.

January 6. Severe bombardment of Austrian positions at Czernowitz. Czartorysk and the heights beyond are captured by the Russians.
January 7. Russians claim repulse of Austrian attacks along the middle Strypa.
January 8. Austrian attempts to recapture Czartorysk fail. Russians hold over thirty miles of the east bank of the Strypa.
January 14. German reports claim the halting of the Russian attack north of Czernowitz.
January 18. New Russian offensive starts in Bessarabia, east of Czernowitz. Heavy fighting on the Bessarabian front.
February 8. General von Hindenburg renews attack on Dvinsk.
February 9. Russians begin new offensive in Volhynia and in eastern Galicia.
Ferbuary 17. Russians claim repulse of German attacks on the Dvina River between Jacobstadt and Dvinsk.
February 27. Russian activities on the Riga front. Austrians are repulsed on the middle Strypa.
March 2. Austro-German activities in Volhynia.
March 4. Renewed activity along the entire Russian front. Minor successes are claimed by Russians.
March 22. Russians penetrate the German line at Jacobstadt. Russian reports claim a repulse of Austro-German attacks in Galicia.
March 23. Russians advance in the Dvinsk region. Operations are retarded by heavy snows.
March 26. Successful German counterattacks against Russians south of Lake Narotch.
March 28. Russians gain ground lost to the Germans at Lake Narotch. Germans driven back north of Pinsk.
April 1. Russian offensive is resumed, with the breaking up of ice in the Dvina River.
April 6. Russians renew attack against forces of Von Hindenburg in the neighborhood of Lake Narotch. Russians capture several small villages in Galicia.
April 10. German artillery active along the whole northern front, especially around Dvinsk and Lake Narotch. Russians claim failure of German thrust at Riga.
April 13. Austrian troops along Strypa and Dniester and northeast of Czernowitz are compelled to fall back in the face of heavy Russian attacks.
April 14. German reports claim failure of Russian attack northwest of Dvinsk.
April 15. Russian successes claimed in Galicia.
April 19. Russian reports claim the repulse of German attacks above Smorgon.
April 20. Russian offensive northwest of Dvinsk. Russians claim successes on the Riga front.
April 27. Germans claim to have gained several positions in the province of Vilna and south of Lake Narotch. Russians claim captures south of Dvinsk and in the Strypa region.
April 29. Austrians capture several trenches north of Mouravitcy.
May 5. Renewed activity along the entire Russian front. Both sides claim successes.
May 20. Germans bombard Dareva southeast of Vilna.

May 22. Russians repulse German attacks near Ostroff and north of Lake Narotch.
May 24. German advances are claimed in the district of Pulkaran southeast of Riga.
June 2. Russian reports claim repulse of German attack near Smorgon.
June 5. Russians begin offensive on a 250-mile front from the Ruktno Swamps to Bessarabia. On the first day 13,000 Austrian prisoners are taken.
June 6. Russian offensive under General Brussilov continues from the Pripet River to Rumanian frontier. Over 25,000 prisoners are taken.
June 7. Russians continue their offensive, taking over 40,000 prisoners and great quantities of supplies.
June 8. Russians capture Lutsk in Volhynia and cross the Ikwa and Strypa Rivers, capturing 11,000 more prisoners.
June 9. Russians cross the Austrian lines, driving them back over fifteen miles. Large numbers of prisoners continue to be taken.
June 10. The Russians occupy Buczacz, on the west bank of the Strypa, capturing many prisoners.
June 11. Town and fortress of Dubno are captured by the Russians. Prisoners captured exceed 100,000.
June 12. General von Hindenburg begins a fierce counterattack near Jacobstadt and Kosjny near Dvinsk.
June 13. Russians attack Sokal and advance toward Kovel. Russians capture Sniatyn, twenty miles north of Czernowitz, taking 6,000 prisoners.
June 14. Russians complete isolation of Czernowitz.
June 16. Russian offensive continues with the capture of nearly 15,000 prisoners.
June 17. Russians occupy the town of Radzlowi, near the Galician frontier, six miles from Brody. Two German armies are rushed to the aid of the Austrians.
June 18. Russians capture Czernowitz, the capital of Bukowina.
June 19. Russian advance continues beyond Czernowitz.
June 20. The Russians cross the Sereth River.
June 21. General von Hindenburg attacks Smorgon, but is repulsed by counterattacks. Germans make stubborn resistance about Kovel. Russians enter Gurizityn, thirty-two miles southeast of Kovel, but are compelled to retire.
June 22. Russians capture Radautz, in southern Bukowina. Germans halt advance of the Russians in the Kolki-Sokal sector. German reports claim repulse of Russians farther south.
June 23. Russians occupy the town of Straza, Widnitz, and Gurahumora, giving them possession of the whole crownland of Bukowina. Austrians retreat to foothills of the Carpathians.
June 24. Russians seize Kutz, fifteen miles from Kolomea.
June 25. Russians capture town of Kimpolung.
June 26. Russians advance before the Carpathians continues.
June 27. Germans report repulse of Russians on Kovel. Germans under Von Linsingen drive back Russians in Volhynia, and occupy Liniewka, seven miles southwest of Sokal.
June 29. Germans continue to advance toward Kolomea, capturing over 10,000 prisoners and three lines of trenches.
June 30. Russians capture Obertyn in southern Galicia, fifteen miles northeast of Kolomea.

July 1. Fighting continues at Thumaiz, fifteen miles northwest of Obertyn. Austrian troops fall back on Stanislau.
July 2. Russian advance west of Kolomea.
July 3. Austrian troops begin a new offensive south of Liniewka and west of Lutsk. It is finally repulsed.
July 4. Russian cavalry patrols reported to have crossed the passes into southern Hungary. Russian army approaches Lemberg.
July 5. Russian forces cut the road to Lemberg below Deletin.
July 6. Russian forces advance toward Kovel, capturing 23,000 prisoners. Russian forces attack Germans under General von Bothmer, defending Lemberg along the Strypa River. Austrian forces west of Kolomea driven back five miles.
July 7. General von Bothmer retires to the west between the Strypa and Zlota Lipa Rivers.
July 8. Russians continue to advance west of Czartorysk, in the Volhynia, following the German retirement. Austrians admit falling back twelve miles.
July 9. Russian offensive crosses the Stokhod, a short distance northwest of Kovel. Austrians stop Russian advance in southern Bukowina.
July 10. Russian offensive continues toward Kovel. The forces crossing the river Stokhod in many places.
July 12. Opposing forces halt the Russians at the bank of the Stokhod.
July 14. Battle rages on the Stokhod River. Austrians claim to have captured over 15,000 prisoners.
July 15. Severe fighting all along the eastern front.
July 16. Germans claim the repulse of Russian attacks.
July 17. Russian advance against Kovel continues with the capture of about 13,000 prisoners. German forces retire across the Lipa River.
July 19. Russians begin the invasion of Hungary. Army of General Lechitsky advances into Carpathian Passes.
July 21. Russians cross Styr River.
July 26. Russian troops cross Slonevke River north of Brody.
July 27-31. Continued Russian successes on eastern front.

THE BALKANS

January 5. Montenegrin reports claim the repulse of Austrians on all fronts.
January 6. Austrians begin new offensive against the Montenegrin northern frontier, winning several towns.
January 10. Austrians capture Mount Lovcen.
January 11. French force landed on the island of Corfu for provisional occupation.
January 12. Cettinje, Montenegro, practically surrounded by Austrian forces. Armistice reported between Montenegro and Austria. The latter are within four miles of Cettinje.
January 13. Austrians capture Cettinje.
January 14. Montenegrin army almost entirely surrounded by Austrian forces.
January 15. Allies land troops at Bhacloran, five miles from Athens.
January 20. Fighting resumed between Austrians and Montenegrins as a result of a failure to come to satisfactory terms.

January 21. Montenegrins fall back in an attempt to join the Serbians in Albania. Austrians capture Montenegrin forts of Antivari and Dulcigno.
January 23. Cuterio, capital of Albania, captured by Austrians. Bulgarian forces capture Burat, south of Semeni River.
February 4. Austrian troops occupy Krovo in Albania, twenty miles north of Durazzo. Austrian forces in Montenegro advance on Monastir.
February 6. Field Marshal von Mackensen assumes command of the Austro-German army, opposing the Allies at Saloniki.
February 8. Rumania calls out reservists. The Italians and Serbians in Albania retreat in the direction of Durazzo.
February 10. Austrian forces occupy heights above Durazzo.
February 11. Austrian forces attack Italians moving on Durazzo, but are repulsed.
February 26. Durazzo evacuated and Austrians enter the city.
April 21. French force landed at Argostoli on the Greek island of Cephalonia.
May 12. Bulgarian troops are withdrawn from Rumanian-Danube-Dobrudja frontier and shifted to the Saloniki sector.
May 26. Activity among the allied forces in the Saloniki district.
May 27. Bulgarian troops cross the Greek frontier, occupy three Greek forts.
May 28. Serbian army, after recuperating at Corfu, are transferred to the field at Saloniki. Greek Government permits the Bulgarians to occupy several forts on the Greek side of the border.
June 1. Large Bulgarian force reported along the east bank of the Struma.
June 4. Allies take over control of the town of Saloniki, replacing the Greek police and establishing martial law.
June 8. The Greek cabinet decides to demobilize its forces following demands from the Allies.

MESOPOTAMIA

January 2. The main body of General Townshend's forces on the Irika, Albania front, retreats down the Tigris following a repulse from Ctesiphon. General Nixon succeeded by Lieutenant General Sir Percy Lake.
January 8. General Aylmer, leading British support for General Townshend's forces, engages three Turkish forces in an attempt to cut them off. British claim success.
January 10. General Aylmer's force stopped at Sheikstaad by bad weather conditions and difficulties of transport.
January 13. Turkish retreat twenty-five miles along the Tigris to Oroh pursued by the British.
January 15. General Aylmer attacks the Turks, forcing them to retire.
January 18. British forces under General Aylmer engages Turks at Es-Sinn, twenty-three miles from Kut-el-Amara.
February 10. Turkish reports claim the failure of two attempts by General Aylmer to reach Kut-el-Amara.
February 12. British forces gain five miles in the direction of Kut.
April 5. General Gorringe, commanding a British relief force, ascends the Tigris and captures Felihe, taking five lines of Turkish trenches.

April 8. Floods prevent carrying on of the campaign in Mesopotamia. Turkish claim a victory in Felihe.

April 11. Turkish force make breaches in the Tigris in order to hold back the relieving expedition.

April 18. Several counterattacks by the Turks prevent the advance of the British relieving forces. Turks make attack on British forces but are repulsed, losing 3,000 men.

April 27. An attempt to send a relief ship up the Tigris into Kut-el-Amara by British fails.

April 28. General Townshend is compelled to surrender Kut-el-Amara to the Turks after holding out for 143 days. The British forces numbered 9,000.

May 13. Russian army reported in Mesopotamia, eighty-two miles northeast of Mosul.

May 24. British reports claim attempt of Turkish on the right banks of the Tigris.

May 26. Russian army advances into Mesopotamia to Suliemanie, 143 miles east of Mosul.

June 12. Turkish reports claim the annihilation of 1,000 of the enemies' cavalry, and the destruction of two gunboats and munition plants in Mesopotamia.

June 16. Turkish reports claim that the British forces on the Tigris have abandoned its position at Felihe. The British reports claim an advance along the Tigris to within 200 yards of the Turkish positions at Sanna-i-Yat.

June 17. British attempt to land troops on the north bank of the Euphrates is prevented by the Turks.

June 21. Russians inflict two defeats on Turkish forces near Mosul.

July 13. British reports claim repulse of concerted Turkish attack about fifteen miles below Kut-el-Amara.

RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN

January 1. Turkish reports announce the repulse of Russians in Kurdistan.

January 3. Russians win a slight advantage in the Caucasus.

January 11. Russians begin a general offensive in the Caucasus on a hundred-mile front.

January 15. Russians win successes in the Caucasus preventing the Turkish forces from crossing the Arkhava River.

January 18. Russian forces push forward toward Erzerum.

January 20. Turkish forces driven back from the Erzerum district. Russian progress reported in the Lake Van district.

January 21. Center of the Turkish army defeated along the sixty-mile front in the Caucasus.

February 4. Turkish report the defeat of Russian forces in Persia.

February 12. Russian artillery bombards Erzerum.

February 13. Russians capture one of the Erzerum forts, taking many prisoners.

February 15. Erzerum is captured following a five days' siege.

February 17. Russians continue to advance, following the capture of Erzerum.

February 18. Russian forces debark at Viteszu, fifteen miles east of Trebizond, to cut off Turkish forces retreating from Erzerum. The city of Mush in the Lake Van district is captured by the Russians.
February 19. Russians capture Didgin near Trebizond and continue to advance toward the west.
February 20. The southern wing of the Russian force enters Bitlis, 110 miles south of Erzerum.
February 23. Russians capture Armenian town of Ispir between Erzerum and Rize. They also capture several towns in Persia.
February 25. Russian forces capture Kermanshah in Persia.
February 28. Turkish forces evacuate Trebizond and other Black Sea forts.
March 1. Russian advance in Armenia continues. Their forces occupy several towns north of Bitlis.
March 2. Russian forces occupy Bitlis. They also capture the Persian town of Bidyar.
March 5. Russians advance against Trebizond.
March 7. The town of Rizeh near Trebizond is captured by the Russians.
March 30. Russians defeat Turks in the Caucasus in the region of the fortress of Kara Malachkan on the direct road to Bagdad.
April 11. Russian forces make further progress in the Russian Caucasus, southeast of Azar, repulsing Turkish attacks in the Bitlis region and defeating Kurd detachments south of Lake Urumia.
April 13. Russian forces claim defeat of Turkish forces after a six days' battle.
April 14. Russians defeat Turks at Bitlis, and storm a Turkish position on the left bank of the Kara River, east of Trebizond.
April 17. Trebizond captured by the Russians after a combined land and sea attack of great violence. City of Drona, six and one-half miles eastward, is also taken.
April 18. The Russian army in the Caucasus pushes forward from Erzerum.
April 19. Turks are dislodged from their north strongholds east of Bitlis.
April 22. Turkish attempt to recapture Trebizond is repulsed.
April 25. Turkish reports claim a Russian repulse near Suren, south of Bitlis.
April 28. Russian forces reported to have crossed through the Serkala Pass on the way to Bagdad. Progress also made toward Erzingan in Armenia.
April 30. The southern Russian army in the Caucasus arrive before Diarbekr, 100 miles southwest of Bitlis.
May 3. Russian forces occupy Turkish trenches before Erzingan.
May 6. Turkish are repulsed near Bagdad by the Russians.
May 9. Russian army southwest of Kermanshah in Persia captures Kasr-i-Sharin on the Digala River, twenty-five miles from the border and 150 miles from Bagdad.
May 17. Twenty thousand Turkish troops transferred from Kut to oppose the Russian advance on Bagdad and Mosul.
May 19. Turkish reports claim the repulse of Russians at Sirate Tepe with heavy losses.
May 20. Russian forces capture Sakkis in Persia.
May 31. Turkish troops in the Diarbekr region are defeated by Russians.
June 1. Turkish troops capture Mama Khatun in Armenia, fifty-three miles west of Azaro.

June 2. Turkish reports claim the repulse of Russian forces in the Caucasus.
June 5. Turkish forces in the Caucasus win additional advantages over the Russians.
June 6. Russians in the Caucasus approach to within seventy miles of Bagdad.
June 7. Turkish reports claim additional reverses for the Russians about Bagdad.
June 11. Russian forces make progress southwest of Trebizond. Turkish claim additional victories.
June 16. Russian forces advancing toward Bagdad repulse Turkish attacks. Turkish forces capture Serpol, but are later dislodged.
June 21. Russians defeat Turkish forces in two engagements near Mosul.
July 7. Russians are compelled to retreat eighty miles in the Bagdad region. Slight advances are reported in other sections of the Caucasus. Arabs about the Bagdad join in revolt against the Turks.
July 10. Arab rebels capture Kinufda, Arabia.
July 12. Russian forces take Kjatum, fifty miles west of Erzerum.
July 13. Russians occupy several positions in the Caucasus.
July 14. The Grand Duke Alexander begins a new attack on the Turkish forces near Erzerum at Baiburt.
July 15. Revolt of the Arabs continues. The city of Mecca reported captured.
July 16. Russians capture Baiburt.
July 21-24. Considerable Russian successes.
July 25. Russians take Erzingan.

OPERATIONS IN GALLIPOLI

January 1. Heavy fighting occurs along the Dardanelles front. Battleships in the Narrows attack Turkish ports.
January 9. Gallipoli evacuated by the Allies with only one casualty and a loss of seventeen old guns. British and French forces are entirely withdrawn from the Gallipoli Peninsula, and the attempt to force the Dardanelles is abandoned.

AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

January-February 25. Little activity on the Austrian-Italian line.
February 26. Italians make surprise attack in the Gorizia front and repulse an Austrian advance on the Dorobo Plateau.
March 22. Austrian forces repulsed in the Sugana Valley. Also north of Tolomino. Bombardment of Gorizia continues.
March 28. Heavy artillery duels about the Gorizia bridgehead. Italians enter Austrian towns east of Selz. Austrians hold firm on the Carnia frontier.
March 29. Italian forces gain the town and fortifications of Selz after a three hours' attack. Small Austrian detachments are defeated in the Daeno Valley.
April 7. Sharp actions take place in the Tyrol region, without advantage to either side.
April 10. Heavy artillery engagements between the Sugana and Adige Valleys and along the whole Isonzo.

April 12. Italian forces gain trenches southeast of Riva in the Ledro Valley.
April 13. Italian reports claim considerable gain in the Sugana Valley.
April 28. Severe fighting in the Plezzo Basin. Italian forces repulse a determined Austrian attack. Italians claim heavy Austrian losses in the Giugericia Valley and in other sectors along the line.
May 11. Italians capture Austrian trenches and redoubts on Monte Cukla.
May 15. Austrians, by a surprise attack, capture a number of important Italian positions southwest of Trent, capturing about 2,500 prisoners.
May 16. Austrian offensive in Trentino continues, with the capture of 6,350 prisoners and the capture of important positions.
May 18. Austrian forces capture the front ridge of Muggaso.
May 19. Austrian troops cross the Italian border and establish themselves on the Costaballa Ridge. Italians reported to have been driven back four miles.
May 20. Italian forces driven by the Austrians from the Col Santa, with a loss of over 1,300 prisoners.
May 22. Austrian forces occupy Lavanore Plateau, but are held at this point by the Italians.
May 24. Italian forces retreat before Austrian attacks in the Sugana Valley. Austrian advance into Italy continues with the occupation of the Suabolo River.
May 25. Italian forces continue to retreat in the Trentino. The Astico and Sugana Valleys are evacuated by Italian forces.
May 26. Italians hold Austrian advance at Astico.
May 27. Austrian artillery batters down the defenses at Arsiero, and armored works guarding Vicenza are captured.
May 28. Austrians continue to gain in the campaign against Arsiero and Asiago.
May 30. Austrian forces capture the defenses of Punta Garda.
May 31. Austrians capture three important peaks in the Asiago and Arsiero regions. Italians admit retreat from Gallio.
June 1. Austrian infantry checked in the Arsiero region. Austrian reports claim the crossing of the Posina River and the capture of Conte Burro.
June 3. Italians recapture the Belmonte position northeast of Monte Cengin.
June 4. Austrian capture Cesuna and take 5,000 prisoners.
June 5. Austrian infantry repulsed in an attack on Monte Alba. Austrian advance along the Arsiero continues with the capture of several important positions.
June 6. Italian forces drive back the Austrians along the entire Tyrolean front.
June 7. Austrians are driven from heights east of the Campo Mulo.
June 8. Italian forces repulse Austrian detachments along the Lagarina Valley.
June 9. Austrians make gains on the Asiago highlands, capturing Monte Lemre.
June 10. Italians assume the offensive and make gains north of Arsiero.
June 12. Important units of Austrian forces withdraw from this front to meet the invaders on the eastern front.
June 13. Italian offensive recovers important lost ground.
June 14. Heavy Austrian losses reported in the Tyrol.

June 15. Italians resume position on Isonzo front, and capture several trenches in Moncalfe.
June 18. Italians continue the offensive in the Asiago campaign.
June 20. Italian Alpine troops continue the offensive in the Asiago sector.
June 23. An Italian advance is claimed in the Arsa Valley.
June 24. Italian counteroffensive continues in Bellasra.
June 25. Italian forces begin an offensive in the Asiago sector.
June 27. Italians retake Arsiero and Posina. Austrian army claimed to be in full flight.
June 28. Italians capture several peaks on the Trentino front.
June 29. Italians begin an offensive on the Isonzo front. A counteroffensive in the Trentino is also maintained.
June 30. Italian line in the Trentino is pushed forward, into contact with the Austrian main line of resistance.
July 1. Italian forces storm Monte Cosmagnon, and extend their offensive.
July 8. There is a lull in activity along the front. Steady bombardment continues.
July 12. Italian forces make progress in the Adige Valley, and occupy positions on Monte Corno.
July 14. Heavy fighting in the Sette Comuni sector.
July 15. Italians carry a strong position at the head of the Posina Valley.
July 19. Italians continue to advance in the upper Posina Valley.
July 20-August 1. Continued Italian gains.

CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

January 1. Following the occupation of Yaunde in Kameruns the Allied forces push on to Koimake on the Nyon River. Germans evacuate Ebolawa and Okono-Linga. Fighting reported on the German-Spanish border.
February 14. Battle is reported in progress in German East Africa, between the German and Belgian forces. Heavy losses are reported on both sides.
February 15. The entire province of Kamerun reported cleared of German resistance.
February 20. German reports claim the Senussi rebels to have captured three inland Egyptian towns.
April 4. Allied forces under General Smuts reported to have captured a German mountain stronghold in East Africa.
April 10. Portuguese troops occupy Kionga on the southern frontier of German East Africa.
April 22. Allies occupy several towns in German East Africa.
May 11. German forces repulsed in an attack on the Allies in German East Africa.
May 12. Belgians occupy Kigiri, the chief town of Runda, German East Africa.
May 20. German forces retreat from around Lake Kiva in German East Africa.
May 26. British make progress in German East Africa, capturing three additional towns.

June 2. Portuguese troops at Mozambique repulse German forces attempting to reoccupy Kionga in German East Africa.
June 7. Germans driven back by British forces in East Africa.
June 15. Belgian forces steadily drive back Germans in East Africa.
July 2. Belgian forces advance along the Kagra River, and capture a village southwest of Victoria Nyanza.
July 10. British forces under General Smuts occupy Taanga on the coast of German East Africa.
July 18. Belgian troops reported to have reached the shores of Victoria Nyanza and to have defeated the German forces there.
July 22. British troops capture several towns in German East Africa.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

January 9. The British battleship *King Edward* is lost by contact with a mine.
February 1. German prize crew brings the British *Appam* to Hampton Roads, following its capture by the German cruiser *Moewe*.
February 13. French cruiser *Admiral Charner* is sunk by a submarine off the Syrian coast.
February 27. The French transport *Provence* sunk by a submarine in the Mediterranean. The British steamer *Maloja* sunk by a mine near Dover.
March 24. British Channel steamer *Sussex* is torpedoed by German submarine.
March 25. In an engagement between the British cruiser *Alcantara* and the German blockade runner *Greif* on February 28, both vessels were sunk.
April 25. The German battle cruiser squadron, together with Zeppelins and submarines, attack the city of Lowestoft and Yarmouth, northeast of London.
April 27. British battleship *Russell* is sunk by a mine in the Mediterranean.
May 8. British transport ship *Cymric* is sunk off Irish coast by German submarine.
May 31. British and German battle squadron engage in combat off the coast of Denmark in the North Sea.
June 5. The British cruiser *Hampshire* is sunk by a mine off the Orkney Islands. Among those lost was Lord Kitchener.
June 10. The Italian transport *Principe Umberto* was sunk by a submarine in the Adriatic.
June 14. A Russian flotilla and a German convoy meet in the Baltic. Several small vessels were sunk.
June 18. The British destroyer *Edenis* sunk by a collision in the English Channel.
July 3. Russian torpedo boats are reported to have sunk fifty-four Turkish sailing vessels in the Black Sea.
July 6. The Turkish war vessel *Midullu*, formerly the *Breslau*, sinks a Russian transport.
July 9. The German merchant submarine *Deutschland* arrives in Baltimore.
July 10. The Turkish warships *Midullu* and the *Sultan Selim*, formerly the *Goeben*, sink four Russian transports and bombard the coast of Caucasus.

July 12. A German submarine shells Seaham Harbor on the English coast.
July 15. The Italian transport *Impetuoso* is sunk by an Austrian submarine in the Adriatic.
July 22. The German flotilla of torpedo boats escape after a running fight with British battleships off the coast of Holland.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

May 1-31. Fifty-six Allied merchant ships and four neutrals sunk by submarines. The vessels lost included the British steamer *Persia.*
February 1-29. Sixteen merchant ships belonging to the Allies sunk by torpedoes.
March 1-31. Twenty-seven merchant ships of Allies and thirteen neutrals sunk by German submarines.
April 1-30. Seventy merchant ships belonging to the Allies and twenty-six neutral vessels sunk by German submarines.
May 1-31. Fifty-six Allied merchant ships and four neutrals sunk by German submarines.
June 1-30. Sixty-one merchant ships of the Allies and seven of neutral nations sunk by German submarines.
July 1-29. Fifty merchant ships of the Allies and nine of neutral nations sunk by German submarines.

WAR IN THE AIR

January 29-30. German Zeppelins make two night raids on Paris, dropping bombs on the city.
January 31. A fleet of Zeppelin airships pass over the northeast counties of England, killing fifty-nine persons with bombs.
February 4. German admiralty admits the loss of the Zeppelin *L-19.*
February 20. German Zeppelin *Lz-77* destroyed by a French automobile crew.
March 5. Three German Zeppelins make a night raid over eight counties on the east coast of England, killing and injuring several men, women, and children.
March 18. In an engagement between a French aeroplane squadron and German squadron in upper Alsace, four French and three German machines were destroyed.
March 19. Four German Zeppelins drop bombs on the southeast coast of England, killing nine persons. One of the machines was destroyed by a British aeroplane.
March 20. Sixty-five British, French, and Belgians flying in machines attack German aircraft at Zeebrugge on the Belgian coast.
March 25. British aeroplanes attack German aircraft at Schlesswig, losing three of their number.
March 27. German aeroplanes drop bombs on the city of Saloniki, killing about twenty persons. Several of the German machines were destroyed by French aviators. Austrian aeroplanes drop bombs over the Venetian provinces.
March 31. Zeppelin airship *L-15* destroyed by gunfire during a raid on England, in which five airships took part.
April 3. German Zeppelins make the fourth consecutive raid in as many nights over Great Britain.

April 14. Three British naval aeroplanes drop bombs on Constantinople.
May 3. German Zeppelin *L-20* is abandoned on the coast of Norway, following a raid over England.
May 4. German Zeppelin scouting off the British coast destroyed by British warships.
May 5. German Zeppelin passing over the harbor of Saloniki is destroyed by gunfire from the Allied fleets.
May 17. Advisory Aerial Board with Earl Curzon as president is established in Great Britain.
June 21. First Lieutenant Immelmann shot down on French front by Lieutenant G. R. McCubbin.
June 24. Victor E. Chapman, an American aviator in the French service, killed over German lines in Verdun.
July 9. German aeroplanes drop bombs on the English southeast coast.
July 10. British hydroplane bombards Beirut, Syria.
July 14. Austrians drop bombs on Padua, Italy.
July 20. French aviator Marchal flies over 800 miles, drops proclamation on Berlin, and descends in Poland, before reaching the Russian lines.
July 29. German airships raid Yorkshire and Lincolnshire on east coast of England.

POLITICAL HAPPENINGS

January 5. Compulsory service bill is introduced into House of Commons.
February 10. Germany and Austria declare that after February 29 they will treat armed merchant craft as warships.
February 15. British Orders in Council issued in regard to taking over war plants and munitions.
February 16. France, Great Britain, and Russia renew their pledges to reestablish the independence of Belgium.
February 21. House of Commons votes a war credit of $2,100,000,000.
February 22. The Russian Duma opens in the presence of the czar.
February 23. Portugal seizes thirty-six German and Austrian interned merchant vessels.
February 29. Italy seizes thirty-four German merchant vessels.
March 27-28. A war conference of the Allies is held in Paris to decide the future conduct of the war.
April 24-May 1. Revolt in Dublin with severe fighting.
May 23. House of Commons votes $1,500,000,000 war credit.
May 25. King George signs the British compulsory military service bill.
June 3. The Allies declare a state of siege at Saloniki.
June 10. The Salandra Government resigns in Italy.
June 14-17. Allied commercial conference in Paris agrees on economic procedure in regard to the Central Powers after the war.
June 21. M. Zaimis becomes Prime Minister of Greece.
July 6. David Lloyd-George appointed Secretary of War of Great Britain to succeed Earl Kitchener.
July 20-21. German authorities remove a large body of population from French and Belgian towns.
July 24. House of Commons issues credit of $2,250,000,000.
July 25. Crisis in the British cabinet over the provisional scheme for home rule in Ireland.
July 28. Execution of Captain Fryatt.

THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR

Statements from the British, French, and German Ambassadors to the United States

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BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1916.

DEAR SIR:

I beg to acknowledge with thanks your courteous invitation to my government to make a statement concerning the war on the occasion of the second anniversary of its outbreak.

My government fully appreciates your kindness and courtesy in placing at its service the Review which has already contributed to such an honourable extent to the world's knowledge of the great events which are now passing before us. Had the policy of my government undergone any change since the war's commencement I have no doubt that a statement explaining such a change would have been issued. But the policy of the British government is now what it was when the war first began under circumstances with which your readers are entirely familiar. To quote Sir Edward Grey's words: "Is there anyone who thinks it possible that we could have sat still and looked on without eternal disgrace?"

Yours faithfully,

CECIL SPRING RICE.

The Editor
Collier's Weekly,
New York.

AMBASSADE
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS

WASHINGTON, le July 10, 1916.

DEAR SIR: .

I had not failed to forward to my Government your request for a statement concerning the war on the occasion of its impending second anniversary.

I am instructed to convey to you, in answer, the expression of the Prime Minister's regret at his inability to comply with the wish of a review so honorably known as *Collier's Weekly*. The case of France is so plain that it is not felt there can be need for explanations, much less for pleadings; and it is enough to refer to public documents.

They show how that war, which France had done her utmost to prevent, was declared on her by the Germans on the 3rd of August, 1914, for such frivolous motives as a shelling by her aeros of places as distant as Nurenberg: an imaginary deed of which she never dreamt, which she has never been able to duplicate, and which an inspection of the local newspapers has proved to have passed unmentioned by them and unnoticed by the inhabitants. As she was considered a prey to be dealt with at once and at all cost, the invasion of her territory was effected through Belgium, and that invasion, entailing on the Belgian and French populations untold misery, still continues.

It still continues; not for very long, a day will soon dawn which will be the day of Justice.

I have the honor to be, dear Sir,

Sincerely yours,

JUSSERAND.

The Editor
Collier's Weekly,
New York.

KAISERLICH DEUTSCHE BOTSCHAFT
GERMAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

NEW YORK, August 28, 1916.

P. F. COLLIER & SON,
Publishers.

DEAR SIRS:

With reference to previous conversations I beg to send you the enclosed statement for the "Story of the Great War". It has been written by Baron Mumm von Schwarzenstein, former Ambassador to Japan, now attached to the Foreign Office in Berlin.

Yours very sincerely,

F. BERNSTORFF.

WHAT HAS GERMANY ACHIEVED IN TWO YEARS OF WAR?

In order to appreciate what Germany has accomplished during two years of war, one has to recall to mind the great expectations which her enemies had attached to this war, into which their powerful coalition, after years of political scheming and thorough military preparations, had enmeshed the prosperous Empire.

At the outset, the avowed purpose of Germany's enemies was to annihilate her,—her army, her fleet, her commerce and her industry. France hoped to regain Alsace Lorraine and the western bank of the Rhine. Russia expected to gratify her desire for territorial expansion by conquering the provinces of East and West Prussia and Posen, which probably were to receive the blessings of Russian culture. Austria-Hungary was to be dismembered; the Balkan states were to be rendered tributary to the Czar; Constantinople and the Dardanelles were to be added to the Romanoff's dominions. As for England, she de-

liberately entered this war because she thought that she would run small risk in helping to bring the war to a speedy termination.

The world will remember the vainglorious way in which Germany's enemies foretold that before long their armies would meet in the heart of Germany, where Cossacks would parade the streets of Berlin and Indian lancers and Gurkhas would stroll through the parks of Potsdam. The German fleet, it was asserted, would be at the bottom of the sea before it had time to think. When this fond hope was not realized, the German fleet was to be dug out like a rat of a rat-hole. In their expectations our enemies saw German industry ruined. Germany was soon to be paralyzed, nay, would soon be passing away.

Such were the expectations of the enemies, attacking us from all sides. Germany was drawn into a war of self-defense. Her fight is a fight for national existence. And today how do matters stand?

Have the hopes and plots of our enemies been realized? Has Germany successfully fought her war of self-defense or has she not?

Excepting one small corner of the Empire, the only enemy soldiers on German soil are vast numbers of prisoners of war. The war is fought on enemy soil. Germany and her allies occupy three independent kingdoms. They hold vast areas of enemy territory in east and west. They hold these territories firmly and without fear of losing them by force of arms.

Consider the efforts that our enemies have made on the west front. In their unsuccessful attempts at Loos and in Champagne last autumn they suffered terrible losses and made no headway. In the spring Germany took up the offensive against Verdun. Step by step, and with but small losses, we are steadily gaining ground; the French positions, although defended with desperate courage, are crumbling away one by one.

Thanks to the genius of Hindenburg, East Germany is no longer threatened by Russia. Last year, in cooperation with our valiant ally, Austria-Hungary, we drove back the Russians,

overwhelming their armies as well as their strongholds. We took possession of Courland, Lithuania and Poland. For the last two months, it is true, the Russians have resumed the offensive. But, although they have gained considerable local advantages at terrible cost, they have not succeeded in breaking through our lines.

Even at the very moment when our enemies, after months of careful preparation, seek to bring to bear their greatest possible pressure on both German fronts they attain nothing but terrible losses. They achieve but little substantial gain. They have in no material way deranged our general position on the western front. The tide has turned again. Our enemies will probably realize in time that they are biting on granite and that partial successes will sooner or later lead to their exhaustion without materially changing the military situation. Today Germany awaits the outcome of the present combined offensive of the Allies with calmness and confidence. Then her turn may come once more. The Allies have been rejoicing over the collapse of Germany. They have repeatedly and positively prophesied it. Repeatedly it has been postponed. It seems now as if it would have to be adjourned *ad Kalendas Graecas.*

Last autumn the world saw the rapid conquest of Serbia and Montenegro by German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. The result was the establishment of direct communication between Berlin and Bagdad. Who can underestimate the political, military and economic importance of this feat to Germany and to her allies?

Bulgaria joined the alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey because she realized that theirs was to be the ultimate victory. The four Central Powers form a solid and powerful political combination; they adjoin each other and are bound together by economic interests.

Let us now consider the naval situation. Instead of the German fleet being at the bottom of the sea, considerably more British than German men-of-war find themselves in that position. Since the great battle of the Skagerrak, where the German High Sea Fleet successfully fought against the entire British Grand

Fleet, the British losses have increased alarmingly. The German Navy is young, but it has proved its merit; more than that, it has proved that the proud British fleet is by no means invincible. Our submarines have shown to the world that Germany possesses a powerful weapon against England, even though, out of consideration for neutral interests, this arm of her navy has not yet been fully tested against the illegal methods adopted by England in her effort to starve Germany's entire civilian population. The exploits of the *Emden,* the *Moewe* and the *Appam* are still fresh in everybody's memory. To them can now be added the achievements of the submersible *Deutschland,* by means of which we have begun to resume our trade relations with the United States despite the so-called British blockade.

For two years we have been fighting for the freedom of the seas. Doubtless, Great Britain's sea power, which has caused us the loss of our distant colonies and the suspension of most of our maritime trade, is not yet broken. Nevertheless, today British prestige is not what it used to be.

British sea power has caused Germany and the neutral nations of the world many inconveniences, and it will no doubt continue to do so until the end of the war. But we know that this will not advance our enemies' cause. Victory does not lie this way. Germany has learned to live on her resources during the war. All the raw materials necessary for her economic life she produces herself. For such as are not accessible at present, she has found substitutes. Our food supply is ample for the maintenance of our military forces as well as for our civilian population. The skillfully organized distribution of food, recently introduced, will enable us to hold out in spite of the British blockade, even if our harvest, which promises to be excellent, should not come up to our expectations.

Looking back upon her achievements during the last two years, Germany enters into the third year of the war with unaltered confidence in her final triumph. Germany is willing to terminate this terrible bloodshed, she is willing to make an honorable peace on condition that her legitimate interests are safeguarded; but she is prepared to continue the struggle with the same dogged

determination that she has manifested up to now, since her enemies are still virtually resolved to annihilate her, even if, for appearance's sake, they have of late somewhat modified their war aims by declaring that they merely intend to wipe out what they call German "Militarism."

Germany is fighting against the greatest odds known in history. She is not only fighting against the most powerful combination of enemies, but at the same time has to contend with a world of prejudice, skillfully created against her, as well as with lukewarmness toward our enemies' tyranny on the part of the neutral nations. Sometimes we wonder at this; but unerringly we go on fighting for our cause.

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PRONOUNCING VOCABULARY

Pronunciation of Geographical Names Occurring in this Work

Abu Zenaima aboo' zay-ny'ma
Achi Baba achee bābā
Adige adee'ghay (Austrian) adee'jay (Italian)
Aerschot ahr-scot'
Agordo agor'doh
Aisle ale
Aisne ane
Aix ex
Aix-la-Chapelle ex-la-shapell'
Aix-Noulette ex-noolet'
Akabah akah'ba
Akhtunski Pass akhtoon'sky
Aldershot awl'dershot
Alexinatz alexee'nats
Alost alost'
Alsace German "elsass"
Alsatian alsay'shen
Alt-Aux alt-owts'
Amiens ah'mee-en
Ancerville anser'vee
Andrechy andreshee'
Annopol anno'pol
Apremont apr'mong
Ardahan ardahan'
Ardennes arden'
Argonne argonn'
Armentières armangtyare'
Arras arass'
Arusha arro'sha
Asiago azeeah'go
Asiero az-yer'o
Asma Dere dai'ray
Assobam assobahm'
Atakpame a'tak-pah'may
Auberive oh-breev'
Aubers oh-bear'
Auerstadt our'statt
Augustijnow avgoostee'noff
Augustovo avgoost'ava
Autreches oh-tresh'
Avlona avlo'na
Avre avr
Ayun Monsa a'yoon
Azerbaijan azerbyjan'
Azizi azee'zee

Babina Glava ba'beena gla'va
Baghche bag'cheh
Banais ba-nice'
Baranovitchy barano'vichy
Baraque de l'Epine barrack del epeen'
Barchon Fort barshong'
Basancourt bazancoor'
Batum batoom'
Bavai bav-eye'
Bazar Siak syak
Beauséjour boh-sezhoor'
Bedzin bedzeen'
Bellewaarde Wood belleh-ar'deh
Berchem - Sainte - Agathe ber'shen-sant-agaht'
Beresina berrezee'na
Bereza beray'zah
Bergen-op-Zoom zome
Berjan ber-jan'
Berry-au-Bac o-bac'
Bethany bettah'nee
Bethune beeton
Beuvraignes bövrain'
Bezzecea betsek'ka
Biecz beeyets'
Bielostok "l" like "w"
Biercza be-yertsa
Bijeljina be-yel-yee'na
Bir Mabeiuk ma-bay'yook
Bitolia bee-tol'ya
Bixschoote bix-sko'teh
Blamont blamong'
Blankenberghe ber'gay
Blaques blahk
Blonie blo-nee'
Bober bobr
Bochnia bokh'nya
Boesinghe boo-sing'er

Bois Bolante bwa bolant'
Bois d'Ailly bwa dah'yee
Bois de Forges forzh'
Bois de Mont-Mare mong-mar'
Bois-le-Peetre pater
Bolimow bolee'moff
Bologna bolon'ya
Boloto bolo'toh
Bonaberi bonnabay'ree
Bordeaux bordoh'
Bosche French slang for a German "Square-head;" "Thick-head"
Boshdarevatz bozhdaray'vats
Bosut boss'oot
Boudonville boodong-vee'
Bramont bramong'
Branjevo branyay'vo
Brazincourt brazangcoor'
Breisgau brice'gow
Brescia bresh'ah
Breza bray'za
Briey bree-ay'
Brimont breemong'
Brindisi brindee'zee
Brodjanska Glavitza brudyans'ska-gla'veetsa
Bruges brüzh
Brzezany bzhe-zah'nee
Brzostek bzhos'tek
Buczacz boo-sass'
Bukowina booko-vee'na
Burnhaupt boorn'howpt
Butaniyeh bootanee'yay

Calais callay'
Cambrai cambray'
Camp de Mailly may'yee
Canteleux cantlö
Carency caran'see
Cattaro cat'taro
Cettinje setteen'yay
Chalons shallong'
Champagne-Pouilleuse pooee-yös'
Chapelle St. Roch shapell' St. Rosh
Charleroi sharl-rwa'
Charleville sharl-veell
Chateau Thierry shatto'tee-err'y
Chatelet shatlay'
Chaudfontaine sho-fonten'
Chauny sho-nee
Chimay shee-may'
Chipres sheepr
Chocimierz khotsimyerts
Chodorow khodo'roff
Cholm kholm
Choruk kho'rook
Chotin khotin
Chyrow khee'rov
Ciezkovice - Walastow ches'kovitz-valas'tov
Cilicia selish'ya
Cividale chivvy-dah'ler
Col de Bonhomme bonnom'
Combres com'ber
Comines commeen'
Compiègne comp-yen'
Coucy-le-Chateau coossee'le-shatto'
Coulommiers coolomeer'
Courtrai coortray'
Couvrelles coovrell'
Ctesiphon tay'zee-fon
Cuinchy canshee
Cuxhaven cooks-hah'fen
Czarkowa tsar'kova
Czernovicz tser'novits

Dannemarie dan-mah-ree'
Daume dome
Debreczen debrets'en
Dedeagatch day-day-ah-gatch'
Dembica dembits'a
Demir Kapu cap'poo
Dinant deenang'
Dixmude dixmoo'deh
Djakova jak'ova
Djamschato jamshah'toh
Dommary Barancourt barancoor'
Donaueschingen doh'now-esh'ingen
Douai oo-ay
Driegrachten dree'grakhten
Drina River dree'na
Droghitchin dro-ghit'chin
Dubiecko doo-be-ets'ko
Dubovitza doo-bo-veet'sa
Dubowoje doobovo'yay
Duffel düf-fell
Dukla Pass dook'la
Dulcigno dool-cheen'yo
Dunajec River doo'nayets
Durazzo doodrat'so

Ecaffaut ekaffo'
Eghezee eggay-zay'
Elabe ellah'bay
Epinal epee-nahl'

Epine de Vedegrange epeen'de-vaid-grahnj'
Erivan eri-vahn'
Ermenonville veel'
Erzerum erts-room'
Etchmiadzin etch-mya-zeen'
Evegnee Fort ev-en-yea'
Eydtkuhmen ite-koo'nen
Eylau eye-low

Fère Champenoise fair shamp-nwahz'
Filipkowu ko'voo
Fiume fee-oo'meh
Fleurbaix flörbay'
Forest of Compiègne compe-eñ'
Fort Besançon bay-zang-sson
Fort Belfort beh-for'
Fort of Boncelles bong-sell'
Fort Breedonck bray-donk'
Fort Broeckem broo'kem
Fort Carnot carno'
Fort Douaumont doo-o-mong
Fort Emines emmeen'
Fort of Loncin long-san'
Fort Maizeret maze-ray
Fortress Osowic vits
Fort Stabroek stabrook
Fort Yeni Kale kah'ler
Fort Zwyndrecht zwine'drekt

Gaba Tepe teh-peh
Galicia galish'yeh
Gallipoli gallip'poli
Garbunovka garboonof'ka
Gembloux zhom-bloo'
Gérarmer zhair-ar-mare'
Givenchy zhivon-shee
Gorizia, Italian; Austrian, Görz, or Göritz
Gorlice Gorleet'sa
Grabiowiec grabyo'vyets
Grafenstafel grah'fens-tah'fel
Gravelotte grahv'lot
Grootfontein grote'fontane
Grybow gree-boff'
Guise gheeze

Haelen hah'len
Haftdewan dewan'
Haisnes aynes
Halicz ha'litch
Hartmannsweilerkopf vilerkopf

Haute Chevauches ote-shevoshe'
Hazebrouck ha'ze-browk
Heldhoek helt'hook
Herzegovina vee'na
Hulluch hoollookh

Inovolodz eenov'olodge
Issy les Molineaux issee-lay-mo-lano'
Ivangorod eevango'rod

Jasiolda River yashold'a
Jazarzew ya'zar-zef
Jena yay'na

Kalisz kalish
Kaluszin ka-loosh'in
Karun River karoon'
Katchanik katcha'nik
Keetmanshoop kate-mans-hope
Kekkau kek-cow
Khorassan san'
Kiao-Chau kee-ah-o-chow'
Kielce Hills kyel'tse
Kniashevatz knya-zhevatz
Koprikeui koy
Korelitchy korell'itchy
Koziany kotsee-ah'ny
Koziowa kotsee-o'va
Kragujevatz goo'ye-vats
Kuczurmik koot'soormik
Kum Kale koom-kah'leh
Kuprikeui see Koprikeui
Kurische Haff koo'risheh
Kurschany koorsha'nee
Kurumum kooromoon

La Bassée bassay'
La Cour de Soupir coor-de-soopee'
La Fére fair
Le Ferté Gaucher go-shay'
La Fontaine-aux-Charmes fonten-o-sharm
Landrecies lan-dres-see'
Le Cateau catto'
Le Mesnil mez-neel'
Liège lee-ezh'
Loos lohs
Losnitza lozh-nee'tsa
Louvain loovang'
Ludihorecza loodihor'etcha

Magyars mad'yars
Malines maleen'

Massiges masseezh'
Maubeuge ma-bözh'
Maupertuis mo-per-twee'
Meaux mo'
Memel may'mell
Mendawi men-da'wee
Menin-Ypres eepr'
Messines messeen'
Meurthe mört
Meuse Valley möz'
Mézières mez-yare'
Mezo-Laborcz laborts'
Miedzyrzets mezheretch'ye
Miraumont meeromong'
Mitau (Russ.) meeta'va
Mlawa mla'va
Mocziska mot-chees'ka
Mohileff mo-ghee-leff'
Mojkovac mozh'kovats
Monastryzek monastree'zhek
Monfalcone mon-fal-co'neh
Montfaucon mon-fo-kong'
Montmirail mongmee-rye'
Moronvillers morongveeyay'
Moselle mo-zell'
Mount Croce cro'cheh
Mt. Lovcen lof'chen
Mount Turchenkeui koy'
Mount Viatrovka vyatrof'ka
Muchavka moo-chaf'ka
Munkacs moon-katsh'

Nagy Polena nady
Namur nammür'
Neu Sandek noi-zan'dek
Nida River nee'da
Niemen River nee'men
Nieuport neev'port
Nizankowice nee-zan'ko-vits
Nouvron noo-vrong'
Novo Radowsk ra'dofsk
Novy-Sacz satch

Oikovice o-ee-ko'vits
Oise wahz'
Old Zuczka Tsootch'ka
Opoczno opoch'no
Orsova or'shova
Ourcq oork'
Ourthe oort'

Pancsova pantch'ova
Pas de Calais pa-de-callay'
Passchendaele pass'ken-dahl
Pervyse per-vie'zeh
Pilaskowice pilasko'vits
Pilisca pee-leets'a
Pilwiszki pill-vish'ki
Pinczow pinchoff
Piotrkow pyotter-koff
Ploegsteert ploog'stairt
Poelcapelle pool-capel'leh
Pomme-Py pom-pee'
Pouillon pooee-yong'
Pozzachio pod-zak'kio
Prague prahg'
Proszowicz prosh-o'vitz
Pruszkow proosh'koff
Przeczyca pzhe-sheet'sa
Przemysl pzhay'misl
Pusterthal Railway poos'ter-tahl

Quennevières ken-vyare'
Quinchy kanshee'

Rajac rah'yats
Ramscappelle rams-ca-pel'leh
Rawa ra'va
Rawa-Ruska ra'va-roos'ka
Reillon ray-eeyong'
Rheims ranz'
Riga ree'ga
Roclincourt roclan-coor'
Roubaix roo-bay'
Rouen roo-ong'
Roulers roo-lay'
Roye Rwah'
Rue d'Ouvert doovair'
Rue du Marais marray'
Rzezow zheshoff

Sadowa-Wisznia sado'va-vish'nya
Saghandere sa-gan-day'reh
Saint Dié san-dee-eh'
St. Eloi ell-wa'
Saint-Hilaire santil-lair'
St. Menehould main-ool'
St. Mihiel mee-yel'
Saint-Souplet soo-play'
Saloniki sa-lo-ni'ki
Sarajevo serra-yay'vo
Save River sah-veh
Scheldt skelt
Schoorbakke shore-bak'keh
Senlis sen-lee'
Skierniewice skyer'nee-vits

Soldau zol'dow
Souain soo-ang'
Souchez soo-shay'
Stryj stree
Strypa stree'pa
Suwalki Province soo'vak
Szaki shak'ee
Szczezerzyny shtchet'ser-tseenee

Tarnoviec tar-no-viets
Telepovce telepoft'seh
Tepe teh'peh
Thann tann'
Thiaucourt tee-o-coor'
Tilicz Pass tillish
Tomaszow toh-mash'off
Tourcoing toor-kwang'
Tournai toor-nay
Trier: German for Trèves
Trou Bricot troo-briko'

Ustanov oos-ta'noff
Uzsok ootsok

Varennes va-renn
Vauquois voh-kwa'
Veldhoek felt'hook
Vereczke veresh'keh
Verlorenhoek ferlo'ren-hook
Visnyvtszyk vis-nift-sheek
Vlamertinghe fla'mer-tin-gay
Volovco volof'tso
Vosges vohzh'
Vouziers vooz-yea
Vysztyt Lake vishtit

Waerloos var'lohs
Wieliczka vee'lish-ka
Windhoek vind'hook
Woevre wo-ayvr'
Wola - Szydlowieca vola - sheed - lo-veets'a
Wyszkow Pass vish'koff
Wytschaete vite-shah'teh

Ypres eep'r
Yser ee'zer

Zaleszczyki za-lesh-chik'ee
Zamszysko zam'shees-ko
Zandvoord zant'fort
Zeebrugge zay'broog-geb

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